Migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain: a study employing automated analysis into the presence of hate and sentiment Migrantes y refugiados en Twitter en España: estudio de la presencia de odio y del sentimiento a partir de un análisis automatizado doxa.comunicación | nº 38, pp. 369-389 | 369 January-June of 2024ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978How to cite this article: Barradas Gurruchaga, A.; Blanco-Herrero, D.; Arcila-Calderón, C. and Sánchez-Holgado, P. (2024). Migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain: a study employing automated analysis into the presence of hate and sentiment. Doxa Comunicación, 38, pp. 369-389.https://doi.org/10.31921/doxacom.n38a1734David Blanco-Herrero. Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam. He has a PhD from the Universidad de Salamanca, a Master’s in Audio-visual Communication (Universidad de Salamanca), and degrees in Journalism (Universidad a Distancia de Madrid) and Business Administration (Universidad de León). He is a member of the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) and his main lines of research are in journalistic ethics, disinformation and hate speech. He is an editor of the Electronic Yearbook on Studies in Social Communication “Disertaciones”. He has also worked as a journalist and collaborated with radio and digital media, particularly on international aairs and audio-visual culture. University of Salamanca, Spain / University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands[email protected] / [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0002-7414-2998Carlos Arcila-Calderón. Full Professor in the Department of Sociology and Communication of the Universidad de Salamanca (Spain). Member of the Audio-visual Content Observatory (OCA) and Professor of the Doctorate in Training in the Knowledge Society. Editor of the Electronic Yearbook on Studies in Social Communication “Disertaciones”. He has a European Doctorate in “Communication, Social Change and Development” from the Complutense University of Madrid. Master’s in Data Science and a Master’s in Journalism, both from the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos (URJC).  University of Salamanca, Spain[email protected]ORCID: 0000-0002-2636-2849Andrés Barradas Gurruchaga. PhD in Communication from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Full-time Professor at the Tecnológico de Monterrey (Mexico). He has conducted research into areas of audio-visual communication and the creative industries, contributing to scientic papers and books. Both scriptwriter and director of short lms shown at lm festivals such as Cannes. He has addressed audiences in Latin America, the US and Spain. A member of the Mexican Association of Communication Researchers and of the Spanish Association of Communication Research. He spent a sabbatical research period at the Universidad de Salamanca, Spain. He has been the Director of the degree in Communication and Digital Media, Regional Director of the Department of Creative Industries, Research Professor, and Post-graduate Professor of the Master’s in Finance at the EGADE Business School.Tecnológico de Monterrey, Mexico[email protected]ORCID: 0000-0001-9020-6659is content is published under Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License. International License CC BY-NC 4.0

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370 | nº 38, pp. 369-389 | January-June of 2024Migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain: a study employing automated analysis into the presence of hate and sentimentISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónReceived: 02/07/2023 - Accepted: 08/09/2023 - Early access: 23/10/2023 - Published: 01/01/2024Recibido: 02/07/2023 - Aceptado: 08/09/2023 - En edición: 23/10/2023 - Publicado: 01/01/2024Abstract:Hate speech directed towards migrants and refugees poses one of the greatest challenges in communication on social networks. By means of an automated analysis of 124,337 messages about migration collected on Twitter in Spain between 2015 and 2020, the presence of hate and the underlying sentiment in the discourse are analysed, as is their development and the possible dierences between Spanish regions. It has been observed that, although greater attention was paid to migration in 2015 and 2016, the core years of the Mediterranean refugee crisis, the greatest volume of hate was detected in 2019 and 2020, following the rise of Vox and its anti-immigration rhetoric. In general, the sentiment in these messages was negative, although the dierence is slight between those expressing hate and those which do not. Finally, dierences have been observed between Spanish regions, with Asturias having the greatest presence of hate and Cantabria showing the most negative sentiment; such dierences, however, are not great and no clear patterns have been detected to explain them.Keywords:Immigration; racism & xenophobia; hate speech; social networks; sentiment analysis; Twitter.Resumen:El discurso de odio dirigido hacia personas migrantes y refugiadas plan-tea uno de los mayores desafíos en la comunicación en redes sociales. A través del análisis automatizado de 124.337 mensajes sobre migra-ción recogidos en Twitter en España entre 2015 y 2020, se analiza la presencia de odio y el sentimiento subyacente en el discurso, así como su evolución y las posibles diferencias entre comunidades autónomas. Se ha observado que, aunque la atención prestada a la cuestión migra-toria fue superior en 2015 y 2016, años centrales de la crisis de refugia-dos del Mediterráneo, el mayor volumen de odio se detectó en 2019 y 2020, tras el ascenso de Vox y su retórica anti-inmigración. En general, el sentimiento de estos mensajes fue negativo, si bien la diferencia entre aquellos que tienen odio y los que no es reducida. Por último, se han observado diferencias entre regiones autónomas, siendo Asturias la de mayor presencia de odio y Cantabria la que muestra un sentimiento más negativo; estas diferencias, no obstante, no son elevadas y no se han detectado patrones claros que las expliquen.Palabras clave:Inmigración; racismo y xenofobia; discurso de odio; redes sociales; aná-lisis de sentimientos; Twitter.Patricia Sánchez-Holgado. Researcher at the Universidad de Salamanca and member of the Audio-visual Content Observatory. Graduate in Advertising and Public Relations (Complutense University of Madrid). She is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Languages and Education in Nebrija University in Madrid and in the Faculty of Communication at the Universidad Ponticia de Salamanca. An expert on Big Data (Universidad Ponticia de Salamanca) with a Master’s degree in Science, Technology and Innovation Studies (Universidad de Oviedo). University of Salamanca, Spain[email protected]ORCID: 0000-0002-6253-70871. Introduction Since the late XXth century Spain has been considered to be a country that receives foreigners (Lacomba et al., 2020), a phenomenon that has generated press interest and presence since the 1990s and 2000s (Seoane-Pérez, 2017). Migratory pressure on the European Union has increased more recently, becoming a central aspect of political and media discourse (Greussing & Boomgarden, 2017).Although the causes had come earlier, it was in 2015 that migratory ows towards the European Union reached a volume and attention rarely seen (Splinder, 2015), especially after the discovery of the lifeless body of the young boy Aylan Kurdi in September on a Turkish beach, an event with considerable media impact (Mielczarek, 2018), which represented a turning point in coverage of the crisis (Zhang & Hellmueller, 2017). roughout 2016, migratory ows towards the European Union

