Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022 National Strike Crisis políticas en redes sociales. La comunicación del Gobierno del Ecuador en Instagram y X durante el Paro Nacional de 2022 doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | 127July-December of 2026ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978How to cite this article: Lozano-Recalde, C.; Suau-Gomila, G. and Pont-Sorribes, C. (2026). Political Crises on Social Media. e Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022 National Strike. Doxa Comunicación, 43, pp. 127-156.https//doi.org/10.31921/doxacom.2829Cristian Lozano-Recalde. Master’s degree in Political and Corporate Communication from the University of Navarra and a PhD Student in the Department of Communication at Pompeu Fabra University. He is a digital communication consultant for companies and projects in Ecuador, as well as a professor of political crises module in the Master’s in Political and Institutional Communication at UPF Barcelona School of Management. He is member of the POLCOM-GRP research group at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and was the coordinator of the research project Crisis and Emergency Communication in Social Media, granted and funded by the Ministry of Science and Innovation of the Government of Spain. His main research lines include crisis and risk communication, the use of social media in political and institutional communication, and political discourse on social media.Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain [email protected]ORCID: 0000-0001-8459-8377Guillem Suau-Gomila. PhD in Communication from Universitat Pompeu Fabra and professor and researcher in the Department of Catalan Philology and Communication at the University of Lleida (UDL). He has published extensively on political and institutional communication during crises and emergencies in reputable academic journals, contributed to numerous book chapters on the topic, and delivered over twenty presentations at national and international conferences. He was the principal investigator of the project Hate on Social Media: e Agora of Misogyny, funded by the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP). His lines of research focus on crisis and emergency communication, political communication, and hate speech on social media. Universitat de Lleida, Spain [email protected]ORCID: 0000-0002-8364-675XCarles Pont-Sorribes. PhD in Social Communication, and is a researcher and Full Professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra. He serves as the Academic Director of the Master’s program in Political and Institutional Communication at the UPF Barcelona School of Management and as the Director of the Ideograma UPF Chair of Political Communication and Democracy. His research interests include political communication, public opinion, risk and crisis communication, and journalism. He has made numerous scientic contributions, many of which have been published in prestigious academic journals. He is the author of seven books and over ten book chapters published by specialised communication publishers. He has participated in prominent competitive research projects (R&D&I) and delivered lectures at universities nationally and internationally. He has also conducted research stays at renowned international centres, including the Risk, Science, Health, and the Media research group led by Full Professor Jenny Kitzinger at the Cardi School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies at Cardi University. Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain [email protected]ORCID: 0000-0003-1135-4245 is content is published under Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License. International License CC BY-NC 4.0

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128 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicación1. Introductione digital ecosystem represents a complex landscape for political communication. Continuous technological changes constantly redene communication tactics, especially on social media (Subekti et al., 2023), where public opinion climates are primarily shaped today (Herbst, 2011; Giansante, 2015). During public crises, social media can enhance communication (Bruns and Burgess, 2014; Sutton and Veil, 2017; Fraustino and Liu, 2017), when they are used strategically and responsibly. In this regard, Valentini et al. (2022) highlight that social media should be fully integrated into crisis strategy, from the prevention stage to response and recovery. In political crises, events are framed within narratives according to the communication processes and interests of the various actors involved (Coombs and Holladay, 2023). However, this typology represents a blind spot in research on crises in public administrations and governments (Auer, 2016; Lozano-Recalde, 2024), which tends to focus primarily on crises related to disasters and health emergencies. Consequently, there is also limited scientic content on the specic use of social media for managing political crises. Recibido: 08/11/2024 - Aceptado: 20/01/2025 - En edición: 02/04/2025 - Publicado: 01/07/2026Resumen:Este trabajo busca aportar a la literatura que existe sobre el uso efec-tivo de las redes sociales en la comunicación de crisis políticas, una de las tipologías de crisis que recibe menos atención por parte de la academia. Para ello, se toma como caso de estudio la comunicación del Gobierno del Ecuador en X e Instagram durante el Paro Nacional de 2022. Por medio del análisis del contenido, se evalúa la estrategia de comunicación y se identican características de las crisis políticas. Además, se señala el rol de X e Instagram en la comunicación de crisis del Gobierno y el de los distintos formatos de contenidos en la elabora-ción de los mensajes. Los resultados reejan que el Gobierno del Ecua-dor utilizó las redes sociales para informar acciones y buscar apoyo ciudadano. Además, se halló que X e Instagram ayudaron a construir la narrativa ocialista sobre la crisis, aunque con inconsistencias. Se concluye que los social media pueden contribuir en los esfuerzos por controlar el relato político en las crisis, mediante una lectura acertada y aprovechando los distintos formatos y recursos digitales. Este trabajo propone un marco metodológico para analizar la comunicación de crisis políticas de confrontación en redes sociales.Palabras clave: Comunicación de crisis; crisis políticas; comunicación gubernamental; redes sociales; comunicación política.Received: 08/11/2024 - Accepted: 20/01/2025 - Early access: 02/04/2025 - Published: 01/07/2026Abstract:is study aims to contribute to the existing literature on the eective use of social media in political crisis communication, a crisis typology that has received relatively little academic attention. e communication strategy of the Ecuadorian Government on X and Instagram during the 2022 National Strike is used as a case study. e communication strategy is evaluated through content analysis, and characteristics of political crises are identied. Additionally, the study examines the role of X and Instagram in the Government’s crisis communication eorts and how dierent content formats contributed to message construction. e ndings reveal that the Ecuadorian Government used social media to inform citizens about its actions and to garner public support. Furthermore, the study found that X and Instagram played a crucial role in shaping the ocial narrative of the crisis, although some inconsistencies were noted. e study concludes that social media can contribute to eorts in controlling the political narrative during crises by providing accurate interpretations and leveraging diverse digital formats and resources. is work also proposes a methodological framework for analysing political crisis communication in confrontational contexts on social media. Keywords: Crisis Communication; political crisis; governmental communication; social media; political communication.
doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 129 Additionally, most research on crisis communication takes X, formerly Twitter and Facebook, as references for case studies (Eriksson, 2018; Cheng et al., 2022). To some extent, this has led academia to focus primarily on analysing textual messages, to the detriment of studying visual messages (Ravazzani y Maier, 2022). erefore, conceptual tools are needed to enable comprehensive analyses of the intermodality of crisis communication on social media. is work aims to contribute to the literature on the use of social media in managing political crises by analysing the communication of the Government of Ecuador during the 2022 National Strike, a crisis that ts the typology dened by Lerbinger (2012) as confrontation. In response to the social and economic unrest at the time, representatives of the indigenous movement called for protests that lasted 18 days. During this period, among other channels, the government used social media to communicate its actions and shape a narrative about the situation in the country. Notably, this was the last political confrontation crisis faced by the Government of Ecuador up to the time of this study.Based on this case, the general objective of this study is to:Analyse the characteristics of the management of political crises on social networks, taking the analysis on X and Instagram as a reference.ree specic objectives are proposed: 1. Identifying specic elements of political communication crisis compared to other types of political crises, such as natural disasters or health emergencies.2. Evaluating the strategy of crisis communication used by the Government of Ecuador, specically through the proles Presidenciaec and Comunicación.ec on Instagram and X.3. Develop, based on previous studies by Cheng (2016), Coombs (2010), Holladay (2009), Quevedo-Redondo and Portalés-Oliva (2017), and Lalancette and Raynauld (2019), among others, a methodological framework for the analysis of social media in political crises of confrontation, from an integral perspective, which values both textual elements and images.e study seeks to address the following research questions:1. What was the strategy of crisis communication on social networks that the Government of Ecuador implemented during the National Strike, and what narrative about the crisis was presented on Instagram and X?2. What functions did Instagram and X have, as well as the dierent content formats on social networks, in the governmental communication of this crisis?3. What specic characteristics do social networks have in communicating political crises of confrontation?1.1. e context: 2022 National Strike in EcuadorOn 13 June 2022, representatives of Ecuador’s indigenous communities declared an indenite strike in protest of the country’s social and economic situation. Led by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), the movement was supported by thousands of people who took to the streets in various cities, demanding government accountability. e strike began with road and highway blockades, which disrupted interprovincial transportation.

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130 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónLed by Leonidas Iza, the CONAIE called on the government to meet 10 key demands related to the economy and improving living conditions for indigenous communities. Among these demands, the most notable were to lower fuel prices, implement agricultural price controls, increase investment in health and education, and oppose the privatization of strategic sectors. e Indigenous sector argued that the strike became their only recourse after exhausting all attempts at dialogue with the authorities. From the beginning, the Government criticised the call for the strike, attributing it to economic disruptions and interruptions to people’s daily lives. Furthermore, as reports of road blockades and acts of vandalism were reported during the protests, the government condemned the interests and motives of CONAIE. Meanwhile, the protests aected the public due to the insecurity they generated and the shortage of food and essential goods, which could not be transported between provinces. Schools and universities suspended in-person activities, and businesses suered from looting. Although the government initially expressed its willingness to engage in dialogue, it did so under the condition that the protests be called o. Days later, as the situation remained unchanged, the president took measures to deter protestors and gain public support, such as reducing fuel prices by $0.10 and signing a state of emergency decree. However, these actions did not ease the crisis. Meanwhile, the opposition in the National Assembly proposed invoking Article 130.2 of the Constitution to call for early elections, though this initiative did not succeed. With the mediation of the Ecuadorian Episcopal Conference, the government and CONAIE reached an agreement on June 30. e Acta por la Paz (Act for Peace) was signed, and both parties formalised their commitments. e Indigenous sector agreed to end the protests, while the Government reduced fuel prices by $0.15 and introduced additional economic and social measures. Dialogue tables were also set up between the government and CONAIE to address demands not included in the decree. After 18 days of protests, the strike concluded with eight fatalities, including both demonstrators and law enforcement ocers. Additionally, hundreds were reported injured or detained. Economically, the government estimated losses exceeding one billion dollars, while the Municipality of Quito valued damage to urban infrastructure at approximately two million dollars.2. eoretical Framework 2.1. Political Crises in GovernmentsInstitutions and governments are constantly subject to public scrutiny. In times of crisis, citizens expect authorities to take decisive action, resolve the situation, and prevent its recurrence (Boin et al., 2009). Eective crisis management begins with recognizing the nature of the threat. Identifying the type of crisis is essential for assessing the scale of the challenge (Frandsen and Johansen, 2020) and determining the most eective response strategy. (Lerbinger, 2012).In the public sphere, Coombs and Holladay (2023) categorise crises into three main types: health emergencies, natural disasters and political crises. Frandsen and Johansen (2020) emphasise the importance of distinguishing political crises from other public crises, as their institutional logic- meaning their practices, structures and symbolic aspects- operates dierently.
doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 131 e classication of a crisis determines key management priorities. In health emergencies and natural disasters the primary focus is on mitigating harm and protecting victims (Lu & Jin, 2022; Stephens & P.Tich, 2022). However, in political crises, what is at stake is the balance of power (Frandsen & Johansen, 2020). In such cases, authorities prioritise communication to defend their positions (Auer, 2016) and maintain legitimacy in crisis leadership (Riorda, 2011).According to Lerbinger (2012), democracies create a political and social environment in which certain groups pressure governments to demand change. Some of these conicts escalate into what the author refers to as confrontation crises (Lerbinger, 2012). In such crises, the balance of power is at stake. e threat arises from the potential loss of power, brought about by changes initiated by a political actor, which jeopardise the fundamental values or norms of a political system (Riorda, 2011; Auer, 2016).In political crises, communication must work to create a receptive environment for the decisions made and ensure coherence in the “communicate-act” relationship (Weinsteiner, 2010, as cited in Riordan, 2011). To achieve this, leaders must craft a coherent and credible narrative. is process, which Boin et al. (2009) dene as constructing the crisis’s meaning, involves explaining the situation, its causes, consequences, and solutions. Meaning construction operates on two levels: one focuses on the crisis itself, and the other on the actions taken by the crisis manager (Coombs, 2010). Furthermore, an eective narrative clearly denes both the political and operational closures of the crisis (Riorda, 2011). While the political closure marks the material end of the crisis, the operational closure focuses on removing the issue from the public agenda. To make sense of a crisis, the rituals of political communication are useful (Rey-Morató, 2011). Among these, framing plays a crucial role in shaping how public interest issues are understood and evaluated (Entman, 1993; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). is resource enables politicians to challenge the denition and assessments of problems, ultimately bolstering their own positions (Entman, 1993; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). According to Boin et al., (2009), an eective frame oers a credible account of unfolding events, indicates the course of action to be taken, conveys empathy, and suggests that leaders remain in control. In line with this narrative, authorities must focus on addressing the crisis. is requires, rst, proactively establishing a response strategy- whether through denial, avoidance, or acknowledgment and management of the crisis (Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 2007; Holladay, 2009; Losada-Diaz, 2009), and consistently communicating aligned with that strategy. Second, to reinforce political legitimacy in crisis management, leaders must cultivate an emotional connection with the public. Mohamed Nour & Kisa (2024), state that, to build trust in times of crisis, authorities must express empathy for people’s circumstances. 2.2. Use of Social Media in Crisis Communication Social media has inuenced the way crises unfold and how communication processes operate in such situations (Lee, 2020). ese platforms amplify informational reach, facilitate real-time updates, encourage interaction, and expedite aid to victims (Houston et al., 2014; Suau-Gomila et al., 2022). However, their dynamic and interactive nature also presents challenges. e diversity of voices and narratives can foster misinformation and hoaxes, potentially undermining control over the conversation (Piqueiras-Conlledo and Sánchez-Calero, 2023).
