Disinformation on the Ukraine war: an analysis of fact-checking
agencies in Spain and their presence on TikTok
Desinformación en la guerra de la ucrania: análisis de las agencias de vericación
españolas en TikTok
doxa.comunicación |
nº 40, pp. 19-41
| 19
January-June of 2025
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
How to cite this article:
Hidalgo-Cobo, P.; Serrano Villalobos, O. and Puebla Martínez, B. (2025). Disinformation on the Ukraine war: an analysis of fact-checking
agencies in Spain and their presence on TikTok.
Doxa Comunicación
, 40, pp. 19-41.
https://doi.org/10.31921/doxacom.n40a2224
Pablo Hidalgo-Cobo.
Associate professor at Rey Juan Carlos University (
URJC
), in addition to serving as visiting professor
at both Complutense University of Madrid and Next Educación Business School. He also works as a communication
and research consultant in the private sector. Moreover, Professor Hidalgo-Cobo has been working toward a PhD in
Communication at URJC since 2022 with a focus on fact-checking in the international context. He is a member of the
technical editorial team of the science journal known as
index.comunicación
, where one of his research areas is political
communication, which include publications on disinformation, fact-checking agencies, news coverage of international
conict, and content analysis on TikTok. Furthermore, he holds a considerable number of post-graduate degrees,
including the following: Master’s Degree in Economics and Business Teacher Training (2022),
URJC
; Master’s degree
in Advanced European and International Studies (2014) from the
Centre International de Formation Européenne
, with
a special mention for academic excellence; Bachelor’s Degree in Human Science from Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
(2021); a Bachelor’s of Law (2012), Carlos III University; and nally, a Bachelor’s in Business Administration (2012), also
from Carlos III University.
Rey Juan Carlos University (URJC), Spain
[email protected]
ORCID: 0000-0001-8260-9706
Olga Serrano Villalobos
. Bachelor’s Degree in Advertising and Public Relations from Complutense University of
Madrid (
UCM
). She also holds a Pre-Doctorate [
Diplomatura de Estudios Avanzados, DEA
] in Sociology with a focus on
Public Opinion and Mass Culture (
UCM
), and a PhD Cum Laude in Techniques and Processes of Image Creation; Social
and Aesthetic Applications, also from
UCM
. Moreover, she won the Extraordinary Doctorate Award in the academic year
2016-2017 at
UCM
. Since 2017, Professor Serrano Villalobos has imparted classes on several bachelor’s and master’s
degree programmes in various faculties of Complutense University of Madrid, as well as at the Miguel de Cervantes
European University, and at Rey Juan Carlos University where she carries out most of her teaching nowadays. From 2012
to 2014, she also worked as a professor at the Madrid Film School (
ECAM
). She has participated in many international
conferences, published articles in various scientic journals listed in SCOPUS, and written books and book chapters for
Dykinson, Fragua, and McGraw Hill. She is accredited by
ANECA
as Professor, Associate Professor, and Private University
Professor. Finally, since 2002 she has also undertaken entrepreneurial ventures in the cultural and audio-visual sector.
Rey Juan Carlos University (URJC), Spain
[email protected]
ORCID:
0000-0002-8562-6680
is content is published under Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License. International License CC BY-NC 4.0
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nº 40, pp. 19-41
|
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Disinformation on the Ukraine war: an analysis of fact-checking agencies in Spain and their presence on TikTok
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
doxa.comunicación
Received: 19/03/2024- Accepted: 18/06/2024 - Early access: 09/09/2024 - Published: 01/01/2025
Recibido: 19/03/2024- Aceptado: 18/06/2024- En edición: 09/09/2024 - Publicado: 01/01/2025
Abstract:
is research addresses the verication and debunking related to the
war in Ukraine carried out by Spanish fact-checking agencies on TikTok.
e agencies include EFE Verica, Maldita, Newtral, and Vericat, all
of which are aliated with the International Fact-Checking Network.
e aim is to analyse the features, purposes, and approaches used in
debunking false information, and to identify similarities among the
four agencies. e study has used statistical quantitative research
methods that are exploratory, descriptive, and inferential in nature,
based on content analysis. A total of 652 posts were reviewed, which
were published on TikTok by the four agencies between February 2022
and March 2023, from which 91 verications related to the war in
Ukraine were revealed. e ndings conrm prior research indicating
a prevalence of fake news related to false contexts, video formats,
and military attacks, which are the most common themes. What is
striking is that the fact-checkers use more dynamic resources in order
to adapt their work to the style of TikTok, with a predominant focus
on debunking false information (e.g. public health), rather than giving
long, drawn-out explanations. Finally, similarities have been identied
among the agencies regarding the types of disinformation veried, as
well as common themes and formats.
Keywords:
Debunking; Ukraine war; TikTok; fact-checkers; disinformation.
Resumen:
La presente investigación aborda las vericaciones y desmentidos sobre
la guerra de Ucrania que realizan en TikTok las agencias españolas de
la International Fack-Checker-Network: EFE Verica, Maldita, Newtral
y Vericat. Los objetivos son analizar las características, la nalidad
y el enfoque de la desinformación vericada, así como las similitudes
entre las cuatro agencias. El diseño metodológico consiste en una inves
-
tigación exploratoria, descriptiva e inferencial basada en el análisis de
contenido en base a la codicación de variables y el tratamiento estadís
-
tico cuantitativo de los resultados obtenidos. Se han revisado 652 posts
publicados en TikTok por las cuatro agencias desde el febrero de 2022
hasta marzo de 2023, con un total de 91 vericaciones realizadas so
-
bre la guerra de Ucrania. Los resultados conrman las investigaciones
previas sobre el predominio del falso contexto, del formato audiovisual
y de los ataques militares como temática más frecuente. Las agencias
utilizan recursos más dinámicos para adaptarse a la red social TikTok,
con un enfoque que prioriza desmentir informaciones falsas (salud pú
-
blica) frente a ofrecer explicaciones en profundidad (razón pública). Por
último, se han identicado similitudes en las agencias en cuanto al tipo
de desinformación vericada, las temáticas y el formato.
Palabras clave:
Fact-checking; guerra de Ucrania; TikTok; agencias de vericación;
desinformación.
Belén Puebla Martínez
.