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doxa.comunicación | nº 38, pp. 369-389 January-June of 2024Andrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón and Patricia Sánchez-HolgadoISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 371began to shift to the central Mediterranean following an agreement between the EU and Turkey, which reduced the number of arrivals through Greece, until that point the country with the highest number of immigrants and asylum seekers. Both the election of Donald Trump in the United States and the victory of Brexit in the United Kingdom, two events with strong nationalist and anti-immigration components (Joppke, 2020), caused immigration as an issue to remain in the media’s eye. e Strait of Gibraltar began to reappear as a route in 2017, and 2018 saw Spain become the European country with the most refugees and migrants arriving by sea, mainly along the coasts of Andalusia, via the eastern Mediterranean route, in part after the tighter measures imposed by the Italian government and, in particular, by the Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini. In June, the Spanish government decided to accept 630 migrants on board the Aquarius in the port of Valencia after the refusal of their Italian counterparts (CEAR, 2019). ere was a decrease in the number of arrivals to Spain in 2020 as a result of the health crisis and, in general, in the international movement of people, though this increased again intensely in the latter months of the year, especially to the Canary Islands (CEAR, 2021).ese events, apart from inuencing the social and political situation, had certain protagonism in the media. In fact, there is widespread agreement in academia about the media’s treatment of migration, which tends to be negative, simplistic, stereotyped and with a lack of focus on individual stories (Igartua et al., 2007; Muñiz, Igartua & Otero, 2006; Fajardo Fernández & Soriano Miras, 2016; Eberl et al., 2018), something which is also applicable to coverage of the refugee crisis from 2015 on (Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017; Brändle, Eisele &Trenz 2019; Fengler et al., 2020). is type of representations reinforces the association of immigration and foreigners with out-groups, according to Tajfel and social identity theory (1978), in turn generating less acceptance of immigrants (Esses et al., 2005).It is true that attitudes towards immigration in Spain tend to be among the most favourable in the European Union, as conrmed by several Eurobarometers (European Commission, 2019; 2022) and international surveys (Pew Research Center, 2021). However, the presence of hate speech and rejection of migrants and refugees on social networks is a matter of growing concern (Arcila Calderón, Blanco-Herrero & Valdez Apolo, 2020), partly as a result of the increase in numbers of hate crimes against the group (OSCE, sf).at is why this study seeks to analyse public discussion in Spain on the social network Twitter between 2015 and 2020, paying particular attention to the presence of hate and the underlying sentiments in said discourse. e study aims to continue contributing to the still small amount of research that use computational techniques to address the issue, oering an analysis of a large corpus of data. Furthermore, the study aims to ll the existing gap regarding longitudinal approaches that allow observation of the phenomenon’s development over time. Such studies, in addition to the scientic knowledge they provide, are key to proposing possible strategic actions a posteriori to combat hate and rejection, both online and in other settings.2. Hate speech towards migrants and refugeesAs noted in the previous section, the presence of expressions of hate, discrimination and rejection has become a phenomenon of some concern, fuelled by anti-immigration discourse (Arcila-Calderón, de la Vega & Blanco-Herrero, 2020), due to generally negative coverage in the media (Schemer, 2012) and by the communication model itself on social networks, an environment in which these types of expressions have increased exponentially in comparison with physical space (Rollnert Liern, 2020).
372 | nº 38, pp. 369-389 | January-June of 2024Migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain: a study employing automated analysis into the presence of hate and sentimentISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónFocusing on hate speech, this can be dened as apology, promotion or incitement in any form, denigration, hatred or vilication on the part of a person or group of people, as well as harassment, insult, negative stereotyping, stigmatisation or threat regarding one or more people (European Commission against Racism & Intolerance, 2005). us, hate speech attacks the dignity of the defamed communities, which are deprived of their right to be considered t for society (Díaz Soto, 2015). Added to this is the fact that hate speech may act as a precursor to violent hate crimes (Müller & Schwarz, 2020), exacerbating the problem.at is why numerous public and private institutions are striving to stop or combat hate speech, especially on social networks (Andres & Slivko, 2021). In the particular case of Twitter, its rules establish that “you may not encourage violence against other people or attack or threaten them directly (Twitter, 2022).”Hate speech with racist or xenophobic motivation is of particular concern, in addition to its signicant presence on digital platforms, it is the commonest type of hate crime registered both in Spain and in the majority of neighbouring countries (OSCE, n.d.). It is precisely discourse of this type, which is largely directed at migrants and refugees1, that will be examined in this study.Content published on Twitter will be used for this analysis, given that, although it is not the most widely used network in Spain, it is, due to its characteristics, one of the most inuential in public discourse, as it is the most relevant and widely used by journalists and media, as well as by politicians and institutions (Rodríguez & Ureña, 2011; Campos-Domínguez, 2017). Furthermore, Twitter, like other social networks, oers a valuable source of information for the analysis of public opinion and citizens’ attitudes, even overcoming some of the limitations posed by survey-based studies (Arcila Calderón, Blanco-Herrero & Valdez Apolo, 2020). Moreover, this network, with its easy virilisation of content, its popularity, simplicity of discourse and speed of communication displays elements that summarise the attributes of Web 2.0 (Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013), along with the capacity for dissemination oered by retweets, which together make this the ideal platform for disseminating information and opinion (Moragas-Fernández, Grau-Masot & Capdevila-Gómez, 2019). is also contributes to the tendency on Twitter to create homogeneous communities that become echo chambers (Gruzd & Roy, 2014), where individuals are only exposed to information that conrms their ideas, contributing to radicalisation (Yardi & Boyd, 2010). And partly derived from that, the network is considered one of the most problematic for the dissemination of rejection discourse, both by“the public repercussion of what is disseminated on this social network, and which increases the social alarm of the discourse expressed in it, as well as the greater methodological simplicity that observation on this social network entails compared to others 1 Although no distinctions will be made in this text, it should be pointed out that there are dierences between the terms ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’. Since the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is considered to be a “person who, due to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of their nationality and is unable or, because of such fears, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country; or who, lacking nationality and nding themselves, as a result of such events, outside the country of their former habitual residence, cannot or, due to such fears, is unwilling to return to it” (International Organization for Migration, 2019) . e IOM includes in the same glossary the word ‘migrant’ as “an umbrella term not dened under international law reecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons” (International Organization for Migration, 2019).
