Analysis of the disinformation campaign in Brazil’s 2022 Elections
Análisis de la campaña de desinformación en las Elecciones Brasileñas de 2022
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July-December of 2025
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
How to cite this article:
Sánchez del Vas, R.; Ruiz Incertis, R.; García Acosta, D. and Magallón Rosa, R. (2025). Analysis of the disinformation campaign in Brazil’s 2022
Elections.
Doxa Comunicación
, 41, pp. 231-255.
https://doi.org/10.31921/doxacom.n41a2320
Rocío Sánchez del Vas.
PhD student in Media Research and Communication at the Carlos III University of Madrid
(UC3M), holding a grant for University Teacher Training (FPU) provided by the Spanish Ministry of Universities. She
holds a bachelor’s degree in Bilingual Journalism and an MA in Research Applied to the Media, both from UC3M. She
was visiting researcher at the IEE-ULB. She is a member of the Jean Monnet Chair “FUTEUDISPAN”.
University Carlos III of Madrid, Spain
[email protected]
ORCID:
0000-0002-6161-3631
Raquel Ruiz Incertis.
PhD student in Media Research and Communication at the Carlos III University of Madrid (UC3M).
Graduated in Journalism and Audiovisual Communication, she also holds a MA in Research Applied to the Media, being
awarded with an award of extraordinary performance. She has worked for dierent media, as well as in communication
oces such as the State Secretariat for the EU in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Aairs. She is a scientic collaborator
of the Jean Monnet Chair “e future of European communication in the face of the disinformation pandemic” and has
several publications focusing on European aairs, institutional communication, journalism and disinformation.
University Carlos III of Madrid, Spain
[email protected]
ORCID:
0000-0002-6670-9704
Dinella García Acosta.
Researcher at the University of Seville and holds an MA in Research Applied to the Media from
UC3M, where she was a recipient of a scholarship from the Ibero-American Association of Postgraduate Studies (AUIP).
She graduated with honours in Journalism from the University of Havana. With experience in various digital media,
she has been honoured multiple times with the National Journalism Award in her country. She has contributed to
several scientic publications, with her main research areas encompassing journalism, disinformation, gender, political
communication, and fact-checking.
Universidad de Sevilla, Spain
[email protected]
ORCID:
0000-0002-0353-3043
is content is published under Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License. International License CC BY-NC 4.0
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1. Introduction
Prior to the attempted assault on Brazilian institutions on January 8, 2023, a wave of false information characterised the
2022 presidential elections in Brazil. is disinformation, primarily based on conspiracy theories, aimed to delegitimise the
electoral system and attack the two main candidates, Jair Bolsonaro and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
Ultimately, after a very close result, the leader of the Workers’ Party won with 50.9% of the votes, becoming president of the
country for the third time, following his two terms between 2003 and 2010. Meanwhile, the outgoing president, Jair Bolsonaro,
trailed by only 1.8 points, with 49.1% of the votes.
Raúl Magallón Rosa.
Professor of journalism in the Department of Communication of Carlos III University of Madrid
(Spain). He has a degree in Journalism and a Ph.D. from the Complutense University of Madrid. His research strand
focuses on the relationship between disinformation and fact-checking. He´s also member of Iberier, a digital media
observatory in Spain and Portugal, funded by the European Commission and linked to the European Digital Media
Observatory (EDMO).
University Carlos III of Madrid, Spain
[email protected]
ORCID:
0000-0002-2236-7802
Received: 03/04/2024 - Accepted: 15/07/2024 - Early access: 23/09/2024 - Published: 01/07/2025
Recibido: 03/04/2024 - Aceptado: 15/07/2024 - En edición: 24/09/2024 - Publicado: 01/07/2025
Abstract:
Disinformation during the 2022 Brazilian elections peaked on
January 8, 2023, coinciding with an attempted assault on key state
institutions. Previously, a wave of false information and conspiracy
theories with the clear objective of delegitimizing the electoral
system and attacking the main candidates was the scenario that
distinguished the presidential elections. is study examines
hoaxes related to the 2022 Brazilian elections through verications
conducted by two leading fact-checking organizations: Agência
Lupa and Aos Fatos. e sample comprises 219 pieces of verication
published between August 29 and October 31, 2022. e results reveal
an electoral campaign characterised by hoaxes in viral audiovisual
format, particularly spread on Facebook and WhatsApp, with a higher
ow of disinformation in the second round. Likewise, deceptive
content about voting processes and electoral fraud predominates.
Additionally, the main targets of false narratives were the presidential
candidates Lula da Silva and Jair Bolsonaro.
Keywords:
Disinformation; fake news; Brazil; elections; fact-checking.
Resumen:
La desinformación durante las elecciones brasileñas de 2022 alcanzó
su momento de mayor intensidad el 8 de enero de 2023, coincidiendo
con un intento de asalto a las instituciones estatales. Previamente, una
ola de informaciones falsas y teorías conspirativas con el claro objetivo
de deslegitimar el sistema electoral y atacar a los principales candida
-
tos fue el escenario digital que marcó las elecciones presidenciales. Este
estudio examina los bulos relacionados con los comicios presidenciales
de 2022 a través de las vericaciones realizadas por dos de las princi
-
pales organizaciones de vericación de datos del país: Agência Lupa y
Aos Fatos. La muestra comprende 219 piezas de vericación publicadas
entre el 29 de agosto y el 31 de octubre de 2022. Los resultados revelan
una campaña electoral marcada por bulos en formato audiovisual vi
-
ralizados especialmente Facebook y WhatsApp, destacando un mayor
ujo desinformador en la segunda vuelta. Asimismo, predominan los
contenidos engañosos sobre los procesos de votación y el fraude electo
-
ral. Por su parte, los principales objetivos desinformadores fueron los
candidatos presidenciales Lula da Silva y Jair Bolsonaro.
