Disinformation and Credibility in the Digital Age: New Information
Consumption Habits and their Impact on Organisations
Desinformación y credibilidad en la era digital: nuevos hábitos de consumo
informativo y su impacto en las organizaciones
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| 323
July-December of 2026
ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978
How to cite this article:
Gomes-Gonçalves, S.; Jiménez-Marín, G. and Sánchez-Gey Valenzuela, N. (2026). Disinformation and Credibility in the Digital Age: New
Information Consumption Habits and their Impact on Organisations.
Doxa Comunicación
, 43, pp. 323-346.
https://doi.org/10.31921/doxacom.3503
Sónia Gomes-Gonçalves.
Holder of a PhD in Communication from the University of Seville and a Master’s degree in
Linguistics from NOVA University Lisbon, specialising in Journalistic Terminology, and with professional experience as
a journalist, she is currently an associate professor at the Universidade da Madeira/LabCom and a lecturer at vocational
training institutions, teaching various subjects in the eld of communication, including Public Relations, Marketing
and Advertising.
She is also a researcher at LabCom –the Centre for Research in Communication and the Arts at the
University of Beira Interior– and a member of the SICA SEJ-624 research group:
IROACAMM – International Research of
Advertising, Communication and Marketing Mix
, funded by the Regional Government of Andalusia. She also works for
the Regional Government of the Autonomous Region of Madeira as a communications advisor.
LabCom/Universidade da Madeira, Portugal
sonia.goncalves@sta.uma.pt
ORCID:
0000-0002-5579-7761
Gloria Jiménez-Marín
. Full Professor in the eld of Audiovisual Communication and Advertising at the University
of Seville, she obtained her PhD in the Communication Process programme. Her academic background includes
two bachelor’s degrees: Journalism and Advertising and Public Relations, both from the same university, as well as
a master’s degree in health communication from Rey Juan Carlos University. She has taught at various Spanish
universities, including the University of Cádiz, the University of Huelva and the Open University of Catalonia, amongst
others. Internationally, she has been a visiting lecturer at the University of California, Berkeley; Glasgow Caledonian
University; the University of Madeira; Mykolas Romeris University; and the Catholic University of Leuven. Founder of
IROCAMM – International Review of Communication and Marketing Mix
, she is currently a member of
the Advertising
Academy
and the IP of the SEJ624 research group:
International Research Of Advertising, Communication & Marketing
Mix
. In her professional career, she stands out as a founding partner of several companies and communication agencies,
in addition to her work in print and audiovisual media.
Universidad de Sevilla, España
[email protected]
ORCID:
0000-0003-0252-3975
is content is published under Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License. International License CC BY-NC 4.0
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Disinformation and Credibility in the Digital Age: New Information Consumption Habits and their Impact on Organisations
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Recibido: 12/12/2025 - Aceptado: 27/02/2026 - En edición: 01/07/2026 - Publicado: 01/07/2026
Resumen:
Este estudio ofrece una visión revisada de la desinformación y sus efectos
en el ámbito organizacional, utilizando un enfoque metodológico mixto
que incluyó el método Delphi para evaluar la percepción de especialistas
de España y de Portugal. Los resultados muestran que el avance de las tec
-
nologías digitales facilita la expansión de la desinformación organizacio
-
nal y publicitaria, especialmente en redes sociales y plataformas digitales.
Las estrategias para combatirla suelen ser lentas y poco ecaces, lo que
afecta la credibilidad de las fuentes ociales y de los medios tradicionales.
El estudio subraya que la alfabetización mediática es fundamental para
fortalecer la capacidad crítica de la ciudadanía y que la desinformación
también puede convertirse en una oportunidad para las organizaciones
si se gestionan las reacciones de manera ética y responsable.
Palabras clave:
Alfabetización mediática; desinformación; ética; fact-checking;
organización; publicidad.
Received: 12/12/2025 - Accepted: 27/02/2026 - Early access: 01/07/2026 - Published: 01/07/2026
Abstract:
is study oers a revised perspective of disinformation and its
eects in the organisational sphere, using a mixed-methodological
approach that included the Delphi method to assess specialists’
perceptions in Spain and Portugal. e results show that advances
in digital technologies facilitate the spread of organisational and
advertising disinformation, especially on social media and digital
platforms. Strategies to combat it are often slow and ineective,
aecting the credibility of ocial sources and traditional media. e
study emphasises that media literacy is essential for strengthening
citizens’ critical thinking skills and that disinformation can also
become an opportunity for organisations if reactions are managed in
an ethical and responsible manner.
Keywords:
Advertising; disinformation; ethics; fact-checking; media literacy;
organisation.
Nuria Sánchez-Gey Valenzuela
. PhD in Communication and a degree in Journalism from the University of Seville. She
currently teaches at the Faculty of Communication at that university. Previously, she has taught at Pablo de Olavide
University, Nebrija University, the International University of Valencia (VIU), and the Andalusian School of Reporters,
amongst others. She has contributed to various academic books and has produced research articles and conference
papers, specialising in journalism, the media, television and disinformation. She is also the author of ‘
History and
Structure of Audiovisual Production
’, published by Pirámide editorial. Professionally, she has served as Director of
Communications at the José Manuel Lara Foundation, part of Grupo Planeta. She has also worked as a journalist for
over 15 years in regional and national audiovisual media. Her most recent roles have been as a news reporter for Canal
Sur TV and Telecinco News, and on the programme ‘Research Team’ on La Sexta.
Universidad de Sevilla, España
[email protected]
ORCID:
0000-0002-4891-9134
1. Introduction
1.1. State of the art
Disinformation poses a major threat to the health of democracies, institutional trust and decision-making, both individual and
collective. Its rapid spread across digital platforms distorts public agendas, amplies false narratives and makes it dicult to
distinguish between veried and misleading information, thereby aecting public deliberation (Lazer
et al.
, 2018). Evidence
suggests that fake news spreads faster than real news, particularly on social media (Catalina-García
et al.
, 2021; Vosoughi
et al.
,
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2018), due to a preference for novel content and algorithmic amplication dynamics (De Sola Pueyo, 2023). Interaction between
users and platforms reinforces pre-existing beliefs and polarises opinions (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Even interventions such
as content labelling can generate unintended eects, such as the implied truth eect
(Gomes-Gonçalves & Sánchez-Gey, 2025;
Catalina-García
et al.