doxa.comunicación | nº 38, pp. 369-389 January-June of 2024Andrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón and Patricia Sánchez-HolgadoISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 373(Facebook, social forums) in which “censorship” of violent discourse is swifter and in which it is more dicult to access a large and homogeneous sample of discourse […]. Short messages are published on Twitter that, although they may contain complex information, are unlikely to contain the nuances of communication found in other places where this limitation does not exist. Since the objective of this study is to dene a basic taxonomy of violent discourse, I consider it appropriate to focus analysis on this type of more basic messages” (Miró Llinares, 2016, p. 86).For these reasons, the study of discourse on this platform focused on migrants and refugees is of special relevance, as shown by previous studies (Kreis, 2017). Before addressing hate speech, it is worth evaluating the attention generated by migratory phenomena. It has been considered that interest in the Mediterranean refugee crisis in Spain came somewhat late (Seoane-Pérez, 2017), and that the rise of Vox, with its anti-immigration discourse, led to an increase in interest in this matter in political discourse (Castromil, Rodríguez-Díaz & Garrigós, 2020). At the same time, the prominence of immigration in the media has been considered a factor which may increase the appeal of anti-immigration parties (Damstra et al., 2019; Dennison & Geddes, 2019; Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou & Wodak, 2018). erefore, and by way of contextualisation, we pose the following research question:RQ1: How did the presence of content about migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain change between 2015 and 2020?In line with the above, it is known that rejection and hatred are not immutable categories but are marked by social and media events. In fact, news events have been observed to aect both the quantity and characteristics of hate speech directed at migrants and refugees (Arcila-Calderón et al., 2021). At the same time, one must take into account the fact that citizens’ attitudes are not unchanging, but uctuate over time, as reected in periodic surveys such as Eurobarometer. And the same is true of media coverage of an issue, in this case migration (Amores, Arcila-Calderón & Blanco-Herrero, 2020; Zhang & Hellmueller, 2017).For this reason, it is necessary to consider what eects oine events may have had on the volume of hate speech expressed on Twitter towards migrants and refugees, which is why the following research question is posed:RQ2: How did the presence of hate speech towards migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain change between 2015 and 2020?e existence of dierences between countries is evident, but also within a country itself, as reected in the study by Arcila-Calderón et al. (2022) on which this study is based. In order to examine more closely any possible dierences between the dierent regions of Spain, both regarding the presence of this issue and the proportion of hate speech, the following research questions are posed:RQ3.1: In which Spanish regions was there a greater presence of content about migrants and refugees on Twitter between 2015 and 2020?RQ3.2: In which Spanish regions was there a greater presence of hate speech towards migrants and refugees on Twitter between 2015 and 2020?Finally, numerous studies have used sentiment analysis to address the representation of migrants and refugees, both in the mass media (Backfried & Shalunts, 2016) and on social networks (Heidenreich et al., 2020). e study of feelings associated with the discourse around migrants and refugees –the connection of which to hate speech has already been identied by Arcila-Calderón et al. (2021)– allows a greater understanding of the attitudes and forms of expression that surround this
374 | nº 38, pp. 369-389 | January-June of 2024Migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain: a study employing automated analysis into the presence of hate and sentimentISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónmatter. Such analysis of feelings in language is important due to the role that negativity or the presence of incivility has in radicalising and polarising discourses (Robles et al., 2022). Hameleers, van der Meer and Vliegenthart (2022) have analysed the convergence between negativity, incivility, hate speech and misinformation, adding layers to the problem. De León and Trilling (2021) have found that political content with negative tones is more frequently shared and achieves greater reach. And Yordakul (2021) even points out that negative emotions have a greater eect on political decision-making. at is why the following research question is posed:RQ4.1: Was there a correlation between the presence of hate and sentiment expressed in content about migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain between 2015 and 2020?RQ4.2: How did the sentiment expressed in content about migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain change between 2015 and 2020?RQ4.3: Were there dierences between the Spanish regions in relation to the sentiment expressed in content about migrants and refugees on Twitter between 2015 and 2020?3. MethodologyIn order to achieve these objectives, the database of tweets used in the work of Arcila-Calderón et al. has been utilised. (2022). Tweets focused on the phenomena of migration and asylum were compiled between 2015 and 2020 using the Academic Research product track that Twitter’s Application Programming Interface (API) makes available to academic researchers. In order to locate the contents, the keywords ‘migrant’, ‘migrants’, ‘immigrant’, ‘immigrants’, ‘refugee’, ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘asylum seekers’ were employed. e next step was to exclude retweets and responses and only select geolocated content, this was so that local analyses could be carried out with greater reliability; in fact, the use of this type of messages is one of the main strengths of the study, since, although it signicantly reduces the amount of content available, it allows us to guarantee the quality of the analysis, knowing its location with certainty and being able to make regional comparisons. Finally, the downloaded contents were analysed utilising a previously validated automatic hate detection tool (Vrysis et al., 2021) and again reset for the work of Arcila-Calderón et al. (2022).Only Spanish data has been utilised for this study, a total of 124,337 tweets, which were passed through the detector to determine the presence of hate. e presence or absence of hate was measured using a scale between 0 and 1, with 0 representing absence and 1 the presence of hate. Similarly, in order to respond to RQ4, sentiment in the messages analysed was evaluated between -1, negative, and 1, positive. An automatic classication tool based on the SentiStrength algorithm, developed by elwall et al. (2010), was also used for the same purpose. Although a study of sentiment was also carried out utilising a tool developed from a lexicon composed ad hoc, the tool based on SentiStrength was chosen due to its generalised validity and for allowing easier replicability and comparison. e option of employing other scales of sentiment that could lead to greater variety and detail in the analysis was also evaluated –for example, through the basic emotions developed by Fernández-Abascal, Palmero and Breva (2002) and Chóliz and Gómez ( 2002)–, however, a binary classication between positivity and negativity was nally chosen, since it is