Palabras clave:
Desinformación; noticias falsas; Brasil; elecciones; vericación de datos.
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However, it is important to note that an intense disinformative environment had already been experienced at the polls in 2018.
At that time, false content played a crucial role in mobilising the electorate and boosting Bolsonaro’s victory, with the events
even being investigated by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE, by its acronym in Portuguese) (Gilbert, 2018). Faced with the
challenge posed by the new electoral process, various institutions sought solutions to prevent a repeat of the 2018 scenario.
Notably, the TSE promoted agreements with Google, Meta, TikTok, and Telegram –among other platforms– with the intention
of curbing the spread of false content during these elections (Biescas, 2022).
Despite these joint eorts, the chaos and uncertainty generated by disinformation strategies also dominated the 2022 electoral
campaign. An investigation by O Globo revealed that among the most viral posts on Facebook and Instagram, lies and
falsehoods garnered more interactions (9.8 million) than truthful content. Simultaneously, the Palver company recorded a
238% increase in false narratives targeting the candidate Lula (Gutiérrez, 2022).
It is in this context that this research aimed to analyse the falsehoods related to the 2022 Brazilian elections based on the
verications labelled as false by two of the main Brazilian fact-checking organisations: Agência Lupa and Aos Fatos. is
allowed for a comparison with the 2018 elections, an analysis of populist proles such as Bolsonaro’s and their relationship
with the phenomenon of disinformation, along with a study of the elections from the perspective of the resilience of democratic
institutions.
2. Literature review
2.1. Disinformation, fake news, and fact-checking in electoral processes
In recent years, the world has faced intense uxes of disinformation surrounding current international and political events.
In this regard, the 2016 United States elections and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom (Tuñón-Navarro, 2021a)
initiated a process of institutional awareness regarding disinformation as a threat to the health of democratic processes such
as elections and referenda (European Commission, 2018).
Although propaganda and information manipulation are not novel phenomena, the rise of digital platforms and technological
professionalisation have exponentially increased their impact (Garriga et al., 2024). ese disinformative strategies have
been consolidated during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war (Ballesteros-Aguayo et al., 2024), the Israel-Gaza
conict (Tuñón-Navarro et al., 2024; López-Martín y Córdoba-Cabús, 2024), and the recent European Parliament elections.
Eorts to combat disinformation at both national and international levels converge in various initiatives, ranging from fact-
checking and media and digital literacy (Ku
ś
& Barczyszyn-Madziarz, 2020; Çömlekçi, 2022) to regulation (Tuñón-Navarro
et al., 2023), where the European Union is attempting to establish digital soft power policies that extend beyond its borders.
Moreover, various actors converge, including data veriers, journalists, universities, NGOs, and think tanks, all of whom play
a signicant role in shaping collective responses (Arcos & Smith, 2021).
One of the main initiatives to counter the mass dissemination of falsehoods is fact-checking. According to the Cambridge
Dictionary, fact-checking is dened as the process of verifying the accuracy of all data in a written work, news, speech, etc.
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is practice originated in journalism (Graves, 2018) as a means to reform the sector (Amazeen, 2020), addressing some of the
deciencies of traditional journalism (Rodríguez-Pérez et al., 2023).
In recent years, however, fact-checking organisations have gained prominence and relevance, establishing themselves as a
global movement (Tuñón-Navarro & Sánchez-del-Vas, 2022) through alliances and collaborations that lend them legitimacy
and identity (Lauer & Graves, 2024).
e proliferation of studies on the relationship between disinformation and electoral processes reveals some common
structures. Firstly, it is essential to note that various political leaders –Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro being prime examples–
currently exploit the multifaceted nature of the concept of fake news to delegitimise the electoral system and the journalistic
information that appears against them (Tible, 2018). Furthermore, false information seeking to legitimise such discourses
primarily appears in contexts where opinions are more polarised (Magallón-Rosa, 2019a; García-Acosta & Gómez-Masjuán,
2022).
In Brazil, over twenty media outlets joined the Comprova project to collaboratively verify viral content during the 2018
presidential elections. Similarly, national courts compelled candidates to remove false and misleading information from their
social media (Smalley, 2022).
2.2. Social networks as platforms for disinformation in electoral campaigns
Traditional media are losing their relevance and role as social agents. ey no longer act as the sole “gatekeepers” of information
(Parisi & Rega, 2011), having to compete with social networks not only for advertising but also for audience attention.
ese new digital spaces have become user favourites, where individuals seek content aligning with their own ideological
views (Pariser, 2017). Consequently, journalism and media, in general, face the hegemony of automated algorithms while
observing a general loss of authority in the post-truth era. is phenomenon, known as media disintermediation, favours the
rise of disinformation, as social networks decentralise information production, leading to the deconstruction of information
and potentially endangering truth and objectivity (Alonso, 2021).
In this context, social networks have emerged as the premier information showcase and the public space where people tend to
consume content reecting their own ideologies, creating an environment where dissent and negotiation are reduced (Pariser,
2017; Waisbord, 2020). is environment leads many individuals to accept falsehoods and conspiracy theories that align
with their viewpoints (Weeks & Garrett, 2014), and social networks become powerful sources of false content dissemination
(Sharma et al., 2019; Shu et al., 2017).
Compounding the issue, articial intelligence techniques used to deceive people by creating and disseminating false content
have been proliferating with increasing impact (Aïmeur et al., 2023). It is also crucial to consider the role of algorithmic
recommendation structures in spreading disinformation as these are essential in organising content on social networks and
understanding the scale and speed of contemporary disinformation dissemination.