, 2024; Pennycook
et al.
, 2020). is highlights the need for multidisciplinary approaches that integrate
regulation, media literacy and improvements in platform design (Morejón-Llamas, 2020).
Disinformation is part of our everyday lives and has gained considerable prominence due to its expansion and the intensive
use of information technologies and social media, which facilitate the circulation of false or manipulated content (Salaverría
et al.
, 2024). e development and accessibility of articial intelligence (AI) have fostered the use of disinformation across
various domains for diverse purposes, particularly in cybersecurity (Román-San-Miguel & Sánchez-Hunt, 2026), where a wide
range of free tools is available to the general public (National Cybersecurity Centre, 2023). However, in everyday life, it is quite
common to encounter situations involving disinformation (Fallis, 2015).
Since the late 20th century, large-scale disinformation campaigns have emerged on issues such as climate change, vaccines,
food, health, nuclear energy, immigration, pandemics and armed conicts (Valero & Oliveira, 2018; Notario Rocha & Cárdenas
Rica, 2020). is phenomenon has gained social and communicative signicance, with negative eects on both individuals and
organisations, including companies, brands and institutions (Pennycook
et al.
, 2020; Gomes-Gonçalves
et al.
, 2025). In this
context, having access to rigorous information and professional practices becomes essential in the digital age (Montemayor &
García Jiménez, 2021), particularly in the eld of organisational communication, where accuracy and truthfulness are key to
trust and credibility.
Corporate information and communication should be strategically structured, faithfully reecting the organisation’s
values and managing brand, identity and reputation in an integrated manner, aligned with transparency, credibility and
social responsibility (Reyes Hidalgo, 2023). is requirement is intensied by globalisation and digitalisation, which make
it essential to incorporate social media and digital platforms to optimise engagement with strategic audiences and internal
teams (Mattelart, 2007). e internal and external dimensions of communication are crucial, as they shape the relationship
between internal groups and external
stakeholders
(González-Fabre, 2015; Silva-Robles & Elías-Zambrano, 2011). Although
the generation of economic value remains central, corporate communication increasingly incorporates the expectations of
employees, customers and local communities (Sendra-Duro, 2025).
ere are various forms of deception in corporate communication. Among the most common is fraud relating to products
or their marketing conditions, particularly when organisations maintain links with political actors who facilitate preferential
treatment or monopolistic positions. ere is also evidence of strategic alliances with stakeholders being concealed for
economic interests, as well as the manipulation of expectations to make people believe that a product satises exaggerated or
non-existent needs (González-Fabre, 2015). However, a negative reputation may legitimately arise from public dissatisfaction
with the brand or internal services (Blikstein
et al.
, 2018).
Some advertisers fund disinformation content to increase their reach and visibility (Berthon
et al.
, 2018), although brands
may also be the target of external disinformation (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Peterson, 2019). Collaboration with inuencers,
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including fake inuencers, adds risks and complicates strategic relationships between advertisers and agencies (Sanz-Marcos
et al.
, 2021; Ju
et al.
, 2024; De Castro &Sousa, 2025).
Advertising disinformation has gained prominence in the contemporary communication ecosystem. e intensive use of
digital marketing (Guilbeault, 2018) and the promotion of false content by some advertisers (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017) allow
disinformation campaigns to undermine corporate reputation, achieving successful positioning and generating signicant
impacts on organisations and brands (Mills & Robson, 2019; Peterson, 2019; Xifra, 2020).
e proliferation of disinformation narratives aects both public and private institutions by challenging their narratives
and credibility frameworks through the systematic distortion of reality, fostering social mistrust and disrupting democratic
coexistence (Marchal González, 2023). Organisations are showing growing concern about the proliferation of false content and
its potential negative eects, particularly in the economic sphere (Christov, 2018). e rapid development of digital technologies
and the internet, coupled with the massive expansion of social media, has signicantly intensied disinformation (García-
Marín
et al.
, 2025; Reig Cruañes, 2025). In this context, the use of disinformation to inuence organisational reputation has
become more common, whether to undermine or boost competitors, or because of consumer dissatisfaction with the brand
or internal aspects of the organisation (Blikstein
et al.
, 2018).
Furthermore, in a manner that is ethically questionable and at odds with professional communication principles, certain
organisations resort to public relations strategies aimed at disseminating disinformation with the aim of persuading their
audiences (Castro-Martínez, 2025). is situation is particularly problematic because disinformation can have severe
consequences and pose a critical risk to companies and brands, which are forced to manage reputational crisis processes
more eectively (Mut Camacho & Rueda Lozano, 2022). Indeed, disinformation messages have the capacity to damage
corporate reputation for various reasons (such as nancial, political, social or psychological, among others), eroding trust and
organisational legitimacy (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017).
1.2. Objectives
e rapid advancement of digital technologies (including emerging developments such as deepfakes) has heightened
organisations’ vulnerability to disinformation, which can signicantly compromise their reputation (Gomes-Gonçalves, 2022;
Ferreira
et al.
, 2021; García-Ull, 2021; Galston, 2020; Westerlund, 2019). In this context, reputation constitutes a strategic risk
for companies, brands, institutions and other organisations, reinforcing the need to strengthen trust with their audiences
(Xifra, 2020). Both corporate social responsibility (CSR) and media responsibility (Sánchez-Gey, 2019) play a central role in
organisational behaviour and the governance of digital channels. Organisations and platform providers, search engines and
web browsers should make ethical commitments regarding moderation and transparency (Saeddine
et al.
, 2016; Liu
et al.
,
2021). However, the limited protability of these tasks hinders their systematic adoption, thereby facilitating the proliferation
of disinformation (Doncel-Martín
et al.
, 2023). However, CRS can contribute to rebuilding trust and promoting informed
engagement among the public (Estanyol
et al.
, 2025).
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In this context, the overall aim of this research is to ascertain expert perceptions of organisational disinformation (both
advertising and non-advertising), drawing on the judgements of specialists in Spain and Portugal, to develop a coherent
interpretative framework for understanding the nature, scope, and implications of the phenomenon in contemporary society.
e following specic objectives derive from this general objective:
To ascertain the degree of recognition, visibility and social problematisation of disinformation in the organisational context.