Professor at Rey Juan Carlos University (
URJC
). She has a PhD in Communication Science,
also from
URJC
, and a Master’s degree in Communication and Sociocultural Issues as well. She holds two bachelor’s
degrees, one in Journalism and one in Audio-visual Communication, again from
URJC
. Professor Puebla Martínez also
serves as Principal Investigator of the research group entitled, Innovation, Education, and Communication (
INECO
),
also at Rey Juan Carlos University, as well as Principal Investigator of the
NODOS
Teaching Innovation Group. She is
Director of the science journal known as
index.comunicación
, which is listed in diverse evaluation systems and scientic
databases, including Scopus (Q1 in Visual Arts and Performance Arts, and Q2 in Communication), the Emerging
Sources Citation Index, and
FECYT
, the latter of which has granted the journal a quality seal. She specialises in the study
of analytical research methods in social communication, innovative teaching methods, media literacy analysis, the ght
against disinformation, Spanish television ction, and the history of media (especially the press and television), among
other areas. Currently, she serves as Principal Investigator of the
URJC
team on the international project known as the
IBERIFIER Observatory, led by Ramón Salaverria (
UNAV
), and composed of a consortium of 25 institutions, which is
funded by the European Commission.
Rey Juan Carlos University (URJC), Spain
[email protected]
ORCID:
0000-0002-1481-4238
<p>[Enlace de URL / hc (has AS)]</p>
<p>[Enlace de URL / hc (has AS)]</p>
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1. Introduction
e relevance of the object of study is justied by the undeniable graveness of a large-scale war on European soil, given
the humanitarian, economic, military, and geopolitical consequences (Feás and Steinberg, 2022. Other risks include the
involvement of prominent international actors (Demurtas and González, 2023) and the escalation of tension to the point
where some European countries have suggested sending troops to Ukraine, with Russia countering with threats of a potential
nuclear war (Cuesta, February 29, 2024).
e choice of the social network TikTok for this study, as well as fact-checking agencies and the Russia-Ukraine conict,
oers a paradigmatic context for examining the communicative and informative aspects of international military conict, as
social networks and disinformation have played a key role in the Ukraine war. Moreover, TikTok has emerged as the fastest-
growing social network in recent years (Qustodio, 2023) and, in the context of the war, TikTok has served as both a channel
for disseminating fake news and for combating it, which highlights the crucial importance of having fact-checking agencies
present on TikTok.
e Ukraine war has been called the rst social media war (Fetoshi and Gërguri, 2023), due to the key role played by User-
Generated Content (UGC) (Magallón-Rosa et al., 2023), and photojournalism (Castrillo and Vera, 2023). Social networks
have been used not only as a vehicle for disinformation and state propaganda (Arteaga, 2023), but also by numerous actors,
including civilians, battleeld combatants, inuencers, and journalists. It has even been used as a personal communication
tool for enhancing the public prole of prominent gures such as Volodymyr Zelensky and Yevgeny Prigozhin (Nastasia and
George, 2023). e use of cameras on military drones and helmet-mounted cameras has generated a huge amount of audio-
visual content regarding the conict, reinforcing the live, rst-hand broadcast of the war, which has added relevant nuances to
the concept of hyper-reality addressed by Baudrillard with regard to the Gulf War in 1990 (Baudrillard and Kauf, 1991).
Nevertheless, we must consider the key role played by the communicative aspect of Russia’s security doctrine (Russian
Federation, 2000, 2016; Veebel, 2015), as well as its widely documented disinformation campaigns (Paul and Mathhews, 2016;
Erlich and Garner, 2021; Bartles, 2016; among others). Furthermore, the European Union has imposed sanctions on Russia in
four areas, one of which is the information realm, which are the following: individual sanctions, economic sanctions, media
restrictions, and diplomatic measures (European Council, 2021). e sanctions began in 2014 with the Donbas war and the
annexation of Crimea by Russia, and intensied with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in March of 2022 (Council Regulation
(EU) 259/2022 of February 23, 2022). e resurgence of geopolitical tension is therefore evident, as well as the current hybrid
confrontation in which the media and information are of vital importance, although disinformation spills over into geopolitics,
and vice versa.
e link between communication and war has taken shape with various government measures against disinformation. On
March 4, 2022, the Moscow Duma passed a law punishing the dissemination of fake news with up to 15 years in prison. In fact,
the Russian government closed the Dozhd channel and the Echo of Moscow radio station for “high treason” and spreading false
information about Russia’s military action (Martino, 2022). Moreover, the Russian communication regulatory agency blocked
access to Twitter and Facebook. All of this led to the exit of several media outlets, including the BBC, CNN, and Bloomberg
News (Darcy, 2022). On March 8, 2022, Josep Borrell promised to enact measures to sanction external disinformation, support
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independent media, and address fake news in European foreign policy (European Union External Action, 2022). On May 30 and
31, the European Council approved additional sanctions, including the suspension of broadcasting in the EU of three Russian
state-owned broadcasters (European Council, 2022a). ese measures have given even greater weight to social networks as an
information medium (Magallón-Rosa et al., 2023).
Since 2014, Russian disinformation campaigns, especially regarding Ukraine, have been characterized by four key aspects: (1)
a large number of channels and messages; (2) falsehoods and half-truths; (3) rapid, continuous, and repetitive false reports;
and (4) a lack of commitment to consistency (Paul and Matthews, 2016). e main targets have been Ukraine, Syria, NATO, and
EU countries (Khaldarova and Pantti, 2016; Erlich and Garner, 2021).
e use of a multitude of channels and sources stands out, including social networks, conventional media, radio, blogs,
journalists, etc., as well as all types of formats, such as text, video, audio, and images using multiple languages (Paul and
Matthews, 2016). e authors of the present study (2016) previously pointed out that the goal is not to provide an overriding
truth, but rather to diuse a combination of false elements and half-truths, without the need for coherence between messages
and statements. Erlich and Garner (2021) have identied four essential disinformation strategies used by the Kremlin: anti-
Ukraine, anti-Western, pro-Russian, and true information.
According to Meiselman et al. (1987), and later cited by Erlich and Garner (2021), Russian disinformation focusses on in three
key areas: political, military, and economic. Erlich and Garner (2021) have included a fourth key area, which consists of linking
Ukraine’s leaders to Nazi ideological movements associated with the country’s historical past. is narrative is based on the
powerful message of the Soviet Union as the safeguard against Nazism and its allies. e tactic of calling Ukrainians “Nazis”, and
focusing on a particular person, known as name-calling, is strategically used in the so-called “memory wars” (Koposov, 2017),
as it ties in with the creation of historical narratives. In the words of Magallón-Rosa et al., “the main Russian disinformation
narratives found after the Euromaidan protests in 2013-2014 have focused on portraying Ukraine as a Nazi state, a failed state,
and a non-state” (2023: 4).
