Aphorismós, between the proverbial and the apophantic

Abstract

This article studies the uses of aphorismós and aphorízo in Plato and Aristotle. The aim is to show how the aphoristic is found in the heart of philosophical practice from its beginnings, in relation to its processes of specific and generic determination, to dialectical technique, to conceptual delimitation, to definition and to its character as an apophantic proposition. It shows how the proverbial always constituted the hypotext of philosophy, and how the works of classical philosophers soon became one of the supporting elements of many literary texts. Against the monadological conception of the aphorism, its plural and intertextual character is defended. Finally, in the light of Plato's and Aristotle's texts, the thesis is defended that the aphorism is the conclusion of an argument in which the premises have been omitted.