To highlight the consequences of disinformation for the strategic management of corporate communication.
To assess the perceived vulnerability of organisations and the extent to which communication professionals are prepared
to address scenarios of information manipulation.
To evaluate the role, scope and eectiveness of fact-checking platforms in mitigating the phenomenon.
To appraise the adequacy and relevance of the European and national regulatory framework regarding organisational
disinformation.
To consider the eectiveness of media literacy and educommunication programmes run by public institutions to strengthen
citizens’ informational resilience.
On this basis, the study is structured around the following research questions:
PI1.
What is the current situation and the level of recognition of the phenomenon of disinformation – whether advertising-
related or not – in contemporary society?
PI2.
To what extent can disinformation aecting organisations be regarded as a threat or an opportunity for organisational
communication management?
PI3.
In the context of informative manipulation and advertising disinformation, are organisations in a more vulnerable
position? Are communication managers prepared to address the challenges arising from these phenomena?
PI4.
What is the role and level of eectiveness of fact-checking platforms in curbing organisational disinformation?
PI5.
To what extent are European and national regulations sucient to regulate disinformation within organisations?
PI6.
Are the media literacy and educommunication programmes promoted by the authorities adequate for enhancing
citizens’ critical capacity in the response to disinformation?
2. Methodology
is research adopts a mixed-methods design that incorporates a two-phase Delphi study as its central technique: an
exploratory phase with open-ended questions and a second phase with closed-ended items for structured assessment.
e combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches allows for analytical pluralism, facilitates the triangulation of
perspectives, and contributes to a more robust and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under study.
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2.1. Delphi method: consultation with a panel of experts
After dening the central problem of this research (disinformation), criteria were established to select a panel of experts and
conduct a Delphi study, following Landeta (1999). is method is considered useful as an exploratory technique for theory
building in areas with limited or scattered evidence (Gaitán Moya & Piñuel Raigada, 1998). e Delphi method allows for the
controlled gathering of expert opinions, prioritising the identication of consensus and rening views through successive
iterations. It is frequently applied in the study of emerging phenomena, such as disinformation, as it facilitates theoretical
validation and contributes to research design. e iterations ensure greater consistency and depth in the results (
ibid.
).
Following the recommendations of Landeta (1999, 2006) for the selection of experts, we rst identied Spanish and Portuguese
universities in the EDMO – European Digital Media Observatory database (EDMO, 2023), an independent platform created
by the European Commission to enable fact-checkers, academic researchers and other relevant stakeholders to tackle the
problem of disinformation in Europe.
A search on the platform yielded results for ten Spanish and two Portuguese universities. All the institutions identied herein
constitute integral members of the
Iberian Digital Media Research and Fact-Checking Hub
(IBERIFIER) project, an observatory
dedicated to the study of digital media in Spain and Portugal, promoted by the European Commission and aliated with EDMO.
Table 1. Spanish and Portuguese universities participating in the IBERIFIER project
NAME OF UNIVERSITY
COUNTRY
1
Carlos III of Madrid University
Spain
2
CEU San Pablo University
Spain
3
ISCTE – Lisbon University Institute
Portugal
4
Miguel Hernández University
Spain
5
Polytechnic University of Madrid
Spain
6
Polytechnic University of Valencia
Spain
7
Rey Juan Carlos University
Spain
8
University of Aveiro
Portugal
9
University of Granada
Spain
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10
University of Navarra
Spain
11
University of Santiago de Compostela (USC)
Spain
12
University of Valencia
Spain
Source: Compiled by the authors (2025)
Subsequently, the academic sta and researchers responsible for the IBERIFIER project, coordinated by the University of
Navarra, were identied. Nine specialists from various academic institutions took part, eight of them in Spain and one in
Portugal. Given that the specialists exhibited markedly heterogeneous proles (a result of the diversity of subtopics related to
disinformation in which each participant conducts their research), the discourse generated and the ndings obtained were
signicantly enriched. To foster greater convergence in the assessments, a mixed methodological approach was adopted,
structured in two successive rounds: a inical round consisting of open-ended exploratory questions and a nal round based
on closed-ended items for structured evaluation.
e application of the Delphi Method in this study was designed with two distinct rounds to gather and structure the opinions
of specialists on disinformation and credibility in the digital age. In the rst round, open-ended questions were employed
to identify relevant dimensions, categories, and criteria based on the participants’ experience (7 March–24 April 2023). e
second round consisted of closed-ended questions, with a binary scale for most items and a specic scale for a particular item,
administered via an online form sent on 5 June 2023 and responded to until 5 July 2023. Although this sequence allowed for
the systematisation and prioritisation of aspects perceived as most relevant by the expert panel, it was not a classic Delphi
study aimed at building statistical consensus; consequently, measures such as the interquartile range or reduction in variation
between rounds were not calculated. e methodology, therefore, focuses on the identication and structuring of qualitative
and quantiable perceptions, rather than on reaching formal consensus. is methodological choice is justied as a hybrid
approach, aligned with recommendations for adapting the Delphi method for exploratory studies in communication and
organisations (Landeta, 2006; Rowe & Wright, 2001).
e questionnaire for the rst round consisted of fourteen open-ended questions and was designed in accordance with
Landeta’s recommendations (1999), so that each item was formulated clearly, concisely, and directly, with the aim of allowing
the experts maximum freedom of expression on the topics addressed. Once this phase was complete, the responses were
analysed, interpreted, systematised, and classied according to the criteria that guided the selection of the questionnaire
items. is procedure made it possible to verify that one of the fundamental premises of the Delphi method had been met:
consensus, understood as the convergence of opinions among the participants (Landeta, 2006).
Given that a high degree of consensus (95%) was achieved in the rst round, exceeding the usual threshold of 75% considered
in the literature to be an indicator of agreement among experts (Diamond
et al.
, 2014), it was decided to conduct two rounds
of questionnaires, a number which, according to Landeta (1999), is considered appropriate for this type of study. Analysis of
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the responses from the second round allowed us to verify compliance with the two essential criteria of the Delphi method:
consensus and stability of opinions (
ibid.