In algorithm-controlled bubbles, which tend to keep users within echo chambers, users are constantly exposed to biased and
repetitive content, further reinforcing their misconceptions and pre-existing prejudices (Ahmed & Gil López, 2022). Empirical
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research has shown that social networks like YouTube reinforce disinformation (Tang et al., 2021) and contribute to increased
political polarisation (Cho et al., 2020).
Moreover, a key factor in this phenomenon is the nancial interest linked to user attention on these digital platforms (Feezell
et al., 2021). is premise helps explain why recommendation systems are designed to maximise the time users spend on
platforms, oering a constant ow of content tailored to their tastes and preferences. Previous studies have shown that these
personalised ows can strengthen pre-existing beliefs and increase the impact of disinformation (Ahmed & Gil-López, 2022).
In particular, personalised algorithmic recommendations that align with users’ individual perspectives tend to reinforce their
attitudes and increase opinion polarisation (Cho et al., 2020; Ohme, 2021; Ahmed & Gil-López, 2022).
In this context of discussion and mobilisation of the public sphere, election candidates’ communication teams closely study
which platforms are most used by users in their country to focus their digital campaign eorts on them (Braga & Carlomagno,
2018).
is is exemplied in several Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela
(Santana & Cánepa, 2019). In these countries, a political party or aliated groups have directed such propagandistic practices,
aiming to manipulate public opinion, demobilise opponents, or generate false support for certain positions (Howard, 2015).
However, interference is not always generated within the same country. Indeed, such actions have been publicly linked to the
Russian government, accused of interfering in the US, French, and even Catalonian crisis elections (Calero, 2018).
As analysed by Cristina Tardáguila, Fabrício Benevenuto, and Pablo Ortellado in the 2018 Brazilian elections, up to 44 percent
of Brazilian voters used WhatsApp to read political and electoral information. eir analysis found that “56 percent of the most
shared images in the analysed WhatsApp groups –open and political in nature– were misleading. Only 8 percent of the 50 most
shared images were considered entirely truthful” (Magallón-Rosa, 2019b).
2.3. Disinformation and populism in the Brazilian context
e erosion of traditional political structures, widespread scepticism towards the media and institutions, and the rise of
populist tactics collectively laid the groundwork for the initial wave of disinformation witnessed during the 2018 elections
in Brazil. Facebook played a key role in this scenario, helping to construct sometimes distorted images of the candidates. An
analysis by e Guardian showed that the vast majority of false content shared on WhatsApp during the elections favoured the
then-candidate Jair Bolsonaro (Avelar, 2019). is messaging app was one of the main channels for spreading disinformation
designed to align with Bolsonaro’s campaign narratives (Eleotério-Gama, 2020).
e Brazilian Federal Police conducted an investigation and identied Bolsonaro as a direct and signicant user of false
information to attack democratic institutions during the 2018 elections. Additionally, the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court
required the removal of hundreds of links containing false data and information, as well as hundreds of thousands of posts that
reached millions of views (Gilbert, 2018).
e Brazilian fact-checking agency Aos Fatos highlighted that during the 2018 election period, 1.17 million pieces of false
information were exchanged via WhatsApp (Eleotério-Gama, 2020), and Avaaz (2020) revealed that 83.7% of Bolsonaro voters
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believed the supposed information that the then Workers’ Party candidate, Fernando Haddad, was distributing the so-called
“gay kit” to children in schools.
Marked by a strong populist shift, the alleged information aligned with the defence of religious conservatism, the so-called
traditional family, the ght against gender ideology, and the denial and distortion of traditionally progressive policies’
achievements (García-Acosta & Gómez-Masjuán, 2022). A marked predominance of hate speech often accompanied these
narratives.
According to Tible (2018), Bolsonaro’s discourse was based on “we are the majority, we are the true Brazil.” On this basis,
falsehoods sought to reiterate the declaration of equality among all Brazilians in opposition to what would be divisiveness,
whether it be class struggle (between rich/poor), racial issues (black/white), generational (parents/children), regional (south/
northeast), or gender and sexual orientation (heterosexual/LGBTQIA+).
In general, it was a discourse aimed at instilling fear, starting from the existing contradictions in society, often resorting to
the imaginary references of the consumers of these contents: prejudices and stereotypes that, as negative symbols, sought to
provoke a conditioned response (García-Acosta & Gómez-Masjuán, 2022: 99).
3. Objectives, research questions, and methodologies
3.1. Objectives
e general objective of this research is to analyse the disinformation related to the 2022 Brazilian elections through the
verication of pieces labelled as false information by two major Brazilian fact-checking organisations: Agência Lupa and Aos
Fatos. e specic objectives are as follows:
O1: To characterise the disinformation based on its theme, format, and typology.
O2: To identify the protagonists of the disinformation and the attributes conveyed about them.
O3: To determine the dierences or similarities between the narratives of the disinformation spread during the rst and
second rounds of the electoral period.
3.2. Research questions
Based on the aforementioned objectives, the following research questions have been formulated:
Q1: What is the predominant channel for the viral spread of the disinformation veried by the selected organisations?
Q2: What format is most commonly used for the viral spread of the analysed content?
Q3: Does the frequency of disinformation vary between the rst and second electoral rounds?
Q4: What is the predominant theme in the veried pieces studied?
Q5: Which candidate is the primary focus of disinformation during the electoral period?
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3.3. Content analysis
For this research, content analysis was employed as the main methodology, considered the quintessential research technique
in communication studies (Wimmer et al., 1996). is methodology has also been previously used in recent studies on fact-
checking and disinformation, such as Salaverría, R. et al. (2020); Aguado-Guadalupe & Bernaola-Serrano (2020); Gálvez-Caja
(2020); García-Marín (2020); Naeem et al. (2020); Brennen et al. (2020); Alonso-González (2021); Ruiz-Incertis et al. (2024);
López-Martín and Córdoba-Cabús (2024); Sánchez-del-Vas and Tuñón-Navarro (2024).