All images and videos about the conict have circulated on various social networks, with TikTok playing a key role (Evans,
2022; Kavenius, 2023; Steel et al., 2023). Some indicators suggest that the Chinese-origin social network has consolidated itself
as a leading global platform for the following reasons: it has grown substantially in the number of new users in recent years
(Mansoor, 2022); it has been the most downloaded mobile platform worldwide for three consecutive years (Sensor Tower,
2023); and it has increased its annual usage time, especially among Generation Z and Alpha users (Qustodio, 2023). is has
secured a prominent place among young internet users, a group that is vulnerable to disinformation (López-Martín et al.,
2022). On the other hand, the rise of TikTok is also due to the success of the audio-visual format, or video, in various contexts,
as well as its massive level of consumption in recent years (Kalogeropoulos et al., 2016; Raun and Petersen, 2021).
e informational use of social networks began in 2007 (Guallar, 2008) and has progressively increased to the present day
(Mayoral and Edo, 2015), where younger generations prefer social networks and audio-visual content rather than watching
conventional news (Galán et al., 2019). In this regard, TikTok has experienced a qualitative and progressive change from videos
that last 15 seconds to videos now lasting up to 30 minutes. is change has led to a wide variety of topics, along with a
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combination of information and entertainment. In fact, the latest data reveal a substantial increase in news consumption on
TikTok (Newman et al., 2023; Matsa, 2023).
Like other social networks, TikTok has become a massive vehicle for disinformation. For this reason, the platform has taken
various steps and formed alliances to try to curb the problem (Herencia, 2020; Hook et al., 2022). In fact, TikTok formed a
collaboration with fact-checking agencies before the 2020 U.S. elections (Bélair-Gagnon et al., 2023). e importance of these
agencies gained momentum worldwide in 2015 with the creation of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) at the
Poynter Institute (Graves and Cherubini, 2016), and they have since become a key player in the current media system as a
result of the increase in information disorders (Wardle and Derekshan, 2017). Other trends have also emerged, such as the
never-ending prominence of social networks and the increase in news consumption that takes place there.
e Spanish agencies registered as IFCN members are Newtral, Maldita, EFE Verica, and Vericat. According to some authors,
Newtral and Maldita are the two largest platforms in Spain, not only due to their size, but also because of the diverse areas
they cover and their commitment to “democratic and civic structuring in Spain” (López-Pan and Rodríguez-Rodríguez, 2020:
1057). eir link to democratic and civic values were also reected by Graves et al. (2023) on the social role that agencies play
in terms of public health and reason in a context of proliferating digital disinformation. Based on statements from the agencies
themselves, these authors (2023) distinguish between two types of fact-checking: that which is related to political discourse,
which fosters public reason and requires deep and nuanced understanding and explanations; and fact-checking focussed
on debunking anonymous false information on social networks, which pursues public health issues by stopping the most
dangerous fake news from the point of view of democracy and civic life.
In this context, military conicts pose a challenge for the activity of fact-checking, due to the complexity of armed conict and
the inltration of partisan and polarised positions in the media, politics, and society. Moreover, the humanitarian component
and potential consequences of disinformation and fact-checking impose an ethical constraint that is not present among other
topics (Varas and Castillo, 2007). An armed conict adds another diculty: the “fog of war”, a term coined by Clausewitz as
far back as 1832 (Clausewitz, 2015), which refers to the informational confusion that inevitably occurs in all wars for various
reasons, above and beyond the propagandistic eorts of the parties involved.
1.1. State of the issue
Russian disinformation has been extensively addressed by numerous authors, especially since the Donbas war in 2014 and
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Noteworthy authors include the following: Paul and Matthews (2016); Erlich and Garner
(2021); Bartles (2016); Duncan (2017); Hjorth (2019); and Veebel (2015), among others. ese researchers have delved into
informational operations targeting NATO countries, especially during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, as well as in the
European Union and Catalonia (Hjorth and Adler-Nissen, 2019; Magdin, 2020; López-Olano and Fenoll, 2019). Interest in this
topic has grown signicantly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began (Dov Bachmann et al., 2023; Yablokov, 2022), with
some studies focusing on the role of social media in the diusion of disinformation (Pierri et al., 2023; Astuti et al., 2022).
Research by García-Marín and Salvat-Martinrey (2023) focusses on war disinformation gathered by the collaborative content
verication project known as #UkraineFacts, the ndings of which are comparable to the present study. e main areas
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identied (2023) are related to the military, international aairs, civil society, and
ad-hominem
attacks, with military topics
taking centre stage, followed by reactions from the civilian population.
Previous research concurs on the point that fact-checking primarily focuses on information circulating on social networks,
with only scant verication of mainstream media or ocial statements (García-Marín and Salvat-Martinrey, 2023; Magallón-
Rosa et al., 2023). ere is also consensus that a false context is currently the most common type of disinformation in the
Ukraine conict. Furthermore, both image and audio-visual formats are dominant in the fact-checking eorts related to the
Ukraine war by Spanish agencies (Magallón-Rosa et al., 2023). Disinformation collected during the rst four months of the war
shows a certain balance between content that is pro-Russian (49.1%) and that which is pro-Ukrainian (44.8%) (García-Marín
and Salvat-Martinrey, 2023).
Regarding media coverage of the war by the BBC and RT, the analysis concludes that information about the conict often lacks
a scientic rationale, based on the following ndings; there are high levels of polarisation fuelled by an
us
vs.
them
narrative
as a confrontational resource; sensationalism is overused; underlying causes of the conict are omitted; and there is a “sharp
division between the perception of good and evil in the conict” (Lara-Aguiar et al., 2023: 94).
In terms of social networking, numerous authors have found TikTok to be a social network where false or misleading
information is spread, especially since COVID-19 (O’Sullivan et al., 2022; Basch et al., 2021; Alonso López et al., 2021). Others
have focused on how fact-checking platforms use TikTok, yet this is still an emerging area without systematic literature. Lu and
Shen (2023) have analysed Chinese fact-checkers on TikTok based on three areas: audio-visual content, persuasive strategies,
and engagement metrics. e results show that agency posts tend to be faster-paced than the videos of other accounts, and
they use various persuasive strategies as well. Sidorenko Bautista et al. (2021) have compared themes among international
agencies, while Arrieta-Castillo and Rubio Jordán (2023) have delved into narratives, topic areas, and the impact of posts
published by Ibero-American agencies.