).
e following table shows, by topic, the questions posed to the participants, with the aim of compiling the views of the most
renowned academic experts in the eld of disinformation.
Table 2. Questions posed to the panel of experts on the subject under study
TOPIC ADDRESSED
QUESTIONS
Current situation and recognition of the
phenomenon
Q1. Do you believe that the phenomenon of disinformation is on the rise?
Q2. To what extent do people recognise fake news?
Q3. Do people easily recognise fake news containing advertising?
Disinformation aecting organisations:
reat or opportunity?
Q4. Can fake news be a threat to companies, brands or institutions?
Q5. What kind of threats can fake news pose?
Q6. Can fake news
be an opportunity for companies, brands or institutions?
Vulnerability of organisations
Q7. Can discussion forums increase the vulnerability of companies, brands or
institutions to fake news?
Advertising disinformation
Q8. Do you think the phenomenon of online advertising fake news is increasing?
Q9. To what extent can the appearance of advertising fake news on the ocial
websites of companies, brands, or institutions be harmful?
Q10. Do you consider that companies, brands or institutions encourage the
spread of fake news when they associate themselves with pages that disseminate
it?
Preparation of communications managers
Q11. Are organisational communications managers prepared to deal with fake
news (whether advertising-related or not)?
Fact-checking platforms
Q12. Are existing verication platforms sucient to tackle the challenges of
disinformation?
Adequacy of European and national regula
-
tions
Q13. Do you consider that current regulations, both European and those of Spain
and Portugal, are sucient to combat the phenomenon of disinformation?
Media literacy and educommunication:
eorts by the authorities
Q14. Do you consider the eorts made by the competent authorities in the eld
of media literacy and educommunication are sucient to combat fake news?
Source: Compiled by the authors (2025)
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e questionnaire was distributed with the following note: “e term
‘
fake news
’
is used to refer not only to false news, but
to all types of false content; that is, manipulated information or hoaxes, rumours spread to deceive, and advertising and
announcements containing false content, amongst others”. Although the term
‘fake
news’ was used in the questions, this study
prefers the term ‘disinformation content’ due to its broader conceptual scope.
3. Results
e results obtained through the application of the Delphi Method are presented organised by thematic categories, in
accordance with the questions posed to the experts who comprised the panel and the analysis of the responses corresponding
to the rst round. e contributions of the participants are quoted, identied by the letter “E” (for expert), followed by a
sequential number, as reected throughout this paper. Considering the consensus reached in the second round, an overall
analysis of the collective perspective of the experts’ voices is undertaken. It should be noted that only one of the questions
did not achieve full consensus; nevertheless, this issue still received a signicant majority of agreement. At this point, it is
worth noting that, although these are individual opinions, some of the participants speak in the royal plural. However, to
avoid any interpretative intervention, the comments of each participant are recorded faithfully and verbatim. us, although
the quotations are used to summarise the consensus, it is evident that the text in quotation marks represents an individual
opinion, regardless of whether it is in the royal plural or not (and is therefore either an individual consensus or an endorsement
by groups of experts).
3.1. Current situation and recognition of the phenomenon
e experts’ view on the rise of the phenomenon of disinformation is unanimous. And this increase is since “disinformation
in almost all its forms is inextricably linked to the rise of mass communication (…) and social media and internet-based
platforms have been an unprecedented breeding ground for catapulting its proliferation” [E1]. Furthermore, “the speed, wide
penetration and audience segmentation of social media are contributing to this rise” [E2].
e rise of this phenomenon is linked to the “increase in communication ows, automated devices, users… and it is bound to
increase because eorts to contain the multiple open channels are very slow and come too late” [E3].
Disinformation is growing exponentially because “robotics has made it possible for individuals, organisations and even
states to create and disseminate disinformation on a large scale” [E4] and “there are increasingly more tools to spread
disinformation” [E5].
Furthermore, “there is evidence that the phenomenon of disinformation is growing (…). is quantitative growth is evident,
for example, in the rise in false content veried by fact-checking organisations, which have observed a proliferation of hoaxes
linked to recent events such as COVID-19 or, more recently, various armed conicts, such as the war in Ukraine. As for the
eects, there is a growing awareness among the public regarding disinformation, as well as certain related phenomena, such
as the increasing discrediting of ocial sources and the media” [E5].
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Concerning recognising the phenomenon, experts believe that most people do not recognise disinformation content. For
this reason, it is important to highlight the role of media literacy and to continue promoting it “so that citizens can be better
prepared to combat disinformation messages” [E1].
Often, “disinformation goes unnoticed because we are poorly equipped to detect it, and awareness of the problem is only high
if we have had bad experiences” [E3].
“In fact, people’s ability to identify fake news
can vary signicantly depending on several factors, such as their level of education,
their prior knowledge of the subject in question, their biases and prejudices, and the source of the information or the channel
through which they receive the news” [E4].
But “there are various levels of fake news” and, as such, “various levels of media literacy or awareness of the issues” [E6]. e
fact is that “the ability to recognise fake news is closely linked to the convenience of such recognition” [E2] and “a signicant
proportion of the public do not have appropriate habits to help them identify false content and, in any case, to avoid sharing
it indiscriminately” [E5].
ere are studies showing that people do not recognise disinformation [E5, E7]. “Sometimes, even when fake news is
recognised, it is still shared. What is not recognised is the harm that can be caused by continuing to spread the fake news” [E8].
About recognising advertising disinformation content, experts believe that, just as people generally fail to identify
disinformation, recognition in the advertising sector is very limited. ere is also a noticeable lack of interest.
“Fake news with advertising content can be particularly dicult to identify, as it is often presented as misleading advertising.
Typically, may include false or exaggerated claims about the products or services being promoted, and are often presented in
a way designed to deceive the consumer and lead them to make a purchasing decision. Furthermore, some advertisements
may be designed to resemble news stories, with eye-catching headlines and persuasive language intended to grab the reader’s
attention. ese advertisements can be particularly dicult to identify, as they often appear on websites or social media
platforms that seem credible, but are in fact created by groups or individuals seeking to deceive the public” [E4].
“ere is a signicant lack of media literacy needed to properly distinguish between these concepts” [E5] and, at times, there is
a lack of interest on the part of the public: “people are suspicious, but if the information pleases them, they are not interested
in checking it” [E6].