For this research, a content analysis was conducted on the publications of two Brazilian fact-checking outlets: Agência Lupa
and Aos Fatos. Both belong to the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), ensuring the formal deontological quality of
their content. us, they present a signicant number of verications published within the selected time frame on the topic
under study.
e sample consists of content published by both fact-checking outlets between 29 August 2022 and 31 October 2022, the
day Lula Da Silva was declared the winner of the presidential elections. In total, two months of the electoral campaign were
studied. Additionally, all publications related to the elections were selected –for example, those referring to the candidates or
Brazilian institutions during periods preceding the electoral campaign itself– ltering out those unrelated to the study topic.
is resulted in an initial sample of 319 publications.
However, since this research focuses on disinformation during the electoral campaign and not exclusively on the work of
fact-checkers, only publications debunking false content or disinformation were ltered. True verications, fact-checking of
politicians, or explanations of events were not included, as the aim is to analyse the nature of the disinformation itself, with the
verication pieces merely serving as a means to access the false content.
is second lter yielded a sample of 233 publications. Finally, manually removing duplicate news items veried by both
fact-checkers resulted in a nal sample of 219 publications. In this respect, 6% of the total publications veried by both fact-
checkers were duplicates.
To conduct the content analysis of the selected media, a coding framework was developed based on a series of analysis variables
tailored to each sample. ese selections were guided by the variables previously coded by researchers in the aforementioned
studies. e variables and categories analysed are detailed below.
–
Variable 1 (V1): e platform of false information. is variable studies the networks where the veried false information was
found. Categories: Facebook; WhatsApp; Instagram; TikTok; Telegram; Twitter; Kwai; YouTube; Helo.
–
Variable 2 (V2): Format of the false information. is refers to the communicative code used to spread the false information.
Categories and subcategories: Combined (text + image; text + video; text + audio); Video; Text; Image; Audio; No specied.
–
Variable 3 (V3): e frequency of fact-checking. is quanties the number of disinformation cases debunked daily by the
fact-checkers.
–
Variable 4 (V4): e theme of the false information. is constitutes the main narrative around which each piece of false infor
-
mation revolves. Categories and subcategories: Electoral campaign (rallies; debates/interviews; publicity and propaganda;
media; other); Electoral program (social issues; other); Voting and electoral fraud (other; candidates; Bolsonaro supporters;
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Lula supporters); Election polls; Social issues (housing; religion; women; drugs; poverty; other); Electoral candidates (su
-
pport for political leaders; boos for political leaders; candidates’ personal lives; other; Lula’s criminal record); Demonstra
-
tions and confrontations; ird countries; Other; Electoral propaganda; Public discourses.
–
Variable 5 (V5): e typology of the false information. is refers to the dierent types of problematic content found in the
informational ecosystem. e categories are based on the classication by Wardle (2017). Categories: Fabricated content;
Manipulated content; False context; Impostor content; Misleading content; False connection; Satire.
–
Variable 6 (V6): e protagonist of a piece of false information. is is the central gure within the fabricated narrative, often
reecting the subject at the centre of the disinformation being spread. Categories: Lula da Silva; Jair Bolsonaro; Workers’ Party
(PT); Liberal Party (PL); Journalists or media outlets; Superior Electoral Court; Other.
It is worth noting that, on some occasions, more than one category was assigned per verication, as some false information
had more than one protagonist and was spread through various networks.
To ensure the validity and reliability of the research, a systematic and coordinated approach was adopted among the four
coders, dividing the sample and performing parallel coding, thus engaging in discussion to reach consensus on cases that
presented greater doubts or complexities in their categorisation.
e analysed content was obtained using web scraping techniques with the Octoparse tool, which allowed the download
of data published on the websites of the two fact-checkers. e data was also coded using advanced functions available in
Microsoft Excel and processed using the statistical software IBM SPSS.
4. Results
4.1. Platform
Within social networks and messaging systems, in both the rst and second rounds, false information veried on Facebook
predominated, with 41.7% and 36.1%, respectively. Following this, the messaging network WhatsApp was the most utilised,
with 21.2% and 30.1% during each period.
In the case of the fact-checking site Lupa, the social network through which they received content from users for verication
via direct message was mentioned most frequently. erefore, the prevalence of WhatsApp and Facebook could be determined
by this bias, although these platforms are also mentioned as the main channels for the dissemination of false information.
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Figure 1. Social networks through which false information circulated by round
checkers. The data was also coded using advanced functions available in Microsoft Excel
and processed using the statistical software IBM SPSS.
4. Results
4.1 Platform
Within social networks and messaging systems, in both the first and second rounds, false
information verified on Facebook predominated, with 41.7% and 36.1%
,
respectively.
Following this, the messaging network WhatsApp was the most utilised, with 21.2% and
30.1% during each period.
In the case of the fact
-
checking site Lupa, the social network through which they received
content from users for verification via direct message was mentioned most frequently.
Therefore, the prevalence of WhatsApp and Facebook could be determined by this bias,
although these platforms are also mentioned as the main channels for the dissemination
of false information.
Figure 1: Social networks through which false information circulated by round
Source: created by the authors
Other social networks used for the dissemination of false information in the first round
were Instagram (9.3%), TikTok (7.9%), Telegram (6.6%), Twitter (6%), and to a much
lesser extent, some such as Kwai (4.0%), YouTube (2%), and Helo (1.3%). In the second
round, Instagram (12%), TikTok (6.5%), Twitter (6%), Telegram (5.1%), Kwai (3.2%),
and YouTube (0.9%) stood out.