doxa.comunicación | nº 38, pp. 369-389 January-June of 2024Andrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón and Patricia Sánchez-HolgadoISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 375precisely negativity, and not a specic type of feeling, that has been associated with phenomena such as polarisation (Buder et al., 2021) or with a greater aective reaction (Soroka & McAdams, 2015). It is precisely these connections that our work seeks to evaluate, since they are what may lead to an accentuation or radicalisation of hate speech. is type of study also promotes the use of the SentiStrength tool, which is widely used internationally and has a greater capacity for replication. Once the presence of hate and the underlying sentiment in the 124,337 items in the study had been considered, metadata such as the date of publication or the place of publication (NUTS2, which corresponds to the regions of Spain) was also identied, which allowed us to examine the temporal and spatial distribution of both hate and sentiment in greater depth. With this, various statistical tests were carried out to answer the research questions posed, mainly descriptive and frequency analyses and median comparison tests.4. Results4.1. Presence of content relative to migrants and refugeesAs indicated above, the 124,337 geolocated messages were obtained over a period of six years, between 2015 and 2020. e total number of messages collected each year was: in 2015, 24,001; in 2016, 28,614; in 2017, 17,246; in 2018, 19,963; in 2019, 19,337; and in 2020, 15,176. Figure 1 shows graphically that there are dierences, and that the number of messages in 2016 is close to double that of 2020, which may indicate greater interest in the issue.Figure 1. Annual number of messages about migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain between 2015 and 2020 Figura 1. Evolución anual de los mensajes sobre migrantes y refugiados en Twitter en España entre 2015 y 2020 Fuente: elaboración propia La Figura 2, por su parte, permite observar la cantidad de mensajes sobre migrantes y refugiados recogidos cada día, entre el 1 de enero de 2015 y el 31 de diciembre de 2020. Se observan una serie de picos, el mayor de ellos en septiembre de 2015, momento en el que las llegadas de solicitantes de asilo a la Unión Europeo se convirtieron en un foco de interés mediático, en gran medida tras la publicación de la foto de Aylan Kurdi ahogado en una playa turca. La cantidad de mensajes se mantuvo alto en 2016, con un importante pico en marzo de ese mes, coincidiendo con la firma de un acuerdo entre la Unión Europea y Turquía para evitar las llegadas masivas a Grecia. En junio de 2018 se alcanza otro pico importante a raíz de lo sucedido con el barco Aquarius, que acabó desembarcando en España. En 2020 se observan valores generalmente bajos, sobre todo a causa de la pandemia, que además de frenar durante muchos meses casi todos los movimientos internacionales, concentró notablemente la atención en los temas de salud, en detrimento de cualquier otra materia. ϬϱϬϬϬϭϬϬϬϬϭϱϬϬϬϮϬϬϬϬϮϱϬϬϬϯϬϬϬϬϯϱϬϬϬϮϬϭϱϮϬϭϲϮϬϭϳϮϬϭϴϮϬϭϵϮϬϮϬSource: created by the authors
376 | nº 38, pp. 369-389 | January-June of 2024Migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain: a study employing automated analysis into the presence of hate and sentimentISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónFigure 2 allows us to observe the number of messages about migrants and refugees collected each day, between January 1, 2015, and December 31, 2020. A series of peaks can be seen, the largest of them in September 2015, at which point in time the arrivals of asylum seekers to the European Union became a focus of media interest, largely after the publication of the photo of Aylan Kurdi, dead by drowning on a Turkish beach. e number of messages remained high in 2016, with a signicant peak in March of that year, coinciding with the signing of an agreement between the European Union and Turkey to prevent massive arrivals in Greece. Another major peak was reached in June 2018 as a result of what happened with the Aquarius, a ship which ended up disembarking in Spain. Generally low values are observed in 2020, principally due to the pandemic, which in addition to stopping almost all international movement for many months, notably focused attention on health issues, to the detriment of all other matters.Figure 2. Daily number of messages about migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain between 2015 and 2020 Figura 2. Evolución diaria de los mensajes sobre migrantes y refugiados en Twitter en España entre 2015 y 2020 Fuente: elaboración propia 4.2. Presencia de discurso de odio contra migrantes y refugiados Centrándonos ahora en la presencia de odio, debemos empezar señalando que de los 124.337 tweets recogidos sobre el tema, un total de 27.468 tweets incluyeron muestras de odio y rechazo superiores al 0,5, lo que podría ya considerarse una forma de discurso de odio consistente. Esto supone un 22,1%, es decir, más de una quinta parte de la conversación alrededor de cuestiones migratorias en Twitter en España. Al mismo tiempo, la media de discurso de odio presente en el conjunto de la muestra es de 0,287 (DT=0,264). Se puede observar que esta proporción tampoco es estable, y varía con el tiempo, como se muestra en la Figura 3. De hecho, si realizamos la prueba Anova de un factor para muestras independientes, comprobamos que las diferencias son estadísticamente significativas; así, el estadístico F de Welch es significativo [F(5, 54378,503)=90,863, p<0,001], mientras las pruebas post-hoc realizadas (T3 de Dunnett) indican que la media de odio en el año 2017 (M=0,256; DT=0,251) fue significativamente inferior al resto de años, mientras que 2020 (M=0,303; DT=0,76), 2019 (M=0,301; DT=0,277) y 2015 (M=0,300; DT=0,262) tuvieron una media de odio significativamente superior al resto de años, con 2018 (M=0,276; DT=0,262) y 2016 (M=0,283; DT=0,255) ofreciendo valores intermedios. Se puede apreciar que la presencia de odio es mayor en los años iniciales y, sobre todo, finales, con menor relevancia en los años centrales de la muestra. Los valores iniciales pueden explicarse por la prominencia que el tema migratorio tuvo en los años 2015 y 2016, en los que los medios informaban de grandes volúmenes de personas, a menudo retratadas ϬϭϬϬϮϬϬϯϬϬϰϬϬϱϬϬϲϬϬϳϬϬϴϬϬϬϭͲĞŶĞͲϭϱϬϭͲĞŶĞͲϭϲϬϭͲĞŶĞͲϭϳϬϭͲĞŶĞͲϭϴϬϭͲĞŶĞͲϭϵϬϭͲĞŶĞͲϮϬSource: created by the authors4.2. Presence of hate speech against migrants and refugeesTurning now to the presence of hate, it is important to begin by pointing out that of the 124,337 tweets collected on the issue, a total of 27,468 tweets included samples of hate and rejection greater than 0.5, which could already be considered a form of consistent hate speech. is represents 22.1%, that is, over a fth of the conversation around migration issues on Twitter in Spain. At the same time, the average value for hate speech present in the whole sample is 0.287 (SD=0.264).It can be seen that this proportion is not stable, and varies over time, as shown in Figure 3. In fact, carrying out the one-way Anova test for independent samples veries that the dierences are statistically signicant; us, Welch’s F statistic is
doxa.comunicación | nº 38, pp. 369-389 January-June of 2024Andrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón and Patricia Sánchez-HolgadoISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 377signicant [F(5, 54378.503)=90.863, p<0.001], while the post-hoc tests carried out (Dunnett’s T3) indicate that the average hate rate in 2017 (M =0.256; SD=0.251) was signicantly lower than the other years considered, while 2020 (M=0.303; SD=0.76), 2019 (M=0.301; SD=0.277) and 2015 (M=0.300; SD=0.262) had a signicantly higher average hate rate than the other years, with 2018 (M=0.276; SD=0.262) and 2016 (M=0.283; SD=0.255) oering intermediate values.It can be seen that the presence of hate is greater in the early and, above all, later years, with less weight in the central years of the sample. e initial values can be explained by the prominence that migration had as an issue in 2015 and 2016, when the media reported large volumes of people, often portrayed as masses (Amores, Arcila-Calderón & Blanco-Herrero, 2020), arriving in the European Union. Recent years, although general interest has declined, and contrary to what might be expected, the values have seen an increase, which in 2019 and 2020 coincided with the rise of Vox, a party with a nationalist and anti-immigration discourse, causing this type of discourse, which until then had been of little importance, to gain weight in Spain (Ferreira, 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019).Figure 3. Annual changes in the presence of hate speech towards migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain between 2015 and 2020 como masas (Amores, Arcila-Calderón & Blanco-Herrero, 2020), llegando a la Unión Europea. Los últimos años, si bien el interés general ha decaído, y en contra de lo que cabría esperar, se produce un aumento, que en los años 2019 y 2020 coincide con el ascenso de Vox, un partido con un discurso nacionalista y anti-inmigración, haciendo que en España ganasen peso este tipo de discursos, que hasta entonces habían resultado poco relevantes (Ferreira, 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). Figura 3. Evolución anual de la presencia de discurso de odio hacia migrantes y refugiados en Twitter en España entre 2015 y 2020 Fuente: elaboración propia 4.3. Diferencias regionales Hay que señalar, en primer lugar, que la mayor atención al tema se da en las regiones más pobladas, de manera que Madrid, Cataluña y Andalucía acumulan una mayor cantidad de mensajes sobre migrantes y refugiados. La Figura 4 resume la cantidad de contenidos sobre el tema recogidos en cada comunidad autónoma. Sin embargo, esta distribución no se corresponde con la proporción de odio detectado, donde las regiones con mayor odio son Asturias y Castilla-La Mancha. Las pruebas de contraste de medias muestran que existen diferencias significativas entre las regiones españolas [F(17, 13157,451)=27,802, p<0,001], y las pruebas post hoc confirman estas diferencias. Así, la media de odio detectada en Asturias (M=0,323, DT=0,285) y en Castilla-La Mancha (M=0,318, DT=0,280) es significativamente superior a la detectada en Comunidad Valenciana (M=0,295, DT=0,268), Islas Canarias (M=0,292, DT=0,264), Madrid (M=0,282, DT=0,263), Melilla (M=0,276, DT=0,235) Extremadura (M=0,272, DT=0,258), Cataluña (M=0,267, DT=0,255), País Vasco (M=0,261, DT=0,248) y Navarra (M=0,257, DT=0,250). También en el caso de las Ϭ͕ϮϯϬ͕ϮϰϬ͕ϮϱϬ͕ϮϲϬ͕ϮϳϬ͕ϮϴϬ͕ϮϵϬ͕ϯϬ͕ϯϭϮϬϭϱϮϬϭϲϮϬϭϳϮϬϭϴϮϬϭϵϮϬϮϬSource: created by the authors