132 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónIn the digital ecosystem, eective crisis communication relies on connecting the public with ocial information sources in real time. is approach reduces uncertainty and reinforces the perception that the situation is under control (Lin et al., 2016; Lee, 2020). Additionally, actions such as monitoring trends, identifying key audiences, ensuring content depth, and tailoring messages to each platform’s characteristics (Palen et al., 2010; Houston et al., 2014; Stewart and Wilson, 2018; Suau-Gomila et al., 2022) enhance control over the digital conversation during crises. Diers-Lawson (2022) highlights that a high level of digital interaction can increase in-person participation and drive mobilization. To achieve this, authorities must develop a social media infrastructure that harnesses digital analytics, establishes clear roles, and integrates support from third-party- actors in the digital space (Watson and Fird, 2022). Engaging credible actors with mobilization power can help to disseminate the message or reduce authorities’ exposure to controversial topics. is is particularly important during political crises, where polarisation intensies, and debates often focus more on political issues than on the incident that triggered the crisis (Ferra and Nguyen, 2017; Pont-Sorribes et al., 2020).e multitude of voices on social media shapes the ow of information throughout dierent crisis phases, traditionally categorized as pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis (Coombs, 2010; Seeger, 2006; Jaques, 2007). As Vijaykumar et al. (2015) indicate, in today’s complex and dynamic media landscape, linear representations of crises are limited. Instead, crises should be seen as cyclical and recurrent (Stewart and Wilson, 2016), where dierent phases can coexist that blur the boundaries of when one stage ends and another begins. Some studies have employed new ways to analyse crises phases (Vanderbiest, 2016; Pont-Sorribes et al., 2020; Suau-Gomila et al., 2022) based on semantic rather than chronological criteria.Eriksson (2018) and Cheng et al. (2022) highlight one of the gaps in crisis communication research: the overemphasis on analyzing X and Facebook. While these platforms stand out for their popularity due to real-time information sharing and the capacity to foster dialogue (Eriksson, 2018), relying on them as primary references risks overgeneralizing ndings. Visually driven platforms, such as Instagram or TikTok, can provide dierent insights and rene the lessons drawn from Facebook and X.is is particularly relevant given the evolution of social media from a text-based to a visually oriented experience. For some time, platforms themselves have begun prioritising interactions with posts featuring visual content (Li and Xie, 2019). In the context of a crisis, as Janoske (2017) points out, visual content serves as a tool for citizens to verify information about the crisis and feel more informed about unfolding events. Integrating multimedia elements can make crisis communication more eective. As Suau-Gomila et al. (2022) highlight, rich content fosters more diverse conversations, mitigates information overload, and extends reach. Additionally, multimedia content tends to boost engagement during crises and instill greater trust (Malik et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2023). When used eectively, these resources can play a crucial role in helping authorities illustrate the progression of crisis management and reinforce condence in its resolution. Lalancette and Raynauld (2017) argue that the visual aspect of social media plays a pivotal role in shaping how citizens perceive and assess politicians, their messages, and their actions. Visual content enhances the narrative during a crisis. Instagram, for instance, can help build leadership during political crises, eectively conveying the unfolding of events, and steering the message towards an emotional tone (López-Rabadán and Doménech-Fabregat, 2018).
doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 133 3. Methodology3.1 Sample selectionis article examines the Ecuadorian Government’s communication on Instagram and X during the 2022 National Strike. ese platforms were chosen due to their popularity in Ecuador at the time of the crisis, based on user growth rates (Del Alcázar, 2022, p.21), and because both had ocial governmental accounts. e sample includes content from the two institutions responsible for government communication: the Presidency and the Secretariat of Communication. On Instagram, the accounts are Presidenciaec and Comunicación.ec, and Presidencia_ec and Comunicacionec, on X. e study focuses on the period from 13 June to 5 July 2022, spanning from the beginning of the crisis to ve days after its resolution, which was marked by the signing of the “Acta Por la Paz”. In total, the analysis covers 23 days, including 18 days of the crisis and 5 days of the post-crisis.For the content review, we analysed all posts from the accounts mentioned during this period. However, Instagram stories, as well as replies or mentions on X, were not considered. Likewise, any content that may have been deleted before the sample was collected was excluded. Data extraction from Instagram was conducted using the analytical tool CrowdTangle on 11 October 2023, while data from X was gathered via PhantomBuster on 20 November 2023. From an initial sample of 589 results, the data was reviewed manually to remove duplicates and exclude posts unrelated to the crisis. e nal selection comprised 194 Instagram posts and 295 from X, totaling 489 units for analysis. Table 1 outlines the sample selection process. Table 1. Sample Collection Process for AnalysisInstagram and X Posts from the Accounts Presidenciaec and Comunicacionec, from June 13 to 5 July 2022N=589 (Instagram=252 X=337)Removal of Duplicate ResultsN=44(Instagram=32 X= 12)Removal of Irrelevant PostsN=56 (Instagram=26 X= 30)Final SampleN=489 (Instagram=194 X=295)Source: created by the authorsTo address the objective and research questions of this study, content analysis was employed. is methodology integrates both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Bardin (1991) denes content analysis as “a set of techniques for analysing communications through systematic and objective procedures for describing the content of messages” (p.32). is technique

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134 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónaims to interpret data from any type of message and analyse their underlying meanings (Krippendor, 1994; Iguatua-Perosanz, 2006), ultimately summarising the information gathered (Bengtsson, 2017). e goal is to interpret the obtained results in a structured manner. Content analysis has been used as a tool in examining the use of social media in crisis communication across numerous studies (Kim and Liu, 2012; Bruns and Burguess, 2014; Pont-Sorribes et al., 2020; Belanger and Lavenex, 2021). Traditionally, research has focused on Twitter, now known as X (Eriksson, 2018). However, recent studies have incorporated content analysis on Instagram (Malik et al., 2021; Mackay et al., 2022; Mele, 2023). 3.2. Variables of the Analysise analysis sheet was constructed by dening variables and indicators based on the work of Liu et al., (2020), Coombs (2010), Holladay (2010), Fearn-Banks (2016), Suau-Gomila et al., (2022), Quevedo-Redondo and Portalés-Oliva (2017), Lalancette and Raynauld (2019), Tirado-García and Doménech-Fabregat (2021) Farkas and Márton-Bene, (2020) and Semetko and Valkenburg (1993). After reviewing these studies, three general analysis categories were established, aligning with the characteristics of a political crisis of confrontation and its communication on social media. e goal was to obtain results that directly addressed the research questions. e nal categories were characteristics of crisis communication, characteristics of the message on social media, characteristics of the image, and characteristics of the narrative.Next, classications for the indicators to be analyzed within each category were dened. ese variables were primarily based on the previously cited studies, though in some instances, custom variables were incorporated to better align with the information in the sample. Table 2 provides a summary of the analysis sheet used.Table 2. Content Analysis VariablesAnalysis CategoryVariableClassicationReferences1. Characteristics of Crisis CommunicationObjective of the postInform government actionsClarify/correct misinformationConnect the public with help resourcesShare citizen testimonies or storiesCall to action/seek supportCondemn actions of political actorsLiu et al., (2020)Crisis Communication PhasesActivation: rejection of the situation, seeking support, and addressing the crisis.Containment: recall of past government actions and addressing population needs during the crisis.Negotiation: responding to the adversary’s demands, thanking eorts, and proposing a solution to the conict. Resolution: de-escalation, capitalizing on and transitioning to normalcyOwn elaboration based on models from Fearn-Banks (2016) and Suau-Gomila et al. (2022).
doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 135 Response StrategyInformative: providing information about the crisis and oering guidance on how to mitigate its impactDenial: failing to acknowledge the crisis, attributing responsibility to a third party. Evasion: Attributing inability to prevent the crisis or its consequences, blaming another, minimizing the crisis’ severity. Justication: recalling the government’s positive actions and victimization. Concession: taking responsibility, compensating victims, implementing preventive measures.Cheng (2016)Coombs (2010), Holladay (2009)2. Characteristics of the message on Social mediaContent FormatTextLinkSingle imageCarousel or set of imagesVideoHashtagOtherQuevedo-Redondo and Portalés-Oliva, 2017; Lalancette and Raynauld (2019)Message’s Communicational WeightTextPhotographPosterVideoHashtagLinkIndeterminateOwn elaborationInterrelation between message elementsIndependence: no relationRedundancy: One element repeats the message, making the other redundantComplementarity: one element complements and adds value to the otherContradiction: the message of one element contradicts the otherTirado-García and Doménech-Fabregat, 20213. Characteristics of the imagePresence of Political or National Identity ElementsPolitical symbols – yesPolitical symbols – noNational symbols – yesNational symbols - noOwn elaboration, based on Selva-Ruiz and Caro-Castaño, 2017; López-Marcos and Vicente-Fernández, 2023Protagonists of the imagePresidentGovernment AuthoritiesSecurity force authoritiesCitizensOther/indeterminateQuevedo-Redondo and Portalés-Oliva, 2017; Lalancette and Raynauld (2019)
136 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónSetting and StagingInstitutional: within the framework of authorities’ managementMediaProfessional Production with planned contentProfessional production with spontaneous contentAmateur: non-professional and improvised contentTirado-García and Doménech-Fabregat (2019)Lalancette and Raynauld (2019)4. Characteristics of the Political NarrativeAppeal (intention of the message)RationalPositive emotionalNegative emotionalDual appealQuevedo-Redondo and Portalés-Oliva, 2017; Farkas and Márton-Bene, 2020.Crisis framingConict: emphasizes the conict between the two partiesHuman interest: presents the crisis from an emotional, human perspectiveEconomic consequences: frames the problem in terms of economic costMorality: frames the situation within moral or religious valuesResponsibility: attributes the problem to a political actorSemetko and Valkenburg (2000)Role in the sense-making processExplains the factsExplains the causes or reasons for the situationPoses possible repercussionsOers solutionsNoneBoin (2009)Source: created by the authorse analysis of results was conducted from 16 February to 22 March 2024, following the established criteria. 4. Analysis of Results4.1. Crisis Communication Strategyree variables were used to analyze the government’s crisis communication strategy. First, the objective of each post on X and Instagram was identied. e primary goal, evident in 36.4% of the posts, was to inform the public about the government’s actions during the crisis. Next, 22.1% of the posts were designed to seek popular support or make a call to action. A smaller proportion, 16.6%, aimed to clarify or correct information/misinformation, while 14.5% sought to condemn the actions of the opponents, i.e., the protesters. Finally, 10.4% of the posts shared stories or testimonies from citizens aected by the strike.
doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 137 When comparing the objectives of the posts on X and Instagram, no signicant dierences emerged, as informing the public remained the primary goal on both platforms. However, the proportion of informative posts decreased on Instagram to 32%, while it increased on X to 39.3%. Meanwhile, posts featuring citizen stories rose on Instagram to 12.4% but fell to 9.15% on X.Image 1. Example of a post using the concession strategy to call for action and seek supportSource: Instagram account of the Secretariat of Communication of the Presidency of Ecuador. https://rb.gy/iuxuvae second variable analysed in this category was the response strategy, according to the criteria dened by Cheng (2016). It was found that in most cases (37%), the strategy focused on providing information and updates regarding the management of the crisis. In 31.5% of the cases, the strategy used was a concession, meaning messages aimed at accepting responsibility, compensating victims, or taking preventive measures to avoid the recurrence of the crisis. In 18.2% of the posts, the strategy was to evade responsibility for the crisis, while in 13.3% of the cases, the strategy was justication. In no instance was the denial strategy applied. Finally, based on the results obtained, the topics of the posts were categorised to assess whether it was possible to determine distinct phases in the government’s communication on Instagram and X during this crisis. e information was analyzed using the frameworks of Fearn-Banks (2016) and Suau-Gomila et al. (2022), revealing four key periods. ese periods were not strictly chronological but rather narrative, meaning that they overlapped. Nonetheless, upon reviewing the crisis process from its activation to its resolution, it was found that communication encompassed all these stages. Table 3 outlines the various phases of crisis communication.