Experts believe that platforms must be held accountable “so that they do not continue to give credence to content whose
falsehood has already been established, simply because they are paid to promote it” [E1].
3.2. Disinformation aecting organisations: reat or opportunity?
Experts agree that disinformation poses a threat to organisations: “In recent years, numerous hoaxes have been detected that
sought to discredit brands, companies and, in particular, institutions” [E6].
ey emphasise that the greatest threat is reputational: “ere is no doubt about it: it is a threat to democratic societies, and
all the ramications we can imagine, because it calls into question the very value of truth and, once we accept that, everything
becomes uncertainty (something which, in business terms, in particular, is not advisable)” [E1].
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“Fake news can damage a company’s reputation by spreading erroneous or misleading information about its products, services,
policies, or actions. If shared on social media, for example, false information can go viral quickly and damage the image of
the company or institution. Fake news can also undermine public trust in a brand or institution, which can have long-term
negative consequences for the business or organisation. A company’s or institution’s ability to detect and respond quickly to
fake news is also crucial to mitigating its potential impact” [E4].
As regards the nature of threats that disinformation content can pose, these are “of all kinds, but above all they aect the
reputation and prestige of those involved; for those who read and spread it, it leads to ignorance, scepticism about any news,
and a lack of engagement with current aairs. And, for the media, it leads to a lack of credibility and manipulation. It is a
problem for society, in one way or another” [E8].
e experts point out that “the main threat is inducing erroneous or harmful decisions for citizens” [E3]. But there are others:
“reputational risks, fraud, political polarisation and indoctrination” [E9], as well as “distrust in communication channels” [E2].
ey also highlight “distrust of institutions, threats to public health and the polarisation of society itself” [E7]. Furthermore,
they point out that “disinformation causes various types of social harm, such as ‘discrediting institutions, political polarisation
and hate speech, amongst others’” [E5].
ey also note that “the most common threats posed by fake news are:
Damaging reputation, as the spread of erroneous or misleading information about a person, company, brand or institution
can damage their reputation and cause long-term harm.
Putting people’s safety at risk (…) and seriously damaging the reputation of the company or institution.
To also be used to manipulate public opinion and inuence the outcomes of elections or referendums.
Increasing polarisation and public mistrust, which can have long-term negative consequences for social and political stability.
Contribute to perpetuating negative stereotypes and prejudices about certain social groups, which can contribute to
discrimination and inequality” [E4].
Finally, regarding the possibility that disinformation content could present an opportunity for organisations, the experts
acknowledge that it “can be a weapon to be used against opposing organisations, which should not be permitted” [E2]. “As
malpractice, it can become an opportunity, but only in the very short term” [E8], as it would be “an opportunity rooted in lies”
and with “the intention to deceive” [E6].
However, “as with any issue aecting ethics, (…) those who behave more ethically will tend to be perceived more positively by
the audiences they are targeting” [E1].
In some specic cases, “companies or brands can capitalise on the situation of fake news to their advantage”. In these cases, “it is
important that companies act ethically and responsibly, ensuring they do not spread further false information and verifying the
information before capitalising on the situation” [E4]. And, to this end, they can be “countered with scientic information” [E7].
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e fact is that “in the face of rising disinformation, every institution has the opportunity to become a credible source, thereby
strengthening its public reputation” [E5]. In fact, “every threat opens opportunities if the challenge is met with the right
response. is means acting before the ood of falsehoods wipes you o the map” [E3].
3.3. Vulnerability of organisations
Experts agree that discussion forums can increase the vulnerability of companies, brands, institutions and other organisations
to disinformation content.
ey understand that these “provide a platform for users to share information, including fake news and rumours, quickly and
widely. In discussion forums, fake news can spread rapidly through multiple users and be shared on other websites and social
media, increasing the likelihood that fake news will go viral and spread even further” [E4]. Indeed, the capacity to disseminate
disinformation is very great” [E5].
Experts understand that vulnerability may increase because “it is a narrative they do not control [E1]”. In forums, “false content
may appear” [E2], particularly because “users can easily hide behind anonymity or assume a false identity” [E5].
ey argue that “we must intervene in these forums with a series of measures to protect vulnerable areas” [E3].
3.4. Advertising disinformation
Regarding whether there has been an increase in online advertising disinformation, most panel participants note that they
lack specic data on the subject and are not specialists in advertising. Nevertheless, they agree that there has been an increase
in this type of content disseminated on the web.
e experts believe that “everything related to disinformation is on the rise” [E8], “especially clickbait” [E6].
ey state that “it is quite likely that the phenomenon of advertising fake news
disseminated online is on the rise, as the
use of social media and other online platforms for advertising has become increasingly common in recent years (…). Some
studies suggest that companies and advertisers often seek to reach specic audiences through targeted advertising, which
could increase the likelihood of fake news or misleading information being shared” [E4].
In this regard, all the experts agree on the signicant harm caused by the appearance of advertising fake news on organisations’
ocial websites. ey understand that it is highly damaging because it is synonymous with “loss of credibility” [E2/3/7/8] and
“lack of seriousness” [E8]. ese “trigger reputational crises, damage the brand or spread hoaxes” [E9], aecting “its reputation,
the privacy and security of its users, and its legal and nancial standing” [E4].
ey assert that “it will hinder eorts to regain trust” [E3] and lament: “it is terrible because that is a narrative they do control,
and if they use it as a platform to give voice to something that is not true, the reputational damage is much harder to reverse” [E1].
e choice to use advertising disinformation content is seen as a mistake: “When an organisation publishes content that turns
out to be false, it seriously damages its social reputation. It is a mistake that no organisation can aord” [E5].
ey explain that this approach, “harmful in all cases”, “while it may lead to a loss of credibility, can also be used to attract a
certain demographic or even undermine other organisations” [E2].