In short, previous research has addressed the role of TikTok, Spanish fact-checkers, and verication agencies in the Ukraine
war. e novelty of the present study is that it analyses all three aspects together: the work of Spanish fact-checking agencies;
specically on TikTok; and precisely focussed on the Ukraine war.
2. Methodology
e overall objective of this study is to analyse the specic features of the fact-checking endeavour conducted by agencies on
TikTok regarding the Ukraine war. is general objective has been broken down into four specic objectives as follows: (1)
analyse the disinformation veried by these agencies; (2) identify the topics of the verications; (3) examine the approaches
and purposes of agencies when verifying war-related disinformation; (4) identify potential dierences among Spanish agencies.
Previous research has allowed us to anticipate some of the results, such as the prevalence of false contexts, the prominent use
of audio-visual formats, anonymous content circulating on social media, and certain topics related to Russian disinformation.
However, as the previous literature on TikTok verication during the Ukraine war is not suciently consolidated, specic
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hypotheses have been avoided, and four research questions have been formulated instead, as they are more suitable for
exploratory research and enable the discovery of ndings not initially considered.
RQ1: What type of disinformation on the Ukraine war do Spanish fact-checking agencies verify on TikTok?
RQ2: What are the topics of these verications?
RQ3: Do Spanish fact-checking agencies on TikTok engage in work that promotes public health and reason in terms of the
ideas set forth by Graves et al. (2023)?
RQ4: With regard to the three previous questions, are there signicant dierences among Spanish agencies?
e methodology used for this research was exploratory, descriptive, and quantitative, specically using content analysis.
e methodological design, including variables and categories, was developed and tested in a previous study, which is the
following: “Methodology for content analysis of fact-checking agencies on TikTok” (Hidalgo-Cobo & Puebla-Martínez, 2024).
is method has been widely used to analyse TikTok (Basch et al., 2022), and specically to study its use by fact-checking
agencies (Arrieta-Castillo & Rubio Jordán, 2023; Alonso López et al., 2021).
e results obtained through inductive coding are presented descriptively, while various statistical parameters have been
applied to achieve outcomes aligned with the initial objectives. Specically, the chi-square independence test was applied
to dierent agencies and specic variables (thematic areas, formats, etc.), in order to determine whether agencies display
signicant dierences or follow a similar distribution.
e sample was delimited based on three criteria: geographic and spatial selection; choosing the most prominent fact-checking
agencies; and, given the topic, selecting an appropriate time frame (Hidalgo-Cobo & Puebla-Martínez, 2024). e research
focuses on verications conducted by Spanish agencies, specically those who are registered members of the IFCN, due to its
status as the benchmark of fact-checking with stringent requirements for transparency and methodology. Four agencies with
active TikTok accounts were selected: EFE Verica (@efeverica),
Maldita.es
(@malditobulo), Newtral (@newtraltiktok), and
Vericat (@desfake).
Regarding the time frame of the sample, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine occurred on February 24, 2022, all posts published
by these four fact-checking agencies during the rst year of the conict were analysed. In addition, as there was signicant
activity both in the month before the conict and in the month following the end of the rst year of the war, the time frame
was extended from one month before the conict began until one month after its rst-year period ended. In total, 652 posts
published by these agencies from February 1, 2022, to March 31, 2023, were reviewed, among which 69 posts addressed the
topic of Ukraine, with a total of 91 verications carried out in the posts.
erefore, the unit of analysis comprises verications related to the Ukraine war in posts published by these four agencies
during the specied period. Posts that mention the war tangentially, or incidentally, were excluded. e robustness of the
sample lies in analysing all posts published on the topic without selective sampling of specic posts or verications.
To perform the content analysis, variables were coded to encompass general post information, thematic areas, specic issues,
the countries involved, politicians by name, type of disinformation, medium of circulation, specic source, disinformation
format, and verication outcome. Categories for the variable of Disinformation Type are based on Wardle and Derakhshan
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(2017), although all categories emerged from the inductive coding process in order to accommodate the analysed sample and
extract qualitative nuances.
3. Results
More than half of all the verications conducted by the four Spanish agencies on TikTok regarding the Ukraine war contain
a false context, which is the most common type of disinformation (56.1%). is type of false information typically involves a
visual format, such as image or video. To a far lesser extent, the agencies veried fabricated content (16.5%) and misleading
content (12.1%). e remaining verications include manipulated images or videos (6.6%), and fraudulent authorship (5.5%).
In 4.4% of the cases, the type of disinformation is not specied, as it only refers to false information in a general or implied way.
Graph 1. Type of disinformation by agency
Source: created by the authors based on data from TikTok
e distribution by agency clearly shows that all four fact-checkers prioritize verications on disinformation consisting of
false contexts. e remaining types of disinformation display a heterogeneous distribution that varies signicantly according
to each agency, as depicted in Graph 1.
e type of disinformation veried also provides valuable information, as certain types allow for quick debunking (false context,
manipulated image, and fraudulent authorship), while others require more detailed explanations and nuances (misleading
content, fabricated content, and meta-verication).
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Graph 2. Types of disinformation that require detailed explanation by agency
Source: created by the authors based on data from TikTok
If we group the types of disinformation into these two categories, we observe that EFE Verica is the only agency where more
verications require detailed explanations. However, the overall trend is to concentrate verications on disinformation that
can be easily debunked.
Figure 1. Types of disinformation that require detailed explanation by agency
If we group the types of disinformation into these two categories, we observe that EFE Verifica is the
only agency where more verifications require detailed explanations. However, the overall trend is to
concentrate verifications on
d
isinformation that can be easily debunked
.
Figure 1. Types of
d
isinformation
that
r
equire
d
etailed
explanation
by
agency
Source: data coded by the authors using SPSS
The chi
-
square independence test shows a p
-
value of exactly 5% (0.05), indicating that we cannot
reject the hypothesis at the 99% significance level
,
and it is precisely at the boundary of rejection at
the 95% significance level. Therefore, the results are not conclusive,
yet
they do indicate a general
trend among the four agencies
toward
verify
ing disinformation that can be quickly
debunked.
The most frequently verified disinformation format is video (52.7%), as well as image
and
photog-
raphy
(33%), with a much smaller number statements, news, text
s
, or other formats (14.3%). It is
striking
that video is dominant in all the areas (military, humanitarian, international)
,
except in deni-
grating image
s
, where photography is prevalent (50% compared to 30% for video).
Graph
3
. Disinformation
f
ormat by
a
gency
Source: created by the authors based on data from
TikTok
The distribution among the four agencies shows a considerable dominance of video
fact-checking
,
with Verificat being the only agency that
checks
more photos than videos.