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138 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónTable 3. Phases of Government Communication on Social Media during the 2022 National StrikePhaseCharacteristicsActivatione strike and its main actors are rejected.e crisis is monitored under a state of alert, but no response measures addressing the root causes of the problem are announced. e government seeks to legitimise its stance by demonstrating public support.Containmente government’s past positive actions are recalled.e needs and demands of citizens, who are starting to be aected by the crisis, are addressed.e eorts of law enforcement and other organisations involved in crisis management are ac-knowledged, recognising their endurance despite the accumulated strain of the situation.Negotiatione demands of the opposition are addressed.Proposals to resolve the crisis are announced. ResolutionA measure that deactivates the crisis is declared. Changes resulting from the crisis are communicated, and the process of returning to routine com-munication begins.Source: created by the authorsroughout the 23-day analysis of the strike- including the ve-day post-crisis period- all four phases of the crisis overlapped. However, their intensity varied, with each phase reaching dierent peaks. Graph 1 illustrates the government’s communication process phases during the National Strike, based on the number of daily publications. Graph 1. Evolution of the Communication Phases of the CrisisSource: created by the authors
doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 139 e activation phase signaled the onset of the crisis. While this phase continued until the crisis was resolved, its signicance diminished as the strike unfolded. is phase was dened by the government’s passive role- closely monitoring the situation but rejecting the movement rather than taking concrete measures to address the issue. e containment phase marked the rst signs of concern for the citizens aected by the crisis, and eorts were made to gain legitimacy for the government’s stance, for example, by highlighting past positive actions. erefore, this was a period in which the government sought support as the crisis persisted. is phase had few peaks and coexisted with the activation phase for most of the crisis. e negotiation phase emerged a few days into the crisis, gaining momentum as the government made concessions and increasingly emphasised dialogue as a solution. After CONAIE rejected calls to end the protests, the negotiation phase lost prominence again. It continued in the early post-crisis period to communicate the agreements reached after the strike ended. Meanwhile, the resolution phase began as protests waned in certain cities during the strike’s nal days and following the Acta por la Paz signing. 4.2 Characteristics of the Message on Social Mediae rst aspect examined in the analysis of social media variables was the format of the published content. is included the type of resources used, such as text or video, and the interaction between dierent resources. is analysis oered insights into the richness of the content employed to communicate the crisis on social media. e central communicational resource accompanying this format was examined among the 489 analysed posts, which primarily included text. It was found that 66.3% of the posts incorporated a hashtag. e most frequently used hashtags were #nopodemosparar, featured in 40.7% of the posts, and #Ecuadorquierepaz, used in 22.7%. Notably, 18% of the posts did not include any hashtag.
140 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónImage 2. Example of a post with rich contentSource: Instagram Account of the Secretariat of Communication of the Presidency of Ecuador https://rb.gy/3m9k6hOther formats used to accompany the texts in the posts included a video (43.8% of the time), a single image (33.5%), image carousels (12.5%), and links (9.4%). e most common combination of these elements was video, text, and hashtag, featured in 30.5% of the posts. e second most frequent combination was a single image, text, and hashtag, used in 18.4% of the cases.An analysis of the resources used across platforms revealed that video played a more signicant role on Instagram, with 54.6% of the content using this format, compared to 36.5% on X. e image carousel was also more prevalent on Instagram than on X, 15.5% vs. 12.4%. In contrast, a single image was used more often on X (33.5%) compared to (29.9%) on Instagram.

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doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 141 Graph 2. Communicational Weight of the Message on Social MediaSource: created by the authorsIn terms of the communicational weight of the message, it was found that the message was primarily centred around the video format. Graph 2 illustrates the results of this variable. Additionally, examining the interplay between the message elements revealed that in 65% of cases, the elements served complementary functions. In 28% of cases, redundancy was present, meaning one of the elements could be removed without altering the message’s meaning. In 6% of the cases, the communicational elements were independent, and in 1% of cases, a contradiction between the resources was identied.
142 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónImage 3. Example of the post in which there was redundancy between the text message and image. https://rb.gy/tmkhj4Source: X Account of the Secretariat of Communication of the Presidency of Ecuador.Due to the characteristics of each platform, dierences were found in the combination of formats used. On Instagram, it was observed that 88.7% of posts placed their communicational weight on images or videos, compared to 70.5% on X. Regarding content richness, it was found that 61.2% of content on X combined three resources within a single post. At the same time, this percentage rose to 68.6% on Instagram.

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doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 143 4.3. e Use of Images in Communication To analyse the characteristics of the image, variables such as the presence of political or national identity elements, the prominence of the message, and the setting and staging of the posts were considered. Regarding the rst criterion, no visual references to political identity elements were found, though national identity was represented. While 81% of the posts did not include national identity elements, 11% featured the national coat of arms, and 7% displayed the Ecuadorian ag. Image 4. An example of a post featuring the ag as a symbol of national identity, with the president as the protagonist of the messageSource: X account of the Presidency of Ecuador. https://rb.gy/6wmdrhPresident Guillermo Lasso was the central gure in the messages, who took a leading role in 20% of the posts. Citizens were the main focus in 24% of cases, while government authorities were highlighted in 15%.

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144 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónImage 5: Example of a post featuring a government authority as the protagonist, with a media-oriented stagingSource: Instagram account of the Secretariat of Communication of the Presidency of Ecuador https://rb.gy/vbiva1An analysis of the staging and setting of the messages revealed that 31.5% of the posts had a spontaneous yet professional production. is means content depicting crisis management was shared with professional production without dramatized scenes or a pre-written script. In 28% of the messages, prior planning and professional production were evident, primarily in the form of posters or graphic designs. Institutional and media settings accounted for 13.5% and 13.1% of the posts, respectively. e remaining 13.9% featured other types of staging or were classied as indeterminate.

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doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 145 Image 6. An example of a post featuring a member of the National Police as the protagonist, with spontaneous yet professional stagingSource: Instagram account of the Secretariat of Communication of the Presidency of Ecuador4.4. e Political Narrative of the Crisis.In analysing the variables of the political narrative of the crisis, it was found that 76% of the messages made a rational appeal. Meanwhile, 15% of posts featured a dual appeal, and 9% appealed to emotion. e primary framing of the government’s narrative centred on human interest, focusing on the victims of the strike, which accounted for 26.4% of the messages. is framing was characterised by expressing concern for individuals whose businesses or jobs were impacted by the protests. Additionally, human interest was conveyed through actions such as oering compensation for the victims and introducing measures to address the demands of citizens, including those of CONAIE:Another framing used during the crisis was the economic consequences framing, which appeared in 20% of the posts. is narrative highlighted the negative impact the protests would have on the country’s economy by halting labour activities. Specically, the government emphasised that Ecuador was only beginning to recover from the COVID-19 crisis and that another shutdown would be detrimental. Later in the crisis, the economic consequences framing was used positively, supporting the government’s measures to address the demands of CONAIE and compensate the victims of the crisis.
146 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónImage 7. Example of a post framed within the economic consequences narrative, in this case, related to the benets of the measures announced by the governmentSource: Instagram account of the Presidency of Ecuador. https://shorturl.at/4apWcTo a lesser extent, in 10.8% of the cases, the crisis was framed as a conict between the government and the indigenous leaders of CONAIE. is framing relied on resources and messages focused on communicating security actions and coordination with the police and armed forces. In 10.6% of the cases, the framing aimed to attribute responsibility for the crisis to CONAIE and its leader, particularly Leonidas Iza. ese messages argued that the organization was generating chaos for political gain rather than seeking solutions to the crisis.