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erefore, they argue that “it is important for companies, brands or institutions to take eective measures to combat the spread
of fake news online and promote transparency and accountability in online advertising” [E4].
e experts’ view on organisations that associate themselves with websites spreading disinformation is that they implicitly
encourage or endorse the dissemination of disinformation.
ey believe that “endorsing in any way sites dedicated to spreading falsehoods makes the endorser an accomplice to those
hoaxes” [E5], because if “they associate themselves with these sites, they are collaborators” [E2].
ey recommend that organisations “should be careful about this, both from an ethical point of view and from a practical point
of view regarding their own reputation” [E1].
ey note that “it is important to bear in mind that not all companies, brands or institutions have the knowledge or resources
to verify the quality of the information sources with which they associate. It is very important that companies and institutions
are aware of the risks associated with the dissemination of fake news and that they take measures to avoid association with
websites or information sources that may spread disinformation” [E4].
3.5. Preparation of communications managers
e experts believe that “it is important for communications managers to be aware of the risks associated with fake news and
how this could aect the company’s reputation. ey should be prepared to identify and evaluate online information, as well
as to communicate eectively with the public if false news arises that could aect their company” [E4].
ey acknowledge that these professionals, who often nd themselves in a working environment characterised by signicant
job insecurity and unfavourable conditions [E6], “play a key role in the prevention and management of fake news, whether it
is advertising-related or not” [E4]. ey assert that, despite being “better prepared than the general public”, they suggest that
“they need to promote their education and awareness of the issue” [E4], as well as “further training because new forms of
disinformation and renewed strategies are emerging” [E3]. In other words: “media literacy can also be applied to professions
that work with material particularly sensitive to the impact of disinformation” [E1].
But “disinformation has too many tentacles to be ‘controlled’ without resorting to censorship. It is a very complicated issue to
resolve without crossing the lines of freedom of expression” [E8].
3.6. Fact-checking platforms
Most experts agree that existing fact-checking platforms are not sucient.
Both E2 and E4 explain that fact-checking platforms are a vital tool in the ght against disinformation. In fact, in the exact
words of E2, “fact-checking platforms are essential”, a point emphasised by E4 when stating that “this is almost a war, and
these platforms represent a ght against disinformation”. Along these lines, it is also stated that “when used properly and with
a commitment to service, they can help” [E1].
However, “unfortunately, their capabilities are limited, and the speed, volume and variety of disinformation make it impossible
for them to tackle this problem adequately” [E2].
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Experts emphasise that fact-checking platforms “constitute only one additional actor; however, their positive contribution
must be complemented by other domains, without which disinformation cannot be eectively addressed. ese domains are
essentially threefold: legislation, technology, and, above all, public education” [E5].
e experts recognise that “the ability of these platforms to reach a wide audience may be limited” [E4], as “the platforms
play a signicant role, but they are only one of the means of combating disinformation. We must strengthen the credibility of
professions in the eld of communication, we must regulate, and we must intervene using current tools” [E3].
“Ultimately, it is the judgment of the recipients that will prevent many of the eects sought by those who disseminate
disinformation for strategic purposes. at is why, (…) the key is media literacy” [E1].
ey suggest making greater use of semi-automated tools [E7] and ask: “Who oversees fact-checking organisations? Why
are certain news items veried whilst others go unnoticed? I believe there is still much to be done regarding fact-checking
organisations and that many lack the independence they should have. I believe more tools are needed for verication, and that
it should be the users themselves who manage these tools. In Spain, there are some examples of fact-checking organisations
that raise doubts, which means that they are all called into question. I do not believe that fact-checking organisations are the
solution. We are at a stage where we take journalistic malpractice for granted. It is important to train journalists to be rigorous,
competent and independent professionals” [E8].
3.7. Adequacy of European and national regulations
To obtain the experts’ views, a single question was posed regarding the potential adequacy of European and national
regulations. Once again, in the rst round of responses, no consensus was reached, although it was very close (67%).
Most participants believe that current regulations are insucient. ey therefore argue that “more comprehensive legislation
is needed, namely, legislation that properly classies the various forms of disinformation and establishes sanctions where
appropriate” [E5].
“Current regulations, both at European level and in countries such as Spain and Portugal, have taken signicant steps towards
combating the phenomenon of disinformation, but there is still much to be done” [E4].
ey state that “we have been working on this issue in Spain for over a year, but current regulations are not sucient to combat
disinformation. It is complicated due to the ne line between censorship, media control and freedom…” [E8].
erefore, the regulations “are an indispensable part of a broader process and undoubtedly help, but they will need to be
constantly updated” [E6].
e experts highlight the institutional commitment to combating disinformation: “For example, European institutions,
through
hubs
such as EDMO and other initiatives, have clearly demonstrated this commitment. ey have also done so by
funding projects managed by experts rather than politicians, and I believe that is important, as it is a way of ensuring that the
aim is truly social and not self-serving” [E1].
ey point out that “regulation is lagging. Action is being taken in many countries, but new measures must be adopted because
deregulation has had disastrous consequences” [E3].
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us, for some experts, “rather than tackling the problem from a legal perspective, it is important to make eorts towards
media literacy, education and communication” [E7] and “to better develop regulations to adapt them to current means of
dissemination, in particular the internet and social media” [E2].
3.8. Media literacy and educommunication: eorts by the authorities
All experts agree that, in the eld of media literacy and educommunication, eorts are also insucient, and that the relevant
authorities could therefore devote more resources to combating disinformation.
ey believe that “although regulations and codes of ethics exist in all countries to tackle the problem of fake news, there is still
much to be done in terms of media literacy and educommunication” [E4].
Although “eorts are being made by the relevant authorities”, often “insucient resources are allocated, both in terms of
personnel and funding”. It is often voluntary work motivated by a sense of commitment and professional ethics” [E7].
e truth is that, although “failings may stem from many areas, those in positions of authority within governments,
supranational bodies and social and political organisations bear greater responsibility. And the relevant authorities have not
risen to the challenge” [E3].
Experts point out that “in many countries, educational programmes do not teach students to critically evaluate the information
they consume from the media, including identifying fake news. erefore, it is necessary to continue investing in media literacy
and educommunication programmes that teach students and the public to be critical and to evaluate information objectively
and based on evidence” [E4].