378 | nº 38, pp. 369-389 | January-June of 2024Migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain: a study employing automated analysis into the presence of hate and sentimentISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicación4.3. Regional dierencesFirstly, it should be noted that the greatest attention to the issue comes in the most populous regions, thus Madrid, Catalonia and Andalusia accumulate a greater volume of messages about migrants and refugees. Figure 4 summarises the amount of content on the question compiled in each region. However, the distribution does not correspond to the proportion of hatred detected, where the regions with the most hatred detected are Asturias and Castilla-La Mancha. Contrasting of averages shows that there are signicant dierences between the Spanish regions [F(17, 13157.451)=27.802, p<0.001], and post hoc tests conrm these dierences. us, the average value for hate detected in Asturias (M=0.323, SD=0.285) and in Castilla-La Mancha (M=0.318, SD=0.280) is signicantly higher than that detected in the Valencian Community (M=0.295, SD=0.268), Canary Islands (M=0.292, SD=0.264), Madrid (M=0.282, SD=0.263), Melilla (M=0.276, SD=0.235), Extremadura (M=0.272, SD=0.258), Catalonia (M= 0.267, SD=0.255), the Basque Country (M=0.261, SD=0.248), and Navarra (M=0.257, SD=0.250). In the case of the Balearic Islands (M=0.311, SD=0.278) the dierences were signicant with respect to the Community of Madrid, Extremadura, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Navarra. Figure 4. Number of messages about migrants and refugees by Spanish region on Twitter between 2015 and 2020 Islas Baleares (M=0,311, DT=0,278) las diferencias fueron significativas con respecto a Comunidad de Madrid, Extremadura, Cataluña, País Vasco y Navarra. Figura 4. Cantidad de mensajes sobre migrantes y refugiados por comunidad autónoma en Twitter en España entre 2015 y 2020 Fuente: elaboración propia La Figura 5 resume los datos anteriores. No se observan, en general, saltos pronunciados entre unas comunidades y otras, y tampoco se detectan patrones regionales (norte-sur, centro-periferia), ni ideológicos (la tendencia ideológica de los gobiernos regionales no sigue una tendencia clara), y tampoco lo hace la proporción de población inmigrante en cada región, como apuntaban Arcila-Calderón et al. (2022). El único elemento que parece intuirse es la presencia de las regiones con un mayor PIB per cápita (Madrid, País Vasco, Navarra y Cataluña) entre aquellas con menor presencia de odio. En cualquier caso, serán necesarios estudios más detallados que puedan arrojar luz sobre estas diferencias. ϬϱϬϬϬϭϬϬϬϬϭϱϬϬϬϮϬϬϬϬϮϱϬϬϬϯϬϬϬϬϯϱϬϬϬ"ŽŵƵŶŝĚĂĚ ĚĞ DĂĚƌŝĚ"ĂƚĂůƵŹĂ$ŶĚĂůƵĐşĂ"ŽŵƵŶŝĚĂĚ sĂůĞŶĐŝĂŶĂWĂşƐ sĂƐĐŽ"ĂƐƚŝůůĂ LJ >ĞſŶ/ƐůĂƐ "ĂŶĂƌŝĂƐ'ĂůŝĐŝĂZĞŐŝſŶ ĚĞ DƵƌĐŝĂ$ƌĂŐſŶ"ĂƐƚŝůůĂ Ͳ >Ă DĂŶĐŚĂWƌŝŶĐŝƉĂĚŽ ĚĞ $ƐƚƵƌŝĂƐ%džƚƌĞŵĂĚƵƌĂ/ƐůĂƐ !ĂůĞĂƌĞƐ"ŽŵƵŶŝĚĂĚ &ŽƌĂů ĚĞ EĂǀĂƌƌĂ"ĂŶƚĂďƌŝĂDĞůŝůůĂ>Ă ZŝŽũĂSource: created by the authors
doxa.comunicación | nº 38, pp. 369-389 January-June of 2024Andrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón and Patricia Sánchez-HolgadoISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 379Figure 5 summarises the above data. In general, clear dierences between the regions cannot be observed, be they pronounced jumps between one region and another, regional patterns (north-south, centre-periphery), ideological (the ideological tendency of regional governments does not follow a clear trend), nor even the proportion of the immigrant population in each region, as Arcila-Calderón et al. observed (2022). e only element that seems to be intuited is the presence of the regions with a higher GDP per capita (Madrid, the Basque Country, Navarra and Catalonia) among those with a lower presence of hate. In any case, more detailed studies will be necessary that can shed light on these dierences.Figure 5. Presence of hate speech towards migrants and refugees by region on Twitter in Spain between 2015 and 2020 Figura 5. Presencia de discurso de odio hacia migrantes y refugiados por comunidad autónoma en Twitter en España entre 2015 y 2020 Fuente: elaboración propia 4.4. Estudio de sentimientos Por último, el estudio del sentimiento muestra un valor medio de -0,125 (DT=0,229). Esto quiere decir que el sentimiento general de los tweets sobre migrantes y refugiados en España es ligeramente negativo. Existe una correlación significativamente negativa entre el sentimiento y la presencia de odio [R(124.031)=-0,068, p<0,001], es decir, un sentimiento más negativo está correlacionado con una mayor presencia de odio, aunque el efecto es de tamaño muy reducido. De hecho, si evaluamos exclusivamente los mensajes con una presencia de odio consistente (aquellos en los que el valor de la presencia de odio es superior al 0,5) el valor medio del sentimiento es de -0,151 (DT=0,226), es decir, muy ligeramente más negativo. Lo anterior es relevante porque implica una aproximación negativa al discurso centrado en migrantes y refugiados, algo particularmente habitual en aquellos mensajes con odio, pero no exclusivo de ellos. Es comprensible, puesto que incluso aquellos mensajes que no incluyen rechazo tienden a centrarse en los aspectos negativos de la migración o al drama que plantea, algo que concuerda con la cobertura que se suele realizar de la migración en los medios de ϬϬ͕ϬϱϬ͕ϭϬ͕ϭϱϬ͕ϮϬ͕ϮϱϬ͕ϯϬ͕ϯϱWƌŝŶĐŝƉĂĚŽ ĚĞ $ƐƚƵƌŝĂƐ"ĂƐƚŝůůĂ Ͳ >Ă DĂŶĐŚĂ/ƐůĂƐ !ĂůĞĂƌĞƐ'ĂůŝĐŝĂ$ŶĚĂůƵĐşĂ"ĂƐƚŝůůĂ LJ >ĞſŶ$ƌĂŐſŶZĞŐŝſŶ ĚĞ DƵƌĐŝĂ"ŽŵƵŶŝĚĂĚ sĂůĞŶĐŝĂŶĂ/ƐůĂƐ "ĂŶĂƌŝĂƐ"ĂŶƚĂďƌŝĂ%ƐƉĂŹĂ>Ă ZŝŽũĂ"ŽŵƵŶŝĚĂĚ ĚĞ DĂĚƌŝĚDĞůŝůůĂ%džƚƌĞŵĂĚƵƌĂ"ĂƚĂůƵŹĂWĂşƐ sĂƐĐŽ"ŽŵƵŶŝĚĂĚ &ŽƌĂů ĚĞ EĂǀĂƌƌĂSource: created by the authors
380 | nº 38, pp. 369-389 | January-June of 2024Migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain: a study employing automated analysis into the presence of hate and sentimentISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicación4.4. Study of sentimentsFinally, sentiment analysis shows an average value of -0.125 (SD=0.229). is means that the general sentiment in tweets concerning migrants and refugees in Spain is slightly negative. ere is a signicant negative correlation between sentiment and the presence of hate [R(124,031)=-0.068, p<0.001], that is to say, a more negative feeling is correlated with a greater presence of hate, although the eect is very slight. In fact, if we only evaluate messages with a consistent presence of hate (those in which the value of the presence of hate is greater than 0.5) the average value of sentiment is -0.151 (SD=0.226), in other words, very slightly more negative.e above is relevant because it implies a negative approach to discourse focused on migrants and refugees, something particularly common in hate messages, but not exclusive to them. is is understandable, since even messages that do not include rejection tend to focus on the negative aspects of migration or the drama it poses, something that is consistent with media coverage of migration (Fengler et al., 2020; Igartua et al., 2007). In fact, Spanish news stories about issues related to migration commonly focus on the Mediterranean, Ceuta and Melilla or the Canary Islands (Fajardo Fernández & Soriano Miras, 2016), that is, points of conict, where tragic events sometimes take place; in such cases, feelings of sadness or indignation over the death of a migrant would not be hatred but do represent negative sentiment.Looking more deeply at developments over time, there are signicant dierences between the dierent years [F(5, 100,459)=100.459, p<0.001]. e post hoc tests conrm that sentiment shows greater negativity in the years 2016 (M=-0.143, SD=0.216) and 2015 (M=-0.140, SD=0.215) than in the years 2020 (M=-0.121, SD=0.242), 2019 (M=-0.116, SD=0.248), 2017 (M=-0.110, SD=0.223) and, particularly, 2018 (M=-0.109, SD=0.239). Figure 6 shows these dierences more visually. One can see that it follows a pattern similar to the distribution of hatred (although inverted because it deals with negative values), with lower values in the middle years, although in the case of hatred the later years show the greatest presence, while the earlier years had the most negative feeling. is could be interpreted by the type of feelings associated with the information on migration generated in those years (López del Ramo & Humanes, 2016; Brändle, Eisele & Trenz, 2019; Amores, Arcila Calderón & Stanek, 2019), with cases of shipwrecks, detentions, overcrowding and stories with considerable impact in the media, such as the death of Aylan Kurdi or the discovery of a truck with dozens of suocated immigrants on the border between Austria and Hungary (Fleming, 2015).