D
isinformation in the form
ValueDf
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
7,823
a
3,050
Likelihood ratio
7,9343,047
N of Valid Cases
91
Chi-square
t
est
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected
count is 3.96.
Ϭ
ϱ
ϭϬ
ϭϱ
ϮϬ
Ϯϱ
"&" sĞƌŝĨŝĐĂ
DĂůĚŝƚĂEĞǁƚƌĂůsĞƌŝĨŝĐĂƚ
sŝĚĞŽ/ŵĂŐĞKƚŚĞƌ
Source: data coded by the authors using SPSS
e chi-square independence test shows a p-value of exactly 5% (0.05), indicating that we cannot reject the hypothesis at the
99% signicance level, and it is precisely at the boundary of rejection at the 95% signicance level. erefore, the results are not
conclusive, yet they do indicate a general trend among the four agencies toward verifying disinformation that can be quickly
debunked.
28 |
nº 40, pp. 19-41
|
January-June of 2025
Disinformation on the Ukraine war: an analysis of fact-checking agencies in Spain and their presence on TikTok
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
doxa.comunicación
e most frequently veried disinformation format is video (52.7%), as well as image and photography (33%), with a much
smaller number statements, news, texts, or other formats (14.3%). It is striking that video is dominant in all the areas (military,
humanitarian, international), except in denigrating images, where photography is prevalent (50% compared to 30% for video).
Graph 3. Disinformation format by agency
Source: created by the authors based on data from TikTok
e distribution among the four agencies shows a considerable dominance of video fact-checking, with Vericat being the only
agency that checks more photos than videos. Disinformation in the form of images or photographs is quite frequent among all
agencies (39.5% in Maldita; 30.8% in Newtral; and 46.7% in Vericat), except for EFE Verica, which reaches only 8.3%.
Figure 2. Disinformation format by agency
of
images
or photograph
s
is quite frequent
among
all agencies (39.5% in Maldita; 30.8% in Newtral;
and 46.7% in Verificat), except for EFE Verifica, which
reaches
only 8.3%.
Figure 2. Disinformation
f
ormat by
agency
Source:
d
ata coded by the authors using
SPSS
The chi
-
square independence test between the variable
s
"format" and "verification agency" yields a
p-
value of 0.083, which is above 0.05. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 95%
confidence
level
. There are four cells with values below five, although only one (8.3%) has a value
below the expected minimum count of 1.58. The interpretation of the test indicates that the agencies
follow a similar distribution regarding the disinformation formats they verify.
The vast majority of verifications focus on information circulating on the internet (41.8%) and on
social media (37.4%). In 17.6% of the cases, the source is unspecified, and very occasionally there
are verifications from newspaper articles (2.2%)
,
and one from TV (1.1%). In contrast, there are no
verifications of statements made by the
politicians
involved.
Regarding specific sources, they often do not
name
the exact social network, as the same
disinfor-
mation may appear on multiple platforms. Specific sources mentioned occasionally include Twitter,
Facebook, Telegram, Google, and digital portals. Specific individuals or organisations mentioned
include a Ukrainian lawmaker, the Deputy Ambassador of Russia to the UN, a Ukrainian journalist,
Antena 3 (a Spanish TV channel), and La Repubblica (an Italian newspaper).
The results of the verifications indicate the extent to which nuanced and in
-
depth explanations are
provided. The research shows that
nearly
all verifications (96.7%) find some amount of fake news.
Labels indicating nuances (e.g., misleading, partially true, true but, etc.) are used in only three veri-
fications (3.3%), and none of the verifications have
found
the information to be completely true
.
Table 1 presents the
thematic
areas covered in the posts, broken down into sub
-topics
. One notable
observation is the homogeneity of the
sub-topics
verified by the agencies, which can be easily cate-
gorized into four main areas: military matters
;
humanitarian and civilian issues; denigrating images
of the opposing side and its leaders
;
and international topics related to military or diplomatic support
from
third-
party
countries.
ValueDf
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
11.182
a
6
.083
Likelihood ratio
12.3146.055
N of Valid Cases
91
Chi-square
t
est
a. 4 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 1.58.
Source: data coded by the authors using SPSS
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January-June of 2025
Pablo Hidalgo-Cobo, Olga Serrano Villalobos and Belén Puebla Martínez
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
| 29
e chi-square independence test between the variables “format” and “verication agency” yields a p-value of 0.083, which is
above 0.05. erefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 95% condence level. ere are four cells with values below
ve, although only one (8.3%) has a value below the expected minimum count of 1.58. e interpretation of the test indicates
that the agencies follow a similar distribution regarding the disinformation formats they verify.
e vast majority of verications focus on information circulating on the internet (41.8%) and on social media (37.4%). In
17.6% of the cases, the source is unspecied, and very occasionally there are verications from newspaper articles (2.2%), and
one from TV (1.1%). In contrast, there are no verications of statements made by the politicians involved.
Regarding specic sources, they often do not name the exact social network, as the same disinformation may appear on
multiple platforms. Specic sources mentioned occasionally include Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Google, and digital portals.
Specic individuals or organisations mentioned include a Ukrainian lawmaker, the Deputy Ambassador of Russia to the UN, a
Ukrainian journalist, Antena 3 (a Spanish TV channel), and La Repubblica (an Italian newspaper).
e results of the verications indicate the extent to which nuanced and in-depth explanations are provided. e research
shows that nearly all verications (96.7%) nd some amount of fake news. Labels indicating nuances (e.g., misleading, partially
true, true but, etc.) are used in only three verications (3.3%), and none of the verications have found the information to be
completely true.
Table 1 presents the thematic areas covered in the posts, broken down into sub-topics. One notable observation is the
homogeneity of the sub-topics veried by the agencies, which can be easily categorized into four main areas: military matters;
humanitarian and civilian issues; denigrating images of the opposing side and its leaders; and international topics related to
military or diplomatic support from third-party countries.
Table 1. ematic areas and sub-topics
ematic Area
No.Freq.Sub-topicNo.Freq.