As such, disinformation specialists consider that “in terms of media literacy, Spain is unfortunately lagging other countries
in our European neighbourhood (…). e interest shown by national and regional authorities in this issue leaves much to be
desired” [E5].
ey therefore argue that it is important “to ensure that educational plans are, on the one hand, long-term; and, on the other,
not dependent, once again, on the ideological whims of each legislature” [E1]. One solution could be to “introduce literacy
tools from a much earlier age than is currently the case, especially given that a few decades ago it was much easier to monitor
children’s consumption of content. Now it is much more dicult, so those children who are going to face an avalanche of
information must have the tools to be able to discern its value from a very early age” [E1].
Nevertheless, they lament that the issue is “so multifaceted that it is dicult to monitor disinformation without censoring or
controlling it”. e fact is that “eorts are beginning to be made, but there is still a long way to go before we see any light at the
end of the tunnel on this issue. But it is certainly true that when it comes to media literacy and educommunication, everything
is a problem. Trying to introduce changes into the education system is almost an impossible task. Civil society has put forward
numerous proposals for changes to combat disinformation, yet none have come to fruition due to all the red tape involved. Any
change one wishes to make takes years to be implemented, and I believe the authorities are not up to the task of tackling these
changes because of all that it entails” [E8].
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Of the results obtained in the second round, the questions on which absolute consensus (100%) was reached and the questions
where the degree of agreement is below 75% are particularly noteworthy:
Fig. 1. Questions where absolute consensus has been reached
made,
but
there
is
still
a
long
way
to
go
before
we
see
any
light
at
the
end
of
the
tunnel
on
this
issue.
But
it
is
certainly
true
that
when
it
comes
to
media
literacy
and
educommunication,
everything
is
a
problem.
Trying
to
introduce
changes
into
the
education
system
is
almost
an
impossible
task.
Civil
society
has
put
forward
numerous
proposals
for
changes
to
combat
disinformation,
yet
none
have
come
to
fruition
due
to
all
the
red
tape
involved.
Any
change
one
wishes
to
make
takes
years
to
be
implemented,
and
I
believe
the
authorities
are
not
up
to
the
task
of
tackling
these
changes
because
of
all
that
it
entails”
[E8].
Of
the
results
obtained
in
the
second
round,
the
questions
on
which
absolute
consensus
(100%)
was
reached
and
the
questions
where
the
degree
of
agreement
is
below
75%
are
particularly
noteworthy:
Fig.
1
–
Questions
where
absolute
consensus
has
been
reached
Source:
Own elaboration (202
5)
Fig.
2
–
Question
with
a
degree
of
agreement
of
less
than
75%
Source:
Own elaboration (202
5)
100%
Do people recognise fake
news containing
advertising?
Sí
No
100%
Do you consider the efforts made by the competent
authorities in the field of media literacy and
educommunication to be sufficient to combat
fakenews
?
Sí
No
62,5%
37,5%
Are the fake news an opportunity for companies, brands
or institutions?
SíNo
Source: Own elaboration (2025)
Fig. 2. Question with a degree of agreement of less than 75%
made,
but
there
is
still
a
long
way
to
go
before
we
see
any
light
at
the
end
of
the
tunnel
on
this
issue.
But
it
is
certainly
true
that
when
it
comes
to
media
literacy
and
educommunication,
everything
is
a
problem.
Trying
to
introduce
changes
into
the
education
system
is
almost
an
impossible
task.
Civil
society
has
put
forward
numerous
proposals
for
changes
to
combat
disinformation,
yet
none
have
come
to
fruition
due
to
all
the
red
tape
involved.
Any
change
one
wishes
to
make
takes
years
to
be
implemented,
and
I
believe
the
authorities
are
not
up
to
the
task
of
tackling
these
changes
because
of
all
that
it
entails”
[E8].
Of
the
results
obtained
in
the
second
round,
the
questions
on
which
absolute
consensus
(100%)
was
reached
and
the
questions
where
the
degree
of
agreement
is
below
75%
are
particularly
noteworthy:
Fig.
1
–
Questions
where
absolute
consensus
has
been
reached
Source:
Own elaboration (202
5)
Fig.
2
–
Question
with
a
degree
of
agreement
of
less
than
75%
Source:
Own elaboration (202
5)
100%
Do people recognise fake
news containing
advertising?
SíNo
100%
Do you consider the efforts made by the competent
authorities in the field of media literacy and
educommunication to be sufficient to combat
fakenews
?
SíNo
62,5%
37,5%
Are the fake news an opportunity for companies, brands
or institutions?
Sí
No
Source: Own elaboration (2025)
4. Discussion
e results allow us to assert that, according to the experts, the phenomenon of disinformation (whether advertising-related or
not) is set to increase, and most people are unable to eectively recognise disinformation content (PI 1). e expansion of the
media and the impact of social media and digital platforms have created an environment conducive to the rapid dissemination
of false content, due to their ability to target specic audiences and ensure the almost instantaneous dissemination of
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information. is proliferation is fuelled by the exponential growth of communication ows, automation and the use of
robotic technologies, as well as by the proven increase in false content detected by fact-checkers
and the lack of credibility
and mistrust towards ocial sources and social media. Given that most people are unable to eectively detect disinformation,
the commitment to media literacy remains important. e degree of recognition varies according to educational level, prior
knowledge, preconceptions and the credibility attributed to sources. Often, people identify false content but continue to share
it without realising the harm it may cause.
In the advertising sphere, recognition is even more limited. Advertising disinformation content is easily confused with reliable
information. e use of native advertising (that is, advertising integrated naturally into the format of the medium in which it
appears) is also common. For this reason, digital platforms must be held accountable so that they do not continue to promote
false content for nancial gain.
Experts agree that disinformation poses a serious threat to organisations, particularly in terms of reputation and public
trust (PI 2). e rapid spread of false or misleading information about products, services or policies exacerbates the loss
of credibility, leads to poor decision-making and fuels social and political polarisation. However, if organisations respond
ethically, swiftly and transparently, disinformation can become an opportunity to strengthen institutional communication,
consolidate reputation and demonstrate accountability to the public.
Furthermore, information manipulation and advertising disinformation increase organisational vulnerability (PI 3).
Discussion forums and targeted advertising facilitate the spread of rumours and misleading content that aect organisations’
reputation, public trust, and legal and nancial security. Proper management of these situations strengthens credibility, ethics
and institutional transparency.
As such, they warn that it is essential for those responsible for communication to be prepared to intervene strategically and
preventively, implementing measures that combat the organisation’s vulnerabilities and reinforce institutional credibility in
the face of the constant challenge of disinformation (PI 3).