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doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 147 Graph 3. Classication of posts according to the proposed framingSource: created by authorsOn the other hand, the role of social media posts in constructing meaning during the crisis was analysed. To gain legitimacy during political crises, authorities must oer the population an explanation of the situation- clarifying what is happening, why it is happening, and providing a solution to the problem (Boin et al., 2017). In this case study, it was observed that the Ecuadorian government primarily used X and Instagram to explain the unfolding events, particularly the measures taken as part of the crisis management. is function accounted for 39.7% of the analysed posts.At the same time, 27.8% of the messages focused on oering solutions to the crisis, mainly through dialogue as a means of reaching consensus and resolving the dierences that had sparked the protests. Another 20.2% of the content outlined the actual or potential consequences of the strike on the population, such as adverse economic eects or impacts on citizens. As the crisis progressed, the framing of consequences was also used to emphasise the positive impact of the measures announced by the Government. Nine percent of the posts aimed to explain the causes that led to the crisis in the country, while 3.3% did not serve any specic function. Table 4 details the various functions social media posts play in the process of constructing meaning.
148 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónTable 4. Function in the process of constructing the meaning of the crisisFunctionCharacteristics% of PublicationsExplain the factsroughout the crisis, government actions to address the situation, such as cabinet meetings and eorts to maintain security on the streets, were publicised. e damage caused by the protests was also shown.39.7Explain the causes of the crisisIt was asserted that the protests did not correspond to citizens’ needs but were driven by the political interests of some actors within CONAIE.9Outline consequencese economic and human impact of the Strike was projected, including the halt of commercial activities, infrastructure damage, food shortages, and the suspension of educational activities. Later, the focus shifted to highlighting the benets of the economic measures enacted after the agreement with CONAI was signed.20.2Oer solutionsFrom the early days of the crisis, the government advocated dialogue as a means of resolution but failed to establish concrete agreements for discussions with CONAIE. e call for dialogue was primarily reected in meetings with various societal sectors that supported the government’s actions and opposed the protests. As the crisis progressed, the government introduced measures to address CONAIE’s demands, asserting that these concessions demonstrated a willingness to negotiate.27.8Source: created by the authors5. DiscussionWhen analyzing the categories of the variables, the “characteristics of crisis communication” reveals that the communication strategy eectively recognised the crisis from the very beginning. Furthermore, attention to the facts was demonstrated through the objectives of the posts, which aimed to inform (36.4%) and garner support (22.1%) for the ocial stance. However, the crisis was addressed without announcing measures to resolve the issue. Instead, the government rejected the situation, attributing it to political interests. As a result, from the outset, the “communicate-act” approach proposed by Weinsteiner (2010, as cited in Riordan, 2011) aligned with the characteristics of a confrontation crisis, as dened by Lerbinger (2012).e analysis of the crisis phases reveals that, as the protests did not subside, the government initially took steps to protect citizens from the consequences. Soon after, the rst concessions were announced, such as the reduction in fuel prices. Most posts (31.5%) focused on demonstrating the government’s responsibility in managing the crisis, taking measures, and compensating the victims. As a result, the response strategy shifted between providing information and making concessions. While the government never directly accepted responsibility, this was conveyed through calls for dialogue and by addressing some of the demands from CONAIE. Ultimately, the resolution came through negotiation and signing the “Acta por la Paz”.
doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 149 e analysis of the ocial narrative revealed inconsistencies. While the narrative eectively identied dialogue as the operational closure of the crisis (Riorda, 2011), contradictions arose in how the consequences of the crisis were presented. Initially, the narrative warned about the economic risks, but a few weeks later, it framed the agreements reached as an achievement. erefore, these inconsistencies reect errors in the narrative construction, aligning with Boin et al.’s observations (2009). e framing strategy uctuated primarily between presenting the crisis as a human interest issue (26.4%), focusing on the victims of protest-related vandalism, and as an economic problem for the country (20%). In this way, the Government of Ecuador attempted to “play” with the narrative that best served its interests as the crisis evolved (Rey Morató, 2011; Vanderbiest, 2016).Regarding the characteristics of the image, it can be argued that the focus of crisis communication on social media was shared between citizens, the president, and government authorities in that order. Furthermore, content not centred on citizens showed that the crisis was managed from the Presidential Palace (26.9%) and with institutional or media-driven staging (49.3%). is aligns with the idea that the authorities distanced themselves from the events unfolding in the streets, particularly at the onset of the crisis. On the other hand, the use of images on X and Instagram did not reveal the use of political elements in crisis management. Concerning each platform’s specic role in crisis management, no signicant dierences were found in response strategies, communicative phases, and post formats. However, the objectives of the posts did vary to some extent. X played an informative role, while Instagram adopted a storytelling approach from the perspective of citizens. When examining the format of the messages, it was found that video predominated on both platforms, although they were more prominent on Instagram. is result is consistent with other studies’ ndings on crisis and emergency situations (Guidry et al., 2017; Malik et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2023).e most signicant disparity between Instagram and X emerged when evaluating the communicational weight of the message. While video was the primary resource for the government’s messages, X placed signicant emphasis on textual content and links. Nearly one in every three posts on X focused the message on non-visual resources. In contrast, on Instagram, nearly 90% of the messages relied on videos, posters, and, to a lesser extent, photographs to carry communicational weight. 6. Conclusionse main objective of this study was to analyse the key characteristics of social media communication during political crises. e results reveal specic aspects of the posts’ objectives, narrative, and communicational phases. In response to the rst specic objective, it was found that the primary goal in political crises is to persuade and create a convincing political narrative. is aligns with existing academic literature, which emphasises the importance of mobilizing public opinion and communicating to defend political positions (Auer, 2016; Watson & Fird, 2022). Furthermore, the study conrmed that it is essential to dene the political actors involved in these crises quickly, understand their motivations, and assess the actual or potential consequences (Boin et al., 2009). Additionally, determining both the operational and political closure of the crisis as soon as possible is essential. Regarding the study’s second objective, the ndings indicate that the Ecuadorian government prioritised securing political support over addressing the informational needs of the population. Additionally, government accounts on X and Instagram
150 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónplayed a key role in shaping the ocial narrative. However, inconsistencies emerged in the messaging throughout the crisis, as demonstrated by the analysis of communicational phases and response strategies. Furthermore, Instagram played a more signicant role in generating emotional content and capitalising on the richness of the video format. On the other hand, X was used for informational and rational purposes. On this platform, the emphasis was placed on text-based content or external links that provided further information. Lastly, regarding the third objective, this study presents a methodological framework for analysing political confrontation crises on social media. is approach considers both the particularities of narrative and crisis strategies in the political context and the multimodality and content richness of messages on social media. Additionally, a new way of analysing the phases of crisis communication in political confrontations on social media has been proposed. is categorisation recognises these crises as dynamic, non-linear processes shaped by ongoing negotiations between political actors.e ndings of this study underscore the complexity of accurately assessing the magnitude and scope of political crises. In such scenarios, an ordinary conict can quickly become an existential threat to a political actor. e challenge lies in identifying when a crisis has escalated and when decisive action is required to resolve it. Social media can serve as a valuable tool for correctly interpreting a crisis and improving the ow of information. Monitoring trends and measuring user sentiment during a crisis can eectively counter alternative political narratives. Likewise, leveraging the unique characteristics of each platform and the richness of multimedia content can optimise the messages and build trust. ese conclusions align with previous research cited in this study (Lee, 2020; Suau-Gomila et al., 2022).e authors acknowledge the limitations of analysing a single case and restricting the study of government communication to only two institutions. It would be benecial to contextualize the ndings of this research by assessing political crises in other countries at dierent times and with varying developments, especially in cases of confrontation. e analysis on only two platforms could also be considered a limitation. Still, the authors have chosen to include the social media platforms with the highest interaction rates in the country at the time of the crisis.Despite these limitations, the intrinsic characteristics of crisis communication, which share very similar parameters across social media platforms, suggest that the ndings of this study can be extrapolated to other analyses with similar characteristics. Nonetheless, these results could be further rened or complemented by future research. 7. Acknowledgementsis article was translated into English by Sophie Phillips, to whom we are grateful for her work.
doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 151 8. Specic contributions of each authorName and surnameConception and design of the workCristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesMethodologyCristian Lozano-Recalde and Carles Pont-SorribesData collection and analysisCristian Lozano-Recalde and Guillem Suau-GomilaDiscussion and conclusionsGuillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesDrafting, formatting, version review and approvalCristian Lozano-Recalde9. Conict of Interestse authors declare that there is no conict of interest contained in this article. 10. Bibliographic referencesAuer, C. (2016). Conceptualizing political crisis and the role of public diplomacy in crisis communication research. In A. Schwarz (Ed.), e handbook of international crisis communication research (pp. 119-132). John Wiley & Sons. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118516812.ch12Barandiaran, X., Unceta, A., & Peña, S. (2020). Comunicación política en tiempos de nueva cultura política. Revista ICONO 14. Revista cientíca de comunicación y tecnologías emergentes, 18(1), 256-282. https://doi.org/10.7195/ri14.v18i1.1382Bardin, L. (1991). Análisis de contenido (p. 32). Ediciones Akal.Belanger, M. E., & Lavenex, S. (2021). Communicating mobility restrictions during the COVID-19 crisis on Twitter: e legitimacy challenge. Swiss Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12494Bengtsson, M. (2016). How to plan and perform a qualitative study using content analysis. Nursing Plus Open. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.npls.2016.01.001Benoit, W. (1997). Image repair discourse and crisis communication. Public Relations Review, 23(2), 177-186. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0363-8111(97)90023-0Boin, A.; ‘t Hart, P.; & Kuipers, S. (2017). e crisis approach. In H. Rodríguez (Ed.), Handbook of disaster research (pp. 23-38). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63254-4_2Boin, A.; ‘t Hart, P.; Stern, E.; & Sundelius, B. (2009). e politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490880

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152 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónBruns, A.; & Burgess, J. (2014). Crisis communication in natural disasters: e Queensland oods and Christchurch earthquakes. In A. Bruns, M. Mahrt, K. Weller, J. Burgess, & C. Puschmann (Eds.), Twitter and society (pp. 373-384). Peter Lang Publishing.Canel, M. J. (2012). Communicating strategically in the face of terrorism: e Spanish government’s response to the 2004 Madrid bombing attacks. Public Relations Review, 38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2011.11.012Cheng, Y. (2016). How social media is changing crisis communication strategies: Evidence from the updated literature. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 26(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12130Cheng, Y.; Wang, Y.; & Kong, Y. (2022). e state of social-mediated crisis communication research through the lens of global scholars: An updated assessment. Public Relations Review, 48(2). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2022.102172Coombs, W. T. (2007). Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: e development and application of situational crisis communication theory. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.crr.1550049Coombs, W. T. (2010). Parameters for crisis communication. In W. T. Coombs & S. J. Holladay (Eds.), e handbook of crisis communication (pp. 17-53). Blackwell Publishing Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444314885.ch1Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2023). e handbook of crisis communication. Wiley Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119678953Del Alcázar Ponce, J. P. (2022). Estado digital Ecuador octubre 2022. Mentinno Consultores. https://www.mentinno.com/estado-digital-ecuador-octubre-2022/del Rey Morató, J. (2022). La comunicación política en la sociedad del marketing y de internet. Encuadres, relatos y juegos de lenguaje. Revista De Comunicación, 10(1), 102-128. https://revistadecomunicacion.com/article/view/2773Diers-Lawson, A. (2022). iSCOTLAND: Crises, the integrated model of activism, and Twitter. In Y. Jin & L. L. Austin (Eds.), Social media and crisis communication (pp. 301-312). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003043409-35Eisele, O. Tolochko, P.; & Boomgaarden, H. D. (2022). How do executives communicate about crises? A framework for comparative analysis. European Journal of Political Research, 61. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12504Entman, R. (1993). Framing: Toward clarication of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51-58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.xEriksson, M. (2018). Lessons for crisis communications on social media: A systematic review of what research tells the practice. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 12(5). https://doi.org/10.1080/1553118X.2018.1510405Farkas, X.; & Bene, M. (2021). Images, politicians, and social media: Patterns and eects of politicians’ image-based political communication strategies on social media. e International Journal of Press/Politics, 26(1), 119-142. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220959553Fearn-Banks, K. (2016). Crisis communications: A casebook approach (5th ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315684857Ferra, I., & Nguyen, D. (2017). #Migrantcrisis: “Tagging” the European migration crisis on Twitter. Journal of Communication Management, 21(4). https://doi.org/10.1108/JCOM-02-2017-0026

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154 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónLerbinger, O. (2012). e crisis manager: Facing disasters, conicts, and failures. Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203222133Li, Y., & Xie, Y. (2019). Is a picture worth a thousand words? An empirical study of image content and social media engagement. Journal of Marketing Research, 57(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/0022243719881113Lin, X., Spence, P., Sellnow, T., & Lachlan, K. (2016). Crisis communication, learning and responding best practices in social media. Computers in Human Behavior, 65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2016.05.080Liu, W., Xu, W., & Tsai, J. (2020). Developing a multi-level organization-public dialogic communication framework to assess social media-mediated disaster communication and engagement outcomes. Public Relations Review, 46(4). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2020.101949López-Marcos, C., & Vicente-Fernández, P. (2023). La fotografía en los perles de redes sociales: El caso de los presidentes autonómicos de España. Gráca, 11(21). https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/graca.255López-Rabadán, P., & Doménech-Fabregat, H. (2018). Instagram y la espectacularización de las crisis políticas: Las 5W de la imagen digital en el proceso independentista de Cataluña. Profesional de la Información, 27(5). https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2018.sep.06Losada-Díaz, J. C. (2009). Comunicación en la gestión de crisis: Lecciones prácticas. Editorial UOC.Lozano-Recalde, C. (2024). Seis años de investigaciones de crisis públicas en social media: Análisis sistemático de las principales aportaciones y guía de recomendaciones para estudios futuros. Revista Mediterránea de Comunicación, 15(2), e25983. https://doi.org/10.14198/MEDCOM.25983Lu, X. and Jin, Y. (2022). Integrating Strategy and Dosage. In e Handbook of Crisis Communication (eds W.T. Coombs and S.J. Holladay). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119678953.ch18Mackay, M., Ford, C., Colangeli, T., Gillis, D., McWhirter, J. E., & Papadopoulos, A. (2022). A content analysis of Canadian inuencer crisis messages on Instagram and the public’s response during COVID-19. BMC Public Health, 22. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-022-13129-5Malik, A., Laeeq, K. M., & Quaan-Haase, A. (2021). Public health agencies outreach through Instagram during the COVID-19 pandemic: Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication perspective. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.102346Mele, E., Filieri, R., & De Carlo, M. (2023). Pictures of a crisis: Destination marketing organizations’ Instagram communication before and during a global health crisis. Journal of Business Research. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.113931Mohamed Nour, M., & Kisa, A. (2024). Political leaders’ communication strategies during COVID-19 in highly infected countries: A scoping review. Healthcare, 12(6), 607. https://doi.org/10.3390/healthcare12060607Palen, L., Starbird, K., Vieweg, S., & Hughes, A. (2010). Twitter-based information distribution during the 2009 red river valley ood threat. Bulletin of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 36(5), 13-17. https://doi.org/10.1002/bult.2010.1720360505

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doxa.comunicación | nº 43, pp. 127-156 July-December of 2026Cristian Lozano-Recalde, Guillem Suau-Gomila and Carles Pont-SorribesISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978| 155 Piqueiras-Conlledo P., & Sánchez-Calero M. L. (2023). Interacción, viralidad e inuencia en Twitter: análisis de la comunicación de emergencias en el caso de los incendios de Tarragona de 2019. Historia y Comunicación Social, 28(2), 373-384. https://doi.org/10.5209/hics.92241Pont-Sorribes, C., Suau-Gomila, G., & Percastre-Mendizábal, S. (2020). Twitter as a communication tool in the Germanwings and Ebola crises in Europe: analysis and protocol for eective communication management. International Journal of Emergency Management, 16(1). https://doi.org/10.1504/IJEM.2020.110106Quevedo-Redondo, R., & Portalés-Oliva, M. (2017). Imagen y comunicación política en Instagram. Celebricación de los candidatos a la presidencia del Gobierno. Profesional De La Información, 26(5), 916-927. https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2017.sep.13Ravazzani, S., & Maie, C.D. (2022). Visual Crisis Communication. A Social Semiotic Approach to Visual Dialogues on Social Media. In Y. Jin & L.L. Austin (Eds), Social Media and Crisis Communication (pp. 168-169). Routledge.Riorda, M. (2011). Gestionando certidumbres: la comunicación de crisis no es comunicación gubernamental, electoral ni de riesgo. En L. Elizalde, D. Fernández Pedemonte y M. Riorda (Eds), La Gestión del disenso. La Comunicación gubernamental en problemas. La Crujía.Seeger, M. W. (2006). Best Practices in Crisis Communication: An Expert Panel Process. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 34(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/00909880600769944Selva-Ruiz, D., & Caro-Castaño, L. (2017). Uso de Instagram como medio de comunicación política por parte de los diputados españoles: la estrategia de humanización en la “vieja” y la “nueva” política. Profesional De La Información, 26(5), 903-915. https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2017.sep.12Semetko, H., & Valkenburg, P. (2000). Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News. Journal of Communication, 50, 93-109. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2000.tb02843.xStephens, K.K. and Tich, K.P. (2022). Rescue Communication. In e Handbook of Crisis Communication (eds W.T. Coombs and S.J. Holladay). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119678953.ch20.Stewart, M.C., & Wilson, B.G. (2016). e dynamic role of social media during Hurricane #Sandy: An introduction of the STREMII model to weather the storm of the crisis lifecycle. Computers in Human Behavior, 56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2015.07.009Suau-Gomila, G., Mora-Rodríguez, M., & Pont-Sorribes, C. (2022). Twitter como herramienta de comunicación de emergencias: análisis de los perles institucionales y propuestas de mejora a partir de los atentados de Barcelona y Cambrils de 2017. Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico, 28(2). https://doi.org/10.5209/esmp.77692Subekti, D., Mutiarin, D., & Nurmandi, A. (2023). Political communication in social media: a bibliometrics analysis. Studies in Media and Communication, 11(6). https://doi.org/10.11114/smc.v11i6.6214Sutton, J., & Veil, S.R. (2017). Risk communication and social media. In R.E. Kasperson (Ed.), Risk Conundrums: Solving Unsolvable Problems (pp. 96-111). Routledge.

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156 | nº 43, pp. 127-156 | July-December of 2026Political Crises on Social Media. The Ecuadorian Government’s Communication on Instagram and X during the 2022...ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978doxa.comunicaciónTirado-García, A., & Doménech-Fabregat, H. (2021). Interacción imagen fotográca-texto como estrategia de comunicación política en Instagram durante la campaña electoral del 28A de 2019 en España. Profesional De La Información, 30(2). https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2021.mar.23Valentini, C., Romenti, S., & Kruckeberg, D. (2017). Handling crises in social media: from stakeholder crisis awareness and sense-making to organizational crisis preparedness. In L. Austin, & Y. Jin (Eds), Social Media and Crisis Communication (pp. 57-67). Routledge.Vanderbiest, N. (2015). Analyse des attentats de Paris sur les réseaux sociaux. Reputatio Lab. https://www.reputatiolab.com/2015/11/analyse-des-attentats-de-paris-sur-les-reseaux-sociaux/Vijaykumar, S., Jin, Y., & Nowak, G. J. (2015). Social media and the virality of risk: e Risk Amplication through Media Spread (RAMS) Model. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. https://doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2014-0072Watson, J., & Firth, J. D. (2022). Navigating political scandal and reputation crisis in social media. In Y. Jin & L.L. Austin (Eds), Social Media and Crisis Communication (pp. 292-300). Routledge.Zhang, W., Yuan, H., Zhu, C., Chen, Q., Evans, R.D., & Min, C. (2023). Factors inuencing public engagement in government TikTok during the COVID-19 crisis. e Electronic Library, ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/EL-06-2023-0150

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