Military
3841%
Attacks
2527,5%
Lack of ethics
44,4%
Military units
55,5%
Military success
44,4%
Humanitarian
2022%
Victims
22,2%
Refugees
22,2%
Civilian population
44,4%
Children
44,4%
Others
88,8%
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|
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Disinformation on the Ukraine war: an analysis of fact-checking agencies in Spain and their presence on TikTok
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
doxa.comunicación
Denigrating image
2022%
Zelensky
55,5%
Ukrainian Nazis
44,4%
Putin
1112,1%
International1314,3%
International threat
44,4%
Diplomatic support
11,1%
Military support
66,6%
Social support
22,2%
Source: created by the authors based on data from TikTok
e military is the most prominent thematic area, accounting for 41% of all verications. Within this section, military attacks
are by far the most frequently addressed issue. It is noteworthy that in 83.8% of the verications within the military section,
the disinformation is related to false contexts. In most cases, the false information is debunked, although specic details about
the attacks or their perpetrators are not specied. At another level, several issues have a certain amount of weight, such as
debunking claims associating Ukrainians with Nazism (9.6%), addressing civilian casualties from a humanitarian perspective
(7.7%), and examining the alleged military support from allied countries to one of the two sides (6.7%).
Graph 4. ematic areas addressed by agency
Source: created by the authors based on data from TikTok
As seen in Graph 4, the distribution of diverse thematic areas among the agencies shows certain dierences. For instance,
Newtral places more emphasis on posts related to denigrating images and humanitarian issues, while posts on military matters
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Pablo Hidalgo-Cobo, Olga Serrano Villalobos and Belén Puebla Martínez
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
| 31
are less prominent. However, common patterns can also be observed. For example, Vericat and EFE Verica have nearly
identical distributions. Moreover, three of the agencies display a similar distribution pattern, with a relatively strong emphasis
on military issues, and less emphasis on humanitarian/civil matters, denigrating images, and international concerns. Moreover,
posts related to international involvement in the conict display only modest representation among all the agencies.
To strengthen the chi-square test, EFE Verica and Vericat data have been combined into a single variable, which is feasible
and recommended due to their nearly identical distribution and the small sample size. As shown in Figure 2, the results
of the chi-square test yields a p-value of 0.054, which is above 0.05, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
independence at the 95% condence level. e interpretation of the test results reveals that the agencies generally exhibit
similar distributions of thematic areas, suggesting no statistically signicant dierences among them.
Figure 3. ematic areas by agency
Source: created by the authors based on data from
TikTok
As
seen
in
Graph
4
, the distribution of di
verse
them
atic areas among the agencies shows certain dif-
ferences. For instance, Newtral places more emphasis on posts related to denigrating image
s
and
humanitarian issues, while posts on military matters are less prominent. However, common patterns
can also be observed. For example, Verificat and EFE Verifica have nearly identical distributions.
Moreover, three of the agencies display a similar distribution pattern, with a relatively
strong
empha-
sis on military issues
,
and
less
emphasis on humanitarian/civil matters, denigrating image
s
, and in-
ternational
concerns
. Moreover, posts related to international involvement in the conflict display only
modest representation among all the
agencies.
To strengthen the chi
-
square test, EFE Verifica and Verificat data have been combined into a single
variable, which is feasible and recommended due to their nearly identical distribution and the small
sample size. As shown in Figure 2, the result
s
of the chi
-
square test yield
s
a p
-
value of
0.054
, which
is above 0.05, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence at the 95% confi-
dence level. The interpretation of the test results reveals that the agencies generally exhibit similar
distributions of thematic
areas
, suggesting no statistically significant differences among them.
Figure 3. Thematic
a
reas by
a
gency
Source:
d
ata coded by the authors using
SPSS
The variables related to countries and
specifically-
named politicians are
very
descriptive, as there is
a notable pr
ominence
of the two presidents, Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin, with very few
verifications mentioning other leaders or countries. The political figures most prominently featured
in the verifications are Zelensky (12.1% of the total) and Putin (7.7%), while in 78.1% of the verifi-
cations no politician is named. Martin Schulz and Joe Biden are mentioned in only one verification
each (1.1%), which are rare exceptions.
Among
all four agencies, this trend is similar: EFE Verifica
does not name even one politician in 91.7% of its verifications
;
Maldita
in
86.8%;
Newtral in 57.7%
;
nor
Verificat in 80%.
Graph
5
. Countries
me
ntioned by agency
ValueDf
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
12.383
a
6.054
Likelihood ratio
13.5276.035
N of Valid Cases
91
Chi-square
t
est
a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 3.71.
Source: data coded by the authors using SPSS
e variables related to countries and specically-named politicians are very descriptive, as there is a notable prominence of
the two presidents, Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin, with very few verications mentioning other leaders or countries.
e political gures most prominently featured in the verications are Zelensky (12.1% of the total) and Putin (7.7%), while
in 78.1% of the verications no politician is named. Martin Schulz and Joe Biden are mentioned in only one verication each
(1.1%), which are rare exceptions. Among all four agencies, this trend is similar: EFE Verica does not name even one politician
in 91.7% of its verications; Maldita in 86.8%; Newtral in 57.7%; nor Vericat in 80%.
32 |
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Disinformation on the Ukraine war: an analysis of fact-checking agencies in Spain and their presence on TikTok
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
doxa.comunicación
Graph 5. Countries mentioned by agency
Source: created by the authors based on TikTok data
e data are very similar when considering the countries or regions mentioned: in 79.1% of the verications, there is no explicit
reference to any country other than Ukraine or Russia. All the agencies follow this trend: 75% of the fact checks carried out by
EFE Verica do not name other countries; the rate is 84.2% for Maldita; 65.4% for Newtral; and 93.3% for Vericat. When other
countries are mentioned, the most frequently named is Qatar (4.4%), probably due to the World Cup and alleged Ukrainian
Nazi fans. In second place at 2.2% are Finland, Spain, Poland, the USA, and NATO, which are named in two verications each.
e remaining countries appear only once, at 1.1%, which include Turkey, Germany, France, Moldova, and North Korea.
Figure 4. Countries mentioned by agency
Source: created by the authors based on TikTok data
The data
are
very similar when considering the countries or regions mentioned: in 79.1% of the ver-
ifications, there is no explicit reference to any country other than Ukraine or Russia. All the agencies
follow this trend: 75% of the fact checks carried out by EFE Verifica do not name other countries;
the rate is 84.2% for Maldita
;
65.4% for Newtral
;
and 93.3% for Verificat. When other countries are
mentioned, the most frequently
named
is Qatar (4.4%), probably due to the World Cup and alleged
Ukrainian Nazi
fans
. In second place at
2.2%
are
Finland, Spain, Poland, the USA, and NATO, which
are named in two verifications each. The remaining countries appear only once
,
at
1.1%
, which i
n-
clude
Turkey, Germany, France, Moldova, and North Korea.