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Other social networks used for the dissemination of false information in the rst round were Instagram (9.3%), TikTok (7.9%),
Telegram (6.6%), Twitter (6%), and to a much lesser extent, some such as Kwai (4.0%), YouTube (2%), and Helo (1.3%). In the
second round, Instagram (12%), TikTok (6.5%), Twitter (6%), Telegram (5.1%), Kwai (3.2%), and YouTube (0.9%) stood out.
4.2. Format
Overall, throughout the analysed period, the combined format prevailed (60.7%), and within this, false information in the “text
+ video” format stood out with 62.4% of the total of this format, followed by the “text + image” binomial (34.5%).
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Figure 2. Format of false information by round
4.2 Format
Overall, throughout the analysed period, the combined format prevailed (60.7%), and
within this, false information in the "text + video" format stood out with 62.4% of the
total of this format, followed by the "text + image" binomial (34.5%).
Figure 2: Format of false information by round
Source: created by the authors
Regarding the formats of false information, during the first round, the combined format
predominated (63.4%), followed by video (20.4%). A smaller percentage of false
information was disseminated only in text format (8.6%), image (4.3%), and audio
(3.2%). It is noteworthy that within the combined format, the use of the "text + video"
binomial reached 71.6%, while "text + image" was used by 26.6%. The "text + audio"
combination was used to a much lesser extent, with only 1.6% of the total.
In the second round of elections, a similar pattern was observed in terms of the combined
format (58.7%). Video and image, on the other hand, were used in almost the same
proportion,
with 17.5% and 18.3%
,
respectively. As in the first round, the "text + video"
binomial prevailed (53.3%), and in second and third place the "text + image" and "text +
audio" combinations (40%) and (6.6%), respectively.
4.3 Verification frequency
Regarding the frequency of verifications, despite the linear trend observed in the results
over the timeframe of the research, there were some peaks of disinformation in both the
first and second rounds. In the first electoral period, the days with the highest number of
false information checks by both Brazilian agencies were 1 October (18.3%), 29
September (7.5%), and 27 September (6.5%).
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Source: created by the authors
Regarding the formats of false information, during the rst round, the combined format predominated (63.4%), followed by
video (20.4%). A smaller percentage of false information was disseminated only in text format (8.6%), image (4.3%), and audio
(3.2%). It is noteworthy that within the combined format, the use of the “text + video” binomial reached 71.6%, while “text +
image” was used by 26.6%. e “text + audio” combination was used to a much lesser extent, with only 1.6% of the total.
In the second round of elections, a similar pattern was observed in terms of the combined format (58.7%). Video and image,
on the other hand, were used in almost the same proportion, with 17.5% and 18.3%, respectively. As in the rst round, the “text
+ video” binomial prevailed (53.3%), and in second and third place the “text + image” and “text + audio” combinations (40%)
and (6.6%), respectively.
4.3. Verication frequency
Regarding the frequency of verications, despite the linear trend observed in the results over the timeframe of the research,
there were some peaks of disinformation in both the rst and second rounds. In the rst electoral period, the days with the
highest number of false information checks by both Brazilian agencies were 1 October (18.3%), 29 September (7.5%), and 27
September (6.5%).
In contrast, in the second period, notable dates include 2 October (10.3%), followed by 30 October (7.1%), and 17 and 25 of the
same month, sharing the third position with 6.3%, where a higher number of disinformation contents went viral.
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Furthermore, the total sample of verications in the second round (N=126) exceeded the rst round (N=93) by nearly thirty.
erefore, the selected fact-checking organisations detected a greater ow of disinformation during the second round, and,
despite being concentrated mainly on key days, the frequency of verications was higher.
Figure 3. Verication frequency by day
In contrast, in the second period, notable dates include 2 October (10.3%), followed by
30 October (7.1%), and 17 and 25 of the same month, sharing the third position with
6.3%, where a higher number of disinformation contents went viral.
Furthermore, the total sample of verifications in the second round (N=126) exceeded the
first round (N=93) by nearly thirty. Therefore, the selected fact
-
checking organisations
detected a greater flow of disinformation during the second round
,
and, despite being
concentrated mainly on key days, the frequency of verifications was higher.
Figure 3: Verification frequency by day
Source: created by the authors
4.4 Theme
In general, throughout the entire campaign, the most viralised theme was related to voting
and electoral fraud (28.8%), followed by disinformation about the electoral campaign
(16.4%) and the candidates (14.6%).
Figure 4: Theme of false information by round
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4.4. eme
In general, throughout the entire campaign, the most viralised theme was related to voting and electoral fraud (28.8%),
followed by disinformation about the electoral campaign (16.4%) and the candidates (14.6%).
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Figure 4. eme of false information by round
Source: created by the authors
Regarding the thematic variable, we observed that in the first round of the elections, the
main theme of viralised false information was voting and electoral fraud (29.03%).
Following this, false information about the electoral campaign (20.43%) was prominent,
particularly those referring to debates and interviews as well as electoral publicity.
In third place, the most shared theme of disinformation was related to the electoral
candidates (13.98%), specifically those referring to boos for political leaders and support
for them.
In the second round, as in the first, voting and electoral fraud (28.57%) were the
predominant themes of most false information. Additionally, the relevance of social
issues (17.46%), specifically religion, drugs, and poverty, stood out. The third most
vir
alised narrative was related to the candidates (15.08%), specifically those mentioning
support for political leaders and their personal lives.
4.5 Typology
In general terms, during the entire period studied, misleading content predominated
(26.03%), followed by information presenting a false context (25.11%), while fabricated
content occupied third place (22.83%).