doxa.comunicación | nº 38, pp. 369-389 January-June of 2024Andrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón and Patricia Sánchez-HolgadoISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 381Figure 6. Annual changes in the underlying sentiment in messages about migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain between 2015 and 2020 comunicación (Fengler et al., 2020; Igartua et al., 2007). De hecho, en el caso español, son habituales las historias sobre cuestiones relacionadas con la migración se centren en el Mediterráneo, Ceuta y Melilla o las Islas Canarias (Fajardo Fernández & Soriano Miras, 2016), es decir, puntos de conflicto, en los que en ocasiones se producen tragedias; en este sentido, un sentimiento de tristeza o indignación por la muerte de una persona migrante no sería odio, pero sí sentimiento negativo. Profundizando en la evolución temporal, existen diferencias significativas entre los distintos años [F(5, 100.459)=100,459, p<0,001]. Las pruebas post hoc confirman que el sentimiento es más negativo en los años 2016 (M=-0,143, DT=0,216) y 2015 (M=-0,140, DT=0,215) que en los años 2020 (M=-0,121, DT=0,242), 2019 (M=-0,116, DT=0,248), 2017 (M=-0,110, DT=0,223) y, sobre todo, 2018 (M=-0,109, DT=0,239). La Figura 6 muestra estas diferencias de manera más visual. Vemos que sigue un esquema semejante a la distribución del odio (aunque invertido por tratarse de valores negativos), con valores más reducidos en los años centrales, aunque en el caso del odio los años con mayor presencia eran los últimos, mientras que los años con sentimiento más negativo son los iniciales. Esto podría interpretarse por el tipo de sentimientos asociados a las informaciones sobre migración generadas esos años (López del Ramo & Humanes, 2016; Brändle, Eisele & Trenz, 2019; Amores, Arcila Calderón & Stanek, 2019), con casos de naufragios, detenciones, hacinamiento y casos de gran impacto mediático, como la muerte de Aylan Kurdi o el descubrimiento de un camión con decenas de inmigrantes asfixiados en la frontera entre Austria y Hungría (Fleming, 2015). Figura 6. Evolución anual del sentimiento subyacente en los mensajes sobre migrantes y refugiados en Twitter en España entre 2015 y 2020 Fuente: elaboración propia Por último, la comparación entre las comunidades autónomas vuelve a arrojar diferencias significativas [F(5, 100.459)=100,459, p<0,001]. En este caso Cantabria tiene un sentimiento significativamente más negativo (M=-0,148, DT=0,252) que Madrid (M=-0,121, DT=0,233), ͲϬ͕ϭϲͲϬ͕ϭϰͲϬ͕ϭϮͲϬ͕ϭͲϬ͕ϬϴͲϬ͕ϬϲͲϬ͕ϬϰͲϬ͕ϬϮϬϮϬϭϱϮϬϭϲϮϬϭϳϮϬϭϴϮϬϭϵϮϬϮϬSource: created by the authorsFinally, the comparison between the regions once again shows signicant dierences [F(5, 100.459)=100.459, p<0.001]. Cantabria has signicantly greater negative sentiment (M=-0.148, SD=0.252) than Madrid (M=-0.121, SD=0.233), Castilla and León (M=-0.120, SD=0.221), Murcia (M=-0.110, SD=0.235), Navarra (M=-0.106, SD=0.238) and Melilla (M=-0.076, SD=0.191). In the case of Asturias (M=-0.138, SD=0.224) the dierences are signicant when compared to Madrid, Murcia, Navarra, and Melilla. e case of Melilla is particularly striking, with signicantly less negative sentiment than all the other regions, except Navarra. Figure 7 summarises this data more graphically.