Figure 4. Countries
m
entioned by
agency
Source: data coded by the authors using SPSS
In Figure 4, the chi
-
square test of independence statistically confirms
a
similar distribution. The p
-
value of the test is 0.137, which is above 0.05. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
independence, confirming that the frequency of verifications naming other countries is not specific
to any particular
agency
. Instead, all the agencies display a comparable distribution in this regard
.
4.
Discussion
4.1 What type of
d
isinformation about the war in Ukraine do Spanish agencies verify on TikTok?
The results obtained confirm previous research (García
-
Marín & Salvat
-
Martinrey, 2023; Magallón
-
Rosa et al., 2023), which has found that false contexts are the main type of disinformation in the
Russo-
Ukrainian conflict, far
beyond
other types. In this regard, it bears mentioning a quote from
Magallón-
Rosa et al. (2023: 3):
ValueDf
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
5.523
a
3.137
Likelihood ratio
5.7143.126
N of Valid Cases
91
Chi-square
t
est
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimun expected
count is 2.51.
Ϭ
ϱ
ϭϬ
ϭϱ
ϮϬ
Ϯϱ
ϯϬ
ϯϱ
"&" sĞƌŝĨŝĐĂ
DĂůĚŝƚĂEĞǁƚƌĂůsĞƌŝĨŝĐĂƚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂ ĂŶĚͬŽƌ hŬƌĂŝŶĞKƚŚĞƌ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ
Source: data coded by the authors using SPSS
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January-June of 2025
Pablo Hidalgo-Cobo, Olga Serrano Villalobos and Belén Puebla Martínez
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
| 33
In Figure 4, the chi-square test of independence statistically conrms a similar distribution. e p-value of the test is 0.137,
which is above 0.05. erefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence, conrming that the frequency of
verications naming other countries is not specic to any particular agency. Instead, all the agencies display a comparable
distribution in this regard.
4. Discussion
4.1. What type of disinformation about the war in Ukraine do Spanish agencies verify on TikTok?
e results obtained conrm previous research (García-Marín & Salvat-Martinrey, 2023; Magallón-Rosa et al., 2023), which
has found that false contexts are the main type of disinformation in the Russo-Ukrainian conict, far beyond other types. In
this regard, it bears mentioning a quote from Magallón-Rosa et al. (2023: 3):
e proliferation of news content makes it extremely dicult to identify the origin and authorship of information, which reinforces
the role of imagery as the core of a collective, illustrated narrative, rather than one that is narrated (Rodríguez-Tranche, 2019).
Although photographs are assumed to guarantee maximum objectivity, they are actually subject to image manipulation (Caballo-
Méndez; De-Santiago-Mateos, 2021), often leading to a lack of contextualisation, which is a major threat when interpreting distant
realities with a far-reaching impact, as in the subject under study
During eldwork and inductive coding, a distinct typology was identied, which exhibits specic features in covering military
conicts, primarily involving a dialectic of verication, argument, and counterargument on a specic event. is meta-
verication typology, which veries disinformation by claiming something is false when it is not, was found in eight (8.8%) of
the verications: four from Newtral, two from Maldita, one from EFE Verica, and one from Vericat. Notably, seven of these
eight verications specically address victims of the conict (Humanitarian section).
Consistent with the predominance of false contexts, this study conrms that formats which are visual (images) and audio-
visual (videos) are the prevalent means of disinformation, with very few instances exclusively containing text or statements.
e research provides a nuanced perspective, as the proportion of videos compared to images in this study is higher than
that of previous investigations linked to Spanish fact-checking agencies, yet those studies did not focus specically on TikTok
(Magallón-Rosa et al., 2023).
us, when communicating on their TikTok accounts, agencies prioritise audio-visual content over visual or text formats. is
pattern is consistent with all the agencies except Vericat, where photography dominates. e demands of a younger audience
and the dynamic pace of TikTok (Lu & Shen, 2023) may explain the overall dominance of the audio-visual format.
It bears mentioning the considerable absence of detailed information regarding the purpose of disinformation. Previous
research (García-Marín & Salvat-Martinrey, 2023) indicates a similar amount of disinformation coming from both sides, which
has been conrmed by thematic analysis. However, Spanish verication agencies do not explicitly indicate in their TikTok
posts whether disinformation is pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian, regardless of whether it may be obvious or inferred at times.
With regard to Russian disinformation, Erlich and Garner (2021) distinguish between information that is anti-Ukrainian,
34 |
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|
January-June of 2025
Disinformation on the Ukraine war: an analysis of fact-checking agencies in Spain and their presence on TikTok
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
doxa.comunicación
anti-Western, pro-Russian, and true information. In this regard, TikTok posts often do not provide sucient information to
contextualise disinformation and classify it based on its origin and purpose.
4.2. What are the themes of these verications?
Recent studies on disinformation in the Russo-Ukrainian conict have yielded results that are in line with the ndings of this
study, although with certain nuances. García-Marín and Salvat-Martinrey (2023) have identied six main thematic areas that
broadly coincide with those obtained in this research: military attacks, international community reactions, military outcomes,
civilian reactions, non-military decisions, and distorted or denigrating images of the main individuals involved.
e present study highlights the dominance of military attacks, which is consistent with previous research (García-Marín
and Salvat-Martinrey, 2023; Magallón-Rosa et al., 2023). Likewise, the ndings of this paper regarding the importance of the
international and humanitarian area are comparable with those obtained by García-Marín and Salvat-Martinrey (2023).
According to Neuman et al. (1992), there are four major generic frames that dominate the coverage of critical issues: conict,
economic consequences, human interest, and morality. Verications on TikTok address conict, aspects of human interest,
and morality (e.g. the issue of a “lack of ethics”, which includes verications of especially deplorable and serious acts). However,
there was a notable absence of economic consequences.
Content with high emotional impact contrasts with the limited importance given to political, economic, and historical issues
that delve into the causes and consequences of the conict. In this sense, the high number of military and humanitarian topics
can also be interpreted in light of the conclusions of Lara-Aguiar et al. (2023), which highlight the sensationalist coverage that
the conict has received from major media outlets.