Figure 5: Typology of false information in each round
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Source: created by the authors
Regarding the thematic variable, we observed that in the rst round of the elections, the main theme of viralised false
information was voting and electoral fraud (29.03%). Following this, false information about the electoral campaign (20.43%)
was prominent, particularly those referring to debates and interviews as well as electoral publicity.
In third place, the most shared theme of disinformation was related to the electoral candidates (13.98%), specically those
referring to boos for political leaders and support for them.
In the second round, as in the rst, voting and electoral fraud (28.57%) were the predominant themes of most false information.
Additionally, the relevance of social issues (17.46%), specically religion, drugs, and poverty, stood out. e third most viralised
narrative was related to the candidates (15.08%), specically those mentioning support for political leaders and their personal
lives.
4.5. Typology
In general terms, during the entire period studied, misleading content predominated (26.03%), followed by information
presenting a false context (25.11%), while fabricated content occupied third place (22.83%).
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Figure 5. Typology of false information in each round
First roundSecond round
Imposter content
0%5,5%
Satire
1,1%0%
False context
33,3%19%
Manipulated content
19,4%17,5%
Fabricated content
21,5%23,8%
Misleading content
21,5%29,4%
False conection
3,2%4,8%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Source: created by the authors
During the rst round of the Brazilian elections (N=93), the predominant type of false information disseminated was, with
one-third of the results, false context (33.3%). is was followed by misleading and fabricated content (both 21.5%) and
manipulated content (19.4%).
Regarding the second round of elections (N=126), misleading content rose to the top position with 29.4%, followed by fabricated
content (23%). e false connection of headlines and content, which was rather residual during the rst round, ranked third
with 19%. It should also be noted that, while in the rst round fact-checkers did not detect impostor content and did identify
some satirical pieces, the opposite occurred during the second round.
4.6. Protagonist
Each time a democratic process such as an election takes place, hundreds of falsehoods are disseminated with the aim of
delegitimising the electoral systems and the institutions responsible for overseeing them, which are directly accused of
facilitating fraud. In this context, throughout the studied period, da Silva was the protagonist of one-third of the sample of false
information (33%), with the Superior Electoral Court and Bolsonaro vying for second and third place at close distances (17%
and 16%, respectively).
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Figure 6. Protagonists of false information by round
Source: created by the authors
During the first round, a greater number of false contents were disseminated around the
figure of the candidate Lula da Silva (25.8%). In second place were falsehoods with an
unidentified collective protagonist or voter, categorised as "other" (20.4%). Upon
detecting unusual cases that did not correspond to any of the assigned protagonists and
differed significantly in nature from each other, the "others" category was established.
This category grouped together falsehoods with unidentified collective protagonists or
voters, namely: institutions/administrations, famous artists, demonstrators, social
platforms, or Brazilian government ministers. For example, this category included a
falsehood referring directly to Silas Malafaia (friend and advisor to President Bolsonaro),
as well as another concerning the ministers of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil.
Finally, in third place in the first round, the liberal candidate Jair Bolsonaro stands out
(18.3%).
On the other hand, Lula da Silva again consolidated himself as the main protagonist of
the falsehoods in the second round, with 38.1%, followed at a significant distance by the
Superior Electoral Court (18.3%) and the candidate Jair Bolsonaro (15.9%), who once
again occupied the third position.
5. Discussion of results
5.1 The role of social media and the prevalence of audiovisual formats
As evidenced in the results, the prevalence of videos, almost always combined with brief
texts, confirms that electoral disinformation appears to have evolved since the 2018
presidential elections into short, unsophisticated videos consumed rapidly to reinforce
voters' preconceived notions (Biescas, 2022). Simultaneously, platforms like TikTok,
Kwai, Instagram, and YouTube have gained prominence, circulating these types of viral
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During the rst round, a greater number of false contents were disseminated around the gure of the candidate Lula da Silva
(25.8%). In second place were falsehoods with an unidentied collective protagonist or voter, categorised as “other” (20.4%).
Upon detecting unusual cases that did not correspond to any of the assigned protagonists and diered signicantly in nature
from each other, the “others” category was established. is category grouped together falsehoods with unidentied collective
protagonists or voters, namely: institutions/administrations, famous artists, demonstrators, social platforms, or Brazilian
government ministers. For example, this category included a falsehood referring directly to Silas Malafaia (friend and advisor
to President Bolsonaro), as well as another concerning the ministers of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil. Finally, in third
place in the rst round, the liberal candidate Jair Bolsonaro stands out (18.3%).
On the other hand, Lula da Silva again consolidated himself as the main protagonist of the falsehoods in the second round,
with 38.1%, followed at a signicant distance by the Superior Electoral Court (18.3%) and the candidate Jair Bolsonaro (15.9%),
who once again occupied the third position.
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5. Discussion of results
5.1. e role of social media and the prevalence of audiovisual formats
As evidenced in the results, the prevalence of videos, almost always combined with brief texts, conrms that electoral
disinformation appears to have evolved since the 2018 presidential elections into short, unsophisticated videos consumed
rapidly to reinforce voters’ preconceived notions (Biescas, 2022). Simultaneously, platforms like TikTok, Kwai, Instagram, and
YouTube have gained prominence, circulating these types of viral contents that users receive on their feeds, devoid of context
and mixed with all kinds of information, making it even more challenging to discern what is real or false.
As Vázquez and Pulido (2020) observed, social media is also the public space where disinformation is most widely disseminated.
Indeed, a study conducted by the agency Aos Fatos on TikTok found that almost half of the posts supporting Jair Bolsonaro’s re-
election contained attacks or disinformation, compared to a quarter of those favouring Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) (Barbosa
and Rudnitzki, 2022).
us, to disinform, it is no longer necessary to present false data or statements; sometimes, a mere clip of a real video with
a misleading description that rearms voters’ beliefs suces. is has created a much more complex scenario than in 2018
(Biescas, 2022).