Experts emphasise that fact-checking platforms play an important but insucient role in the ght against disinformation (PI
4). ey acknowledge their usefulness as a tool for detecting and correcting disinformation, provided they operate with rigour,
independence and a commitment to public service. However, they warn that their capacity is limited in the face of the speed,
volume and diversity of the disinformation circulating in digital environments, which prevents them from addressing the
problem in its entirety.
ey emphasise that fact-checkers
are just one actor within a system that requires a broader response, based on three
complementary pillars: eective legislation, technological development and media literacy. Furthermore, they point out that
their reach may be limited and that it is necessary to strengthen the credibility of journalism and professions in the eld of
communication, as well as to promote critical thinking among the public, since the judgment of the audience is key to curbing
the spread of disinformation.
Finally, some specialists question the independence and operating criteria of certain platforms, highlighting the need for
greater transparency and oversight of their operations. ey propose enhancing semi-automated tools and fostering users’
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own ability to verify content. In short, fact-checking platforms are useful, but they do not in themselves constitute the solution
to the problem, which requires coordinated, ethical and long-term educational action.
Most experts consider that current European and national regulations are insucient to eectively regulate the phenomenon
of organised disinformation (PI 5). Although they acknowledge signicant progress in the European Union and in countries
such as Spain and Portugal, they agree that more comprehensive and up-to-date legislation is needed, capable of adequately
classifying the dierent forms of disinformation and establishing clear penalties where appropriate. ey believe that
regulations still lag behind the digital reality and that the lack of regulation in some areas has had negative consequences.
e specialists emphasise that regulation must form part of a broader approach, combining legislation, constant updating,
and ongoing institutional commitment. ey highlight the positive role of European initiatives such as EDMO, which promote
projects managed by independent experts and geared towards the public good.
Finally, the experts agree that the media literacy and educommunication programmes promoted by the authorities are
insucient to strengthen citizens’ critical capacity in the face of disinformation (PI 6). ey believe that, although eorts are
being made by the competent authorities, insucient resources are being allocated, both in terms of human and nancial
resources. ey recognise that regulations and ethical codes exist, but institutional eorts are limited and lack adequate
human and nancial resources, often relying on the voluntary work of committed professionals.
As such, the authorities have not risen to the challenge, as in many countries, the education systems do not teach students to
critically evaluate information or identify fake news. As such, the ght against disinformation requires a genuine and sustained
commitment from the authorities and civil society, with long-term programmes free from ideological interests, which introduce
literacy tools from an early age and prepare children to cope with today’s information overload.
It is equally important to adapt regulations to new dissemination environments, particularly the internet and social media,
where disinformation spreads more rapidly and widely.
5. Conclusions
e results of the Delphi method enabled the consolidation of a coherent narrative, reecting the experts’ consensus view
on disinformation and summarising the challenges and opportunities identied. Disinformation is emerging as a growing
problem, driven by the expansion of social media, the automation of communication ows and the speed at which digital
information circulates.
In the advertising sector, online disinformation seriously aects the credibility of brands and institutions. Direct or indirect
association with websites that disseminate false content may imply complicity in questionable practices, meaning that digital
platforms must also take responsibility.
From an organisational perspective, disinformation poses a signicant threat to reputation, credibility and public trust,
causing reputational crises and eroding legitimacy. However, this threat can be turned into an opportunity if the organisation
acts with ethics, transparency and rigorous communication, reinforcing its role as a reliable source of information.
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Communications managers play a key role in managing and preventing disinformation. As such, it is important to ensure
ongoing and specic training to tackle new forms of information manipulation, without overstepping the boundaries of
freedom of expression.
Regarding fact-checking platforms, it should be noted that, whilst useful, they are insucient on their own to curb the scale of
the problem. ey must be complemented by robust legislative frameworks, advanced technological tools and a media-literate
public. ere is also a need to ensure their independence and transparency to avoid bias or social mistrust.
Most people lack sucient critical tools to recognise disinformation, both in general and in advertising, which reinforces the
urgency of strengthening media literacy and educommunication. Although there are initiatives by the authorities, resources
remain limited and eorts fragmented. More robust educational policies are needed (independent of ideological interests and
with a long-term focus) that incorporate media literacy from an early age and foster a critical and resilient citizenry capable
of resisting information manipulation.
Finally, it is important to note that European and national regulations are still insucient to tackle disinformation eectively.
Whilst progress and institutional commitments are evident, laws need to be continuously adapted to new digital dissemination
channels, seeking an appropriate balance between regulating the ow of information and protecting freedom of expression.
As a line of future research, it is suggested that further study be conducted into the impact of disinformation on specic
sectors, as well as into the evaluation of the eectiveness of media literacy and fact-checking strategies implemented in various
socio-cultural contexts. is approach would enable progress towards comprehensive and sustainable models for managing
disinformation, incorporating multidimensional and gender perspectives into the analysis of its eects and mitigation
strategies.
6. Acknowledgements
e authors wish to express their gratitude to all the experts who participated in the Delphi study, whose collaboration has
been fundamental to the development of this research.
7. Funding
is work has been carried out without recourse to any specic external funding, whether from public bodies or private entities.
Nor has recourse been made to non-prot organisations. e costs of the research have been borne entirely by the authors.
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8. Specic contributions by each author
First name
&
surname
Conception & design of the study
Sónia Gomes-Gonçalves, Gloria Jiménez-Marín &
Nuria Sánchez-Gey Valenzuela
Methodology
Sónia Gomes-Gonçalves, Gloria Jiménez-Marín &
Nuria Sánchez-Gey Valenzuela
Data collection & analysis
Sónia Gomes-Gonçalves, Gloria Jiménez-Marín &
Nuria Sánchez-Gey Valenzuela
Discussion & conclusions
Sónia Gomes-Gonçalves, Gloria Jiménez-Marín &
Nuria Sánchez-Gey Valenzuela
Writing, formatting, revision & approval of versions
Sónia Gomes-Gonçalves, Gloria Jiménez-Marín &
Nuria Sánchez-Gey Valenzuela
9. Conict of interest
e authors declare that they have no conict of interest.
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