382 | nº 38, pp. 369-389 | January-June of 2024Migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain: a study employing automated analysis into the presence of hate and sentimentISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónFigure 7. Underlying sentiment in messages about migrants and refugees by region on Twitter in Spain between 2015 and 2020 Castilla y León (M=-0,120, DT=0,221), Región de Murcia (M=-0,110, DT=0,235), Navarra (M=-0,106, DT=0,238) y Melilla (M=-0,076, DT=0,191). En el caso de Asturias (M=-0,138, DT=0,224) las diferencias resultan significativas con Madrid, Murcia, Navarra y Melilla. Resulta particularmente llamativo el caso de Melilla, con un sentimiento significativamente menos negativo que todas las demás regiones, salvo Navarra. La Figura 7 resume estos datos de manera más visual. Figura 7. Sentimiento subyacente en los mensajes sobre migrantes y refugiados por comunidad autónoma en Twitter en España entre 2015 y 2020 Fuente: elaboración propia Aunque en estos casos sí observamos saltos más pronunciados que en lo que respecta a la presencia de odio, sobre todo en el caso de Melilla. En cualquier caso, el rango es reducido, y no llega a los 0,10 puntos en un rango ente -1 y +1. El orden tampoco parece obedecer a criterios claros, por lo que será necesario profundizar en potenciales causas que expliquen estas diferencias. 5. Conclusiones Comenzando por la PI1 sobre la evolución de los contenidos sobre migrantes y refugiados en Twitter en España, se puede afirmar que el interés ha venido marcado por sucesos de gran impacto mediático, siendo los años 2015 y 2016, los más relevantes de la crisis de refugiados, los que más atención se prestó a esta materia, como también confirma el interés académico sobre la relevancia que estos años tuvieron en la representación mediática de la migrción (Zhang & Hellmueller, 2017; Amores, Arcila-Calderón & Blanco-Herrero, 2020). Tras esos ͲϬ͕ϭϲͲϬ͕ϭϰͲϬ͕ϭϮͲϬ͕ϭͲϬ͕ϬϴͲϬ͕ϬϲͲϬ͕ϬϰͲϬ͕ϬϮϬDĞůŝůůĂ"ŽŵƵŶŝĚĂĚ &ŽƌĂů ĚĞ EĂǀĂƌƌĂZĞŐŝſŶ ĚĞ DƵƌĐŝĂ/ƐůĂƐ !ĂůĞĂƌĞƐ"ĂƐƚŝůůĂ LJ >ĞſŶ"ŽŵƵŶŝĚĂĚ ĚĞ DĂĚƌŝĚ/ƐůĂƐ "ĂŶĂƌŝĂƐ%ƐƉĂŹĂ%džƚƌĞŵĂĚƵƌĂ"ŽŵƵŶŝĚĂĚ sĂůĞŶĐŝĂŶĂ$ŶĚĂůƵĐşĂ'ĂůŝĐŝĂWĂşƐ sĂƐĐŽ"ĂƚĂůƵŹĂ>Ă ZŝŽũĂ$ƌĂŐſŶ"ĂƐƚŝůůĂ Ͳ >Ă DĂŶĐŚĂWƌŝŶĐŝƉĂĚŽ ĚĞ $ƐƚƵƌŝĂƐ"ĂŶƚĂďƌŝĂSource: created by the authorsMore pronounced jumps can be observed in these cases than in the presence of hate, especially in the case of Melilla. However, the range is quite limited, not reaching 0.10 points in a range between -1 and +1. Neither does the order seem to obey clear criteria, so it will be necessary to look more deeply into potential causes that could explain these dierences.5. ConclusionsStarting with RQ1, concerning changes in the content about migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain, it can be armed that interest has been marked by events of great impact in the media, with 2015 and 2016 being the most noteworthy years of the refugee crisis, the years when most attention was paid to this matter, as also conrmed by the academic interest in the importance that these years had in the media representation of migration (Zhang & Hellmueller, 2017; Amores, Arcila-Calderón & Blanco-Herrero, 2020). After those years, interest seems to have declined, reaching minimum levels in 2020, coinciding with the pandemic, when attention shifted to health-related matters.Regarding RQ2, focused on the changes in hate speech, the trend is dierent and concerning, as the volume of messages of this type has increased, 2020 being the year with the greatest rejection on Twitter in Spain towards migrants and refugees. e
doxa.comunicación | nº 38, pp. 369-389 January-June of 2024Andrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón and Patricia Sánchez-HolgadoISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 383emergence in the Spanish political arena of a party with an anti-immigration and nationalist discourse seems to have played a key role in this sense, as previous research has already indicated (Ferreira, 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019).To respond to RQ3, regarding regional dierences, we can arm that, although the greatest volume of messages about migrants and refugees was concentrated in the most populous regions (Madrid, Catalonia, and Andalusia), the highest proportions of hatred were observed in Asturias, Castilla-La Mancha, the Balearic Islands, and Galicia, without clear patterns being detected. It may be advisable for future studies to look into these issues in greater detail, since there do not seem to be ideological patterns –the colour of the regional government, for example–, wealth or population of immigrant origin that explain these dierences.Finally, the sentiment analysis carried out to respond to RQ4 indicates that there is a very weak correlation, whereby sentiment is more negative in messages with a greater presence of hate. In general, the sentiment in discourse about migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain between 2015 and 2020 was negative, especially in the rst two years of the sample, something that coincides with the fact that media coverage and discourse concerning migration tends to focus on negative elements (Amores, Arcila-Calderón & Blanco-Herrero, 2020). Even the discourse in support of migrants can incorporate negativity, by focusing on their status as victims, something that could also explain the weakness of the correlation. Sentiment was negative in all the regions of Spain, Melilla being the place with the least negative sentiment, and Cantabria, the most.It is worth noting that this work has focused on sentiment analysis from a binary perspective, between positive and negative. is derives from the relevance of examining the association between negativity and hate speech more closely, a connection that other studies have already observed (Arcila-Calderón et al., 2021) and which has been conrmed herein. is, however, sets a limitation, since it does not allow us to evaluate what specic feelings or emotions are associated with this type of rejection discourse, a line of work that future research in the area may explore, research which could go beyond the exploratory vocation of this study.e above allows us to gain greater knowledge about online hate speech based on racist and xenophobic criteria, conrming the clear relationship between such hatred and news and media events (Arcila-Calderón et al., 2021). e application of computational techniques and automated analyses has allowed us to carry out one of the most extensive longitudinal studies yet, with the particularity of including geolocated content which has allowed consistent comparisons to be made between regions of Spain. is is a considerable advance as a large part of the policies pertaining to coexistence and integration in Spain are the responsibility of the regional governments. However, and despite the interesting observations made, it must be pointed out that the main dierences regarding attitudes towards migration occur at the national rather than regional level, as illustrated by the various Eurobarometers (European Commission, 2019; 2022), hence the interpretation of those dierences at the regional level still requires future study to give clearer understanding.Beyond this, a limitation that must be taken into account is the fact that with large volumes of data it is easier for statistical tests to be statistically signicant. us, it is worth qualifying the observations made, especially those related to regional dierences, whose eects were smaller than those observed between the dierent years.It should also be noted regarding regional variables that the corresponding region could not be identied automatically in 4,271 cases, since the metadata did not include enough information. Among these messages it is expected that there will be,
384 | nº 38, pp. 369-389 | January-June of 2024Migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain: a study employing automated analysis into the presence of hate and sentimentISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónamong others, all those corresponding to the autonomous city of Ceuta, which is not included among the regions or cities in the study. Given Ceuta’s population, and in view of the number of messages identied in Melilla (858), a similar city, it is estimated that the eects of this limitation will be slight, but it would be advisable for future studies to continue perfecting the analyses to look into this question in greater depth.6. Acknowledgementsis study has been supported by the project “Enhanced migration measures from a multidimensional perspective (HumMingBird)” nanced by the European Union within the framework of the Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme, reference number 870661. is article has been translated into English by Brian O´Halloran7. Specic contributions of each authorName & surnameConception and design of the workAndrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón MethodologyDavid Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-CalderónData collection and analysisDavid Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón, Patricia Sánchez-HolgadoDiscussion and conclusionsAndrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-HerreroDrafting, formatting, version review and approvalAndrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón, Patricia Sánchez-Holgado8. Conicts of intereste authors declares that there is no conict of interest contained in this article. 9. Bibliographic referencesAmores, J., Arcila-Calderón, C., & Blanco-Herrero, D. (2020). Evolution of negative visual frames of immigrants and refugees in the main media of Southern Europe. El Profesional de la Información 29(6), e290624. https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2020.nov.24Amores, J.J., Arcila Calderón, C., & Stanek, M. (2019). Visual frames of migrants and refugees in the main Western European media. Economics and Sociology, 12(3), 147-161. https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-789X.2019/12-3/10