Although the most frequently used platforms remain Facebook and WhatsApp, these elections were marked by the rise of new
networks like TikTok and Telegram, where many traditional media outlets still do not reach large audiences or have not yet
entered.
In spaces where the impact of false information on political topics is much greater than on other areas of general interest
(Vosoughi et al., 2018), we observe, once again, that the potential of social media to spread false content increases, especially
during electoral campaigns, where disinformation benets from an increasingly polarised public opinion (Lewandowsky et
al., 2017).
5.2. Flows of disinformation during the electoral rounds
is study has revealed peaks of disinformation that occurred both in the rst and second rounds. In this regard, in the nal
days of September and the early days of October –coinciding with the end of the rst electoral round and the beginning of the
second– there was a signicant number of fact-checking verications. In fact, the analysed fact-checkers veried three times
more disinformation on October 1st and 2nd than on other days during the campaign. ere was also a noticeable increase
in verications of false content during the week leading up to the nal election results, including October 30th, the date when
candidate Lula da Silva was declared president of Brazil with 51% of the votes.
In the case of Brazilian elections, it appears evident that disinformation spread more extensively both in the nal days of the
rst round –preceding the start of the second round (September 27th and 29th; October 1st and 2nd)– and in the days leading
up to its conclusion –coinciding with electoral debates– as well as on the day of the president’s proclamation (October 17th
and 25th; October 30th).
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According to Magallón-Rosa (2019b), two specic moments accelerate fact-checking during electoral campaigns: candidate
debates and election day. From an informational intensity perspective, days featuring candidate debates, alongside the voting
day, become pivotal dates, evidenced by the fact that activity on social media platforms such as Twitter (now X) during these
days typically doubles or triples compared to the rest of the campaign.
It is worth noting that the quantity of false content veried by fact-checking organisations during the study period is signicantly
higher in the second electoral round than in the rst. is leads us to infer that as the electoral process approaches its nal day,
more disinformation is disseminated on the topic.
In this regard, Congosto (2015) warns in their research that electoral processes, such as the reection day, can be challenging to
control on social media because they always have activity circulating beneath the radar of the traditional public sphere. Whether
in the form of memes, misleading headlines, or manipulated images and videos, this content circulates indiscriminately on
WhatsApp, Facebook, or Instagram with the political objective of trying to convince or dissuade undecided voters according
to their interests.
5.3. Topics of viral electoral disinformation: electoral fraud and voting irregularities
Voting and electoral fraud have constituted the primary theme of viral hoaxes both in the rst and second rounds, as well as
throughout the entire timeframe studied. ese topics were followed by others of a related nature, such as the course of the
electoral campaign or references to the personal and/or professional lives of the candidates.
is observation is consistent with the ndings of Magallón-Rosa (2019c:246), who notes that disinformation during electoral
periods typically centres on themes related to legislation, particularly “electoral fraud, fake polls, and false information or
statements by candidates.”
Contemporary works in a similar vein, such as that of Paniagua-Rojano et al. (2020) on the 2019 Spanish general elections
or Noain-Sánchez’s (2019) study on the 2018 Mexican elections, corroborate this, indicating that electoral irregularities, the
National Electoral Institute (INE), and other actors linked to the electoral process were a hot topic for hoaxes.
It is therefore coherent that the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) emerges as one of the indisputable protagonists of the
disinformation campaign surrounding the Brazilian elections, as will be discussed below.
Whenever a democratic process like elections takes place, hundreds of hoaxes are disseminated aiming to delegitimize
electoral systems and the institutions responsible for overseeing them (Spanish Department of Homeland Security, 2022),
which are directly accused of facilitating fraud. Natália Leal, CEO of Agência Lupa, explained to Maldita fact-checkers that
“this content creates the idea that there is a lack of transparency in the Brazilian electoral process and leads to challenges to
the results, which is extremely damaging to Brazilian democracy” (Maldito Bulo, 2022). For instance, after the rst round of
elections, disinformation was spread about irregularities in the use of electronic voting machines in Brazil.
is contrasts with previous research, which reveals that hoaxes in earlier Brazilian elections were primarily centred on social
issues, particularly Catholic religion or the defence of the traditional family by candidate Jair Bolsonaro (García-Acosta and
Gómez-Masjuán, 2022). However, it was also possible to identify issues related to controversial information –such as familial or
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business ties of the candidates– and false statements made during the campaign, as well as ambiguous references to Brazilian
legislation.
5.4. e protagonists of the hoaxes: Lula da Silva and Jair Bolsonaro
In Latin America, the main targets of disinformation during electoral periods are primarily the candidates (Ojeda-Copa and
Peredo-Rodríguez, 2020). Indeed, in light of the results obtained, it is apparent that Lula da Silva has been the central gure in
a signicant portion of the disseminated falsehoods. e narrative of “Lula as the Antichrist” was one of the most prominent
throughout the campaign (Dénis-Cruz, 2022).
In 2018, the virality of false information benetted one candidate at the expense of others (Canavilhas et al., 2019). However,
in this case, da Silva, despite being the target of the primary disinformation strategies, ended up being elected president of the
country. In this regard, some researchers report that the candidate with the greatest likelihood of winning tends to be the focus
of disinformation (Paniagua-Rojano et al., 2020).
Secondly, there were direct attacks on the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). is is the highest court in Electoral Justice, which,
among other functions, is responsible for investigating electoral crimes, overseeing electoral propaganda, and addressing
candidate registration challenges (Tribunal Superior de Justiça, 2022). Although the most widely circulated disinformation
theme was electoral fraud, it is not surprising that the ocial body responsible for conducting the elections was also targeted
by rumours.