With regard to denigrating imagery, the connection to Nazism is conrmed as one of the major topics of online disinformation
about the war (García-Marín and Salvat-Martinrey, 2023), which is a classic Kremlin strategy (Erlich and Garner, 2021), and one
of the main narratives veried by Spanish fact-checking agencies (Magallón-Rosa et al., 2023). is research shows how both
sides use the two tactics of denigrating the opposing leader and linking the enemy to Nazism, although Russian disinformation
in this regard is more prevalent, due to its dening feature as the Russian narrative in Ukraine (Erlich and Garner, 2021).
e politicians and countries named in the posts provide us with information about the topic features of the veried content.
ere is a notable absence of politicians and international actors other than the presidents of Ukraine and Russia, despite the
signicant roles played by various world leaders. Furthermore, the position of the Spanish government and its national policy
with regard to the Ukrainian crisis is barely reected in the verications. e limited emphasis on third-party countries is even
more noticeable than in previous research on the role of Spanish agencies in the Ukrainian conict (Magallón-Rosa et al.,
2023). In summary, the scant presence of disinformation related to Spain and its stance on the war stands out, as well as the
absence of other countries and politicians whose roles have been crucial.
4.3. Verication of the Ukraine war on TikTok: public health or public reason?
In accordance with the latest theoretical contribution on the state of verication agencies by Graves et al. (2023), we also
dierentiate between debunking and fact-checking. e vast majority of verications are aimed at unmasking false information
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| 35
that circulates online, yet without scrutinizing political discourse. Moreover, 96.7% of the ndings are categorically false, often
veried in a few seconds or as part of compilations where multiple verications are conducted in a single post.
Within these parameters, the verication work carried out by Spanish agencies on TikTok adheres to the logic of debunking,
focusing on online content circulating with the primary aim of halting false information, although not necessarily providing
in-depth explanations. According to these denitions, the agencies do not engage in the specic task of political fact-checking,
which would involve holding politicians accountable and fostering healthy democratic debate. Instead, their aim is oriented
toward public health goals.
is approach reects a more paternalistic attitude, prioritising the prevention of virality of certain content due to its
seriousness or potential negative impact on the democratic health of society. Moreover, this is applicable to the context
of war, in which fake news might have humanitarian consequences. Additionally, the approach taken does not enable an
understanding of wars in all their complexity, which include aspects that are militaristic, geo-economic, political, cultural,
diplomatic, historical, ideological, and so on.
4.4. Dierences and similarities between Spanish agencies
is comparative analysis of the agencies provides a general overview of the verication dynamics of Spanish IFCN fact
checkers regarding the Ukraine war, as well as specic features and dierences among them. e analysis of descriptive data
and chi-square independence tests reveal generally similar activity among the four agencies. Specically, they mostly verify
false contexts and display the following features: a similar distribution across thematic areas; a comparable frequency of
verication in which countries other than Ukraine and Russia are named; a prevalence of audio-visual formats over text; and
much greater emphasis on video than images.
Newtral displays a distinct prole in terms of topics, as it veries more false information related to denigrating images and
humanitarian issues, and is the only agency in which the military section is not the most frequent. It also has the highest
percentage of verications regarding countries other than Russia and Ukraine (34.6% compared to the average of 20.9%). EFE
Verica stands out as the agency with the highest proportion of video verications, and the only one that carries out more
verications of disinformation that require more detailed explanations and nuances, such as misleading or fabricated content
and meta-verications.
By contrast, a high percentage of the disinformation revealed by Maldita can be veried quickly, such as false contexts,
manipulated images, and fraudulent authorship. It also has the highest proportion of false contexts, with more focus on the
military, and it veries the least amount of non-audio-visual formats such as text, statements, etc. In this regard, Maldita’s
approach to public health is more evident, as it prioritises rapid and extensive debunking of rumours about the war. In fact, it
conducts the highest number of verications. Moreover, according to López-Pan and Rodríguez-Rodríguez (2020), not only
are Maldita and Newtral considered the two largest platforms in Spain, they are also the most active agencies on TikTok in
terms of the number of posts and verications.
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5. Conclusions
is study conrms the results of other research on verications in the Ukraine war. Furthermore, it oers nuances to the
results of previous work, mentions some ndings that are unique to this research, and uncovers some signicant shortcomings.
Firstly, this research conrms the dominance of the audio-visual format, military topics (especially specic attacks), and the
typology of false contexts as the most frequent types of disinformation in the Ukraine war and in verication posts. A high
percentage of the false contexts consist of videos unrelated to the conict that are presented as part of the war. Although these
verications can be carried out quickly and easily, they fail to oer in-depth explanations about the dynamics of the conict.
Secondly, denigrating images and the link to Nazism take on signicant importance in the verications of all the agencies,
thus conrming the use of certain typical narratives of disinformation campaigns. However, we must mention that this same
strategy is also used against Russia and its president Vladimir Putin, although to a lesser extent,
e research questions posed have led to certain ndings related to issues that were not originally addressed. For example,
the four Spanish agencies generally show similarities in their approach to the Ukraine war, especially according to the type
of disinformation veried, themes, and formats. Furthermore, the public health approach of the agencies is evident, which
implies greater eciency and faster response time in debunking false information, yet it prevents in-depth analysis. is
research has also discovered a much greater focus on video in the verications conducted by the agencies. is appears to
be an attempt to use a more dynamic style with an emphasis on audio-visual content in order to adapt to the TikTok social
network and/or younger audiences. In addition, meta-verication, which is a kind of battle for the narrative and the truth, has
also been identied as a typology of disinformation specic to military conicts.
Finally, most notably absent from the verications are the countries and politicians who have played an important role in the
war, in addition to a shortage of background issues related to economics, politics, history, and war, as well as the stance taken
by Spain and its politicians on the conict. Moreover, the verications analysed do not always indicate which side generated
the false information, nor the context of the disinformation, nor the narratives or information which, although misleading, are
not entirely false.
6. Acknowledgments
is article has been translated into English by Charles E. Arthur, to whom we are grateful for his meticulous work.
Funding sources: is study is part of an international project entitled, IBERIFIER PLUS, funded by the European Commission.
External reference: DIGITAL-2023-DEPLOY-04/101158511. Furthermore, the research was carried out under the auspices of
the Excellence Program for University Faculty, as part of the Multi-Year Agreement between the Autonomous Region of Madrid
and Rey Juan Carlos University, with regard to regulating the framework of cooperation in the regional system of scientic
research and technological innovation (2019-2024).
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7. Specic contributions of each author
Name and Surname
Conception and design of the workPablo Hidalgo-Cobo and Belén Puebla Martínez
Methodology
Pablo Hidalgo-Cobo and Belén Puebla Martínez
Data collection and analysisOlga Serrano Villalobos
Discussion and conclusionsPablo Hidalgo-Cobo and Olga Serrano Villalobos
Drafting, formatting, version review and approvalOlga Serrano Villalobos
8. Conict of interest
e authors declare that there is no conict of interest contained in this article.
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