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doxa.comunicación | nº 38, pp. 369-389 January-June of 2024Andrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón and Patricia Sánchez-HolgadoISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 387Ferreira, C. (2019). Vox como representante de la derecha radical en España: un estudio sobre su ideología. Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 51, 73-98. https://doi.org/10.21308/recp.51.03Fleming, M. (2015, 28 de agosto). Cuerpos sin vida encontrados en un camión cerca de la frontera, mientras los solicitantes de asilo continúan llegando a Hungría. ACNUR. https://tinyurl.com/2j33amdnGreussing, E., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2017). Shifting the refugee narrative? An automated frame analysis of Europe’s 2015 refugee crisis. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(11), 1749-1774. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1282813Gruzd, A., y Roy, J. (2014). Investigating political polarization on Twitter: A Canadian perspective. Policy & Internet, 6(1), 28-45. https://doi.org/10.1002/1944-2866.POI354Hameleers, M., van der Meer, T., & Vliegenthart, R. (2022). Civilized truths, hateful lies? Incivility and hate speech in false information–evidence from fact-checked statements in the US. Information, Communication & Society, 25(11), 1596-1613. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2021.1874038Heidenreich, T., Eberl, J. M., Lind, F., & Boomgaarden, H. (2020). Political migration discourses on social media: a comparative perspective on visibility and sentiment across political Facebook accounts in Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies46(7), 1261-1280. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1665990Igartua, J. J., Muñiz, C., Otero-Parra, J. A., & De-la-Fuente-Juan, M. (2007). El Tratamiento Informativo de la Inmigración en los Medios de Comunicación Españoles. Un Análisis de Contenido Desde la Teoría del Framing. Estudios Sobre el Mensaje Periodístico, 13, 91-110. Joppke, C. (2020). Immigration in the populist crucible: comparing Brexit and Trump. Comparative migration studies8(1), 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-020-00208-yKreis, R. (2017). #refugeesnotwelcome: Anti-refugee discourse on Twitter. Discourse & Communication, 11(5), 498-514. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750481317714121 Krzyżanowski, M., Triandafyllidou, A., & Wodak, R. (2018). e Mediatization and the Politicization of the “Refugee Crisis” in Europe. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 16(1–2), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2017.1353189Lacomba Vázquez, J., Benlloch Doménech, C., Cloquell Lozano, A., & Veira Ramos, A. (2020). La aportación de la inmigración a la sociedad española. Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones. Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración. https://tinyurl.com/mrnerm29López del Ramo, J. L., & Humanes, M. L. (2016). Análisis del framing visual y sus componentes en el tratamiento fotográco de la crisis de los refugiados sirios en medios de prensa internacional. Scire: representación y organización del conocimiento, 22(2), 87-97. Mielczarek, N. (2018). e dead Syrian refugee boy goes viral: funerary Aylan Kurdi memes as tools of mourning and visual reparation in remix culture. Visual Communication, 19(4), 506-530. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470357218797366Miró Llinares, F. (2016). Taxonomía de la comunicación violenta y el discurso del odio en Internet. IDP. Revista de Internet, Derecho y Política, 22, 82-107.

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388 | nº 38, pp. 369-389 | January-June of 2024Migrants and refugees on Twitter in Spain: a study employing automated analysis into the presence of hate and sentimentISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónMoragas-Fernández, C. M., Grau-Masot, J. M., & Capdevila-Gómez, A. (2019). Articulación de la inuencia en Twitter ante el anuncio de la Ley del referéndum en Cataluña. Profesional de la Información, 28(3), e280320. https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2019.may.20Müller, K., & Schwarz, C. (2020). Fanning the ames of hate: Social media and hate crime. Journal of the European Economic Association, 19(4), 2131-2167. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa045 Muñiz, C., Igartua, J. J., & Otero, J. A. (2006). Imágenes de la Inmigración a Través de la Fotografía de Prensa. Un Análisis de Contenido. Communication & Society, 19(1) 103-128. https://doi.org/10.15581/003.19.1.103-128Organización Internacional de las Migraciones (2019). Glosario de la OIM sobre migración. https://tinyurl.com/mww4cn4hOSCE (s.f.). Hate Crime Reporting, https://hatecrime.osce.orgPew Research Center (2021). Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies. Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. https://tinyurl.com/yeyr8be4Robles, J., Guevara, J., Casas-Mas, B., & Gómez, D. (2022). When negativity is the fuel. Bots and Political Polarization in the COVID-19 debate. Comunicar, 30(71), 63-75. https://doi.org/10.3916/C71-2022-05Rodríguez Andrés, R., & Ureña Uceda, D. (2011). Diez razones para el uso de Twitter como herramienta en la comunicación política y electoral. Comunicación y Pluralismo, 10, 89-116.Rollnert Liern, G. (2020). Redes sociales y discurso del odio: perspectiva internacional. IDP. Internet, Derecho y Política, 31, 1-14. https://doi.org/10.7238/idp.v0i31.3233Schemer, C. (2012). e Inuence of news media on stereotypic attitudes toward immigrants in a political campaign. Journal of communication, 62(5), 739-757. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01672.xSeoane-Pérez, F. (2017). Framing of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in the Spanish Press. En Barlai, M., Fähnrich, B., Griessler, C. & Rhomberg, M. (Eds.), e Migrant Crisis: European Perspectives and National Discourses (pp. 267-282). LIT Verlag.Soroka, S., & McAdams, S. (2015). News, politics, and negativity. Political communication, 32(1), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2014.881942Splinder, W. (2015, 08 de diciembre) 2015: El año de la crisis de refugiados en Europa. ACNUR. https://tinyurl.com/34ucruu5Tajfel, H. (1978). Dierentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Academic Press elwall, M., Buckley, K., Paltoglou, G., Cai, D., & Kappas, A. (2010). Sentiment strength detection in short informal text. Journal of the American society for information science and technology, 61, 2544-2558. https://doi.org/10.1002/asi.21416Turnbull-Dugarte, S.J. (2019). Explaining the end of Spanish exceptionalism and electoral support for Vox. Research & Politics, 6(2), 1-8. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168019851680Twitter (2022). Hateful conduct policy. https://tinyurl.com/462n2xwj

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doxa.comunicación | nº 38, pp. 369-389 January-June of 2024Andrés Barradas Gurruchaga, David Blanco-Herrero, Carlos Arcila-Calderón and Patricia Sánchez-HolgadoISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 389Vrysis, L., Vryzas, N., Kotsakis, R., Saridou, T., Matsiola, M., Veglis, A., Arcila-Calderón, C., & Dimoulas, C. (2021). A Web interface for analyzing hate speech. Future Internet, 13(3), 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/13030080 Yardi, S., & Boyd, D. (2010). Dynamic debates: An analysis of group polarization over time on twitter. Bulletin of science, technology & society, 30(5), 316-327. https://doi.org/10.1177/0270467610380011Yurdakul, K, H. (2021). How Do the Main Negative Emotions Aect People’s Political Decision Process? Fear, Anxiety and Anger. Journal of Academic Inquiries, 16(1), 247-261. https://doi.org/10.17550/akademikincelemeler.708916Zhang, X., & Hellmueller, L. (2017). Visual framing of the European refugee crisis in Der Spiegel and CNN International: Global journalism in news photographs. International Communication Gazette, 79(5), 483-510. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048516688134

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