Indeed, Pablo Ortellado, a Public Policy lecturer at the University of São Paulo, explained to Newtral (Dénis-Cruz, 2022) that
one of the major concerns throughout the 2022 elections has been the attacks on the electoral system. is was also observed
in the United States with Trump, “but in Brazil with more fervour.” Moreover, these ndings are not unique to this electoral
process, as they resemble those detected in the Spanish case by Paniagua-Rojano et al. (2020), which found that the electoral
system itself was the most aected by rumours.
Similarly, although to a lesser extent, former President Bolsonaro has also been subjected to disinformation attacks, despite
being one of the main sources of such disinformation during the electoral campaign. is is not a novel phenomenon, as his
gure had previously been embroiled in controversy due to his false and anti-vaccine statements disseminated during the
COVID-19 pandemic (Koch, 2021).
5.5. Types of disinformation in electoral contexts: distortion of truth as the main phenomenon
As in the 2018 Brazilian elections, where contents classied as “false information” outnumbered those containing true
information (Canavilhas et al., 2019), various types of disinformation have also found their place in the 2022 elections. In this
regard, as addressed in the results section, the predominant types of disinformation throughout the studied timeframe have
been misleading content and false context.
is observation aligns with the ndings of Brennen et al. (2020) and Sánchez-del-Vas and Tuñón-Navarro (2024), showing that
fabricated information (where the truth is distorted or reworked) has had a substantially decisive role in the disinformation
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campaign. us, the results also resemble those obtained by Paniagua-Rojano et al. (2020), who detected that a signicant
portion of the rumours spread during the 2019 Spanish general elections were falsely attributed to actions and statements.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that fabricated content has also had a signicant presence within the analysed sample. Wardle
(2017) classies this type as the most harmful, given its greater intent to deceive. However, this could be due to the editorial
decisions of fact-checkers when discrediting false information, who may have prioritised verifying information that could
potentially cause more harm to the public.
Despite the various types of disinformation detected, Marlos Ápyus, an audience analyst at the newspaper O Estado de São
Paulo, noted to Newtral (Dénis-Cruz, 2022) that, unlike the 2018 Brazilian elections, the 2022 electoral process has been more
controlled in terms of disinformation.
6. Conclusions
Considering the attempted assault on the main institutions of the Brazilian state on 8 January 2023, this study on disinformation
surrounding the electoral campaign acquires greater relevance for understanding subsequent events.
rough the analysis conducted, this research has conrmed the prevalence of videos accompanied by succinct texts as
the primary format for the viral spread of hoaxes. Additionally, the dominance of social media as the main channel for the
dissemination of disinformation has been established. ese ndings address the rst and second research questions.
Moreover, the results reveal that while disinformation increased during both the initial and second electoral rounds, the
volume of false content analysed by the fact-checking media signicantly surged during the latter phase. In this context,
specic events such as electoral debates and the election day itself catalysed fact-checking eorts. All these ndings address
the third research question.
Regarding the themes of the hoaxes, voting procedures and alleged electoral malpractices emerged as the main disinformation
narrative during the two electoral rounds and throughout the entire study period. ese themes were closely followed by
discussions about the electoral campaign trajectory and references to the personal or professional lives of the candidates. is
elucidates the fourth research question.
Furthermore, throughout the study period, the dominant forms of disinformation were misleading content, false context, and
fabricated content. Lastly, concerning the key gures involved in the spread of erroneous information, a larger proportion of
hoaxes was propagated about the Workers’ Party candidate, Lula da Silva, in contrast to his rival in the presidential race, Jair
Bolsonaro. Notably, there were prominent cases of direct attacks against the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). is addresses the
fth and nal research question.
In conclusion, it is important to highlight that one of the main limitations of this research is that it is conned to a single
informative event, namely the 2022 Brazilian elections. Furthermore, although the selected fact-checkers hold a quality seal of
ethical standards, another limitation of this study lies in the fact that the research is based on the hoaxes previously selected by
them, as they are subject to their own journalistic criteria in selecting the hoaxes to analyse. Nevertheless, this is a widely used
methodological decision in the academic study of disinformation.
doxa.comunicación |
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Rocío Sánchez del Vas, Raquel Ruiz Incertis, Dinella García Acosta and Raúl Magallón Rosa
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
| 249
Regarding future lines of research, it would be highly benecial to study dierent time periods based on the discovered
evidence while also considering alternative study topics. is approach would facilitate the expansion of knowledge about
political processes and the growing strategies of disinformation.
7. Acknowledgements
is article has been proofread in English by Harvey Holtom, to whom we express our gratitude for their work.
Funding Sources: is work was supported by the IBERIFIER Plus project, co-funded by the European Commission under
the Call DIGITAL-2023-DEPLOY-04, European Digital Media observatory (EDMO) – National and multinational hubs, grant
number: IBERIFIER Plus - 101158511.
8. Specic contributions of each author
Name and surname
Conception and design of the work
Rocío Sánchez del Vas; Raquel Ruiz Incertis; Dinella García Acosta;
Raúl Magallón Rosa
Methodology
Rocío Sánchez del Vas; Raquel Ruiz Incertis; Dinella García Acosta;
Raúl Magallón Rosa
Data collection and analysis
Rocío Sánchez del Vas; Raquel Ruiz Incertis; Dinella García Acosta;
Raúl Magallón Rosa
Discussion and conclusions
Rocío Sánchez del Vas; Raquel Ruiz Incertis; Dinella García Acosta;
Raúl Magallón Rosa
Drafting, formatting, version review and approval
Rocío Sánchez del Vas; Raquel Ruiz Incertis; Dinella García Acosta;
Raúl Magallón Rosa
9. Conict of interest
e authors declare that there is no conict of interest contained in